Nanobiotix S.A. (NBTX) Cash Flow Statement

The ratio has been highly unstable rather than indicative of a consistent earnings-quality regime: 0.30 in 2024Q4 (a $46.3M loss against only $13.7M of operating burn) versus 3.23 in 2025Q2 (a $5.4M loss against $17.4M of burn), implying that the reported loss is repeatedly reshaped by items that do not touch cash, most plausibly non-cash fair-value, impairment, or currency-related charges given that stock compensation alone was only $0 to $2.4M per quarter. For an investor, the recurring pattern of OCF diverging from net income by $10M or more in both directions means the headline loss is a weak proxy for funding requirements; the cash burn, not the reported loss, is the more reliable base for runway modeling. Notably, the 2025Q2 episode, where cash burn was more than triple the net loss, suggests that in some periods the income statement understates the true consumption of capital, which warrants closer review of the non-operating line items behind those quarters.

The trajectory shows a company whose cash burn has not been bent by the cost reductions reported elsewhere: operating outflow moved from roughly $5.8M–$19.6M per quarter through 2024 to $16.0M–$22.3M in the two most recent disclosed periods, even as research spending was reportedly cut. Two analytical caveats attach to the margin data: the reported FCF margins (−6.2% in 2026Q2, −5.5% in 2025Q4) are not internally consistent with the CapEx-to-revenue ratios for the same quarters, which imply revenue of only about $3–4M, and one quarter (2024Q4) shows a positive 85.4% FCF margin alongside negative free cash flow of $14.1M, indicating the margin series may be computed on a different or error-affected basis. Given that apparent inconsistency, I would anchor the FCF trajectory on the absolute outflow figures, which show no evidence of a self-funding inflection.

Absolute capex remains trivial relative to the operating burn, so the shift appears to reflect facility, manufacturing-readiness, or laboratory spending rather than a capital project large enough to change the cash profile, which is worth monitoring because such spending tends to be sticky once committed. The rising ratio is driven by both a tripling of spend and a collapsing revenue denominator, the latter of which implies the company is investing into a commercialization path that has not yet produced product revenue. Investors should treat the small capex base as a constraint, not a strength: depreciation of only about $0.7–0.8M per quarter means the asset base is negligible, and the replacement needs of any future manufacturing build-out are not yet visible in these figures.

The sign pattern has shifted decisively: working capital swung from a $4.2M source in 2021Q4 and a $2.6M source in 2024Q4 to consecutive outflows in the two most recent disclosed quarters, which suggests the cash conversion cycle has moved from a modest tailwind to a recurring headwind rather than a one-off timing item. In a business whose revenue is contract-driven, sustained working capital outflows are consistent with receivables being drawn down on older collaboration balances while payables are drawn against R&D obligations that are not generating offsetting collections, though the underlying detail is not provided in the data supplied. Because no balance sheet detail is available here, the durability of this drag cannot be confirmed, and investors should monitor whether the recent outflows reverse as any new partner payments are billed.

The deployment profile is effectively inactive: there is no evidence of shareholder return, and the acquisition line is immaterial, which means essentially 100% of the reported free cash outflow of roughly $142M over ten quarters has been absorbed by operations rather than by strategic investment or distribution. This is internally consistent for a clinical-stage asset, but it also implies that any capital deployment will first require external funding that is not visible in the supplied data, since financing inflows, debt, and cash balances are not disclosed here. The zero-buyback pattern removes one potential offset that peers with negative earnings sometimes offer, and it leaves valuation dependent on milestone timing rather than on demonstrated capital returns.