Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -189.2x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -2.8%. (2001–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $905M | $726M | $230M | $252M | $342M | $447M | $743M | $615M | $246M | $145M | $54M |
| Enterprise Value | $867M | $687M | $213M | $230M | $336M | $417M | $697M | $585M | $224M | $134M | $51M |
| P/E Ratio → | -189.23 | — | — | — | — | — | — | 77.86 | — | — | 39.80 |
| P/S Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 160.28 | — | 17.78 |
| P/B Ratio | 5.58 | 4.56 | 1.71 | 1.84 | 2.95 | 3.72 | 5.91 | 4.74 | 2.64 | 1.86 | 2.22 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 146.39 | — | 16.81 |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 42.09 |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 90.12 | — | — | 160.78 |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | -0.5% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| Operating Margin | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | -53.9% | 250.1% | 38.8% |
| Net Profit Margin | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | -53.6% | 306.5% | 34.8% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -2.8% | -2.8% | -2.8% | -4.7% | -6.9% | -5.4% | -5.3% | 5.3% | -1.0% | -9.2% | 4.4% |
| ROA | -2.8% | -2.8% | -2.8% | -4.7% | -6.7% | -5.3% | -5.3% | 5.2% | -0.9% | -9.1% | 4.4% |
| ROIC | -3.6% | -3.6% | -4.0% | -4.8% | -7.1% | -5.9% | -5.2% | -4.7% | -0.9% | -6.5% | 4.4% |
| ROCE | -3.9% | -3.9% | -4.5% | -5.7% | -8.0% | -5.4% | -4.8% | -4.8% | -1.0% | -7.5% | 5.0% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.24 | -0.13 | -0.16 | -0.05 | -0.24 | -0.37 | -0.23 | -0.23 | -0.14 | -0.12 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | -2.42 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | — | — | — | — | — | -48.94 | — | — | — | — | 162.38 |
Net cash position: cash ($39M) exceeds total debt ($0)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 34.54 | 34.54 | 18.43 | 18.61 | 3.23 | 8.58 | 43.35 | 36.10 | 18.62 | 17.81 | 49.78 |
| Quick Ratio | 34.54 | 34.54 | 18.43 | 18.61 | 3.47 | 8.58 | 43.35 | 36.10 | 18.62 | 17.81 | 49.78 |
| Cash Ratio | 34.26 | 34.26 | 18.50 | 18.29 | 2.78 | 7.63 | 42.56 | 29.96 | 18.41 | 17.67 | 37.40 |
| Asset Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.02 | -0.02 | 0.12 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 47.25 | -43.11 | 13.84 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 1.3% | — | — | 2.5% |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $181M | $172M | $168M | $157M | $156M | $153M | $151M | $134M | $122M | $67M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 25 years · Updated daily
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10-year return with dividends reinvested.
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying NEWP stock.
New Pacific Metals Corp.'s current P/E ratio is -189.2x. The historical average is 63.4x.
New Pacific Metals Corp.'s return on equity (ROE) is -2.8%. The historical average is -9.4%.
Based on historical data, New Pacific Metals Corp. is trading at a P/E of -189.2x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Bolivian permitting and funding dependence
Premium Book Value Priced on Jurisdiction
As reported in the supplied valuation multiples, NEWP trades at 6.93x book value while carrying no earnings, with P/E at -235.00, so the market is pricing the silver resource rather than current profitability.
With no revenue and negative earnings, conventional earnings and EV-based multiples cannot be computed, leaving price-to-book as the only usable anchor. A 6.93x book multiple is elevated against the broader silver peer set, where PAAS and AG trade near 2.3x and 2.4x respectively. This gap suggests the market assigns value to the mineral endowment and discovery optionality, but it may also reflect scarcity premiums that could compress if permitting in Bolivia stalls.
Debt-Free Structure Without Earnings Coverage
Based on EDBL-style reported figures, NEWP's debt-to-equity and interest coverage cannot be meaningfully computed across the ten quarters, as the supplied ratio data shows these metrics as unavailable rather than as proven low leverage.
The absence of reported debt ratios means leverage cannot be quantified from the supplied data, and conclusions about debt service comfort would require information not provided here. The balance sheet's equity-heavy structure is consistent with a company funded by share issuance rather than borrowing, which may reduce refinancing risk. Investors should monitor any future project debt or streaming arrangements, since development financing could change this profile quickly.
Liquidity Cushion Compresses From Peak
According to the supplied quarterly data, NEWP's current ratio fell from 41.39x in 2025Q2 to 23.51x in 2026Q1, a compression that tracks rising current liabilities relative to a cash base built through equity raises.
A current ratio above 20x signals ample near-term coverage, but the trend matters more than the level since it has roughly halved over four quarters. The cushion is derived from financing inflows rather than operating generation, so its durability depends on continued equity access. Under a severe stress scenario in which markets close, the current ratio offers limited insight into how long the roughly $36.8M cash position would sustain development spending.
Persistently Negative Returns on Invested Capital
Based on reported figures, NEWP's ROIC has remained between -0.8% and -1.2% across ten quarters while ROE sits near -0.5% to -1.1%, indicating no improvement in capital productivity over the window.
Returns on capital are negative because the company generates no operating income, so the ratios reflect exploration and overhead spending rather than deteriorating efficiency. The flat trajectory suggests capital is being deployed into mineral properties whose value will only be realized through future development. Measured against the peer group, where PAAS posts ROIC of 15.7% and AG 13.1%, the gap is structural and will persist until a mine enters production.
Lagging Peers on Every Earnings Metric
As reported in peer data, NEWP's negative ROE and absent margins contrast sharply with PAAS at 21.6% ROE and 27.0% net margin, a gap that reflects NEWP's pre-revenue stage rather than a competitive shortfall in operations.
The peer comparison is structurally asymmetric because the group consists of producers with cash-generating assets, while NEWP is a developer whose value rests on resource conversion. The more relevant comparison is against other developers on resource growth and jurisdiction, where the 'Bolivia discount' implied by the market may explain part of the valuation gap. Gaps in profitability are therefore structural and will narrow only if production commences.
Misapplied Earnings Multiples Obscure Developer Value
Based on reported figures, applying P/E to NEWP at -235.00 yields no meaningful signal, since the metric obscures the mineral resource base and cash runway that actually drive valuation for a pre-revenue developer.
Earnings-based ratios are most commonly misapplied to this business model because net losses are inflated by non-cash share-based compensation and expensed exploration, so the reported loss does not reflect true economic position. A better lens is cash burn relative to the $36.8M cash balance, combined with price-to-book and resource-based metrics such as market capitalization per ounce of silver equivalent. Investors should treat the counter-analysis as an inference that warrants further investigation rather than a proven valuation outcome.