Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 8.3x · EV/EBITDA 5.9x · ROE 19.9%. (2000–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $32.0B | $40.1B | $21.7B | $15.4B | $18.8B | $22.6B | $23.2B | $47.7B | $44.2B | $63.2B | $49.4B |
| Enterprise Value | $30.4B | $38.5B | $24.0B | $18.7B | $22.1B | $23.7B | $24.3B | $53.5B | $54.9B | $65.4B | $62.1B |
| P/E Ratio → | 8.29 | 10.17 | 9.49 | 9.05 | — | — | 10.98 | 32.38 | 13.93 | 26.46 | 20.73 |
| P/S Ratio | 1.15 | 1.45 | 2.66 | 1.29 | 2.15 | 0.85 | 0.64 | 0.51 | 1.57 | 0.73 | 0.56 |
| P/B Ratio | 1.53 | 1.88 | 1.16 | 0.86 | 1.11 | 1.18 | 1.05 | 2.43 | 2.01 | 2.90 | 3.37 |
| P/FCF | 14.75 | 18.48 | 6.18 | 19.57 | 22.39 | 93.47 | 9.52 | — | 20.62 | 57.20 | 29.79 |
| P/OCF | 14.07 | 17.64 | 6.01 | 18.53 | 21.52 | 81.37 | 9.30 | — | 19.65 | 52.41 | 24.21 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 1.38 | 2.94 | 1.56 | 2.52 | 0.89 | 0.67 | 0.57 | 1.95 | 0.76 | 0.70 |
| EV / EBITDA | 5.92 | 7.50 | 7.67 | 7.14 | — | 7.89 | 7.10 | 19.00 | 16.98 | 0.81 | 0.93 |
| EV / EBIT | 6.14 | 7.50 | 7.67 | 7.38 | — | 7.89 | 6.90 | 19.00 | 16.98 | 15.33 | 15.82 |
| EV / FCF | — | 17.71 | 6.83 | 23.73 | 26.28 | 97.89 | 9.95 | — | 25.62 | 59.20 | 37.45 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 235.2% | 100.0% | 22.5% | 97.6% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 80.9% |
| Operating Margin | 17.8% | 17.8% | 36.3% | 17.5% | -7.4% | 10.1% | 8.8% | 2.4% | 12.3% | 92.8% | 74.8% |
| Net Profit Margin | 14.3% | 14.3% | 28.1% | 14.2% | -11.5% | -7.7% | 5.9% | 0.8% | 11.2% | 2.8% | 2.7% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 19.9% | 19.9% | 12.5% | 9.8% | -5.6% | -9.9% | 10.2% | 3.8% | 14.4% | 13.1% | 14.0% |
| ROA | 2.0% | 2.0% | 1.3% | 1.0% | -0.6% | -0.6% | 0.4% | 0.1% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.4% |
| ROIC | 18.3% | 18.3% | 10.5% | 7.6% | -2.4% | 9.3% | 9.9% | 5.9% | 9.1% | 234.2% | 195.1% |
| ROCE | 2.5% | 2.5% | 1.7% | 1.3% | -0.4% | 0.8% | 0.7% | 0.4% | 0.5% | 12.9% | 11.5% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.27 | 0.30 | 0.43 | 0.41 | 0.42 | 0.74 | 0.77 | 0.88 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 1.18 | 1.18 | 1.51 | 1.86 | — | 2.74 | 2.65 | 2.93 | 5.01 | 0.21 | 0.19 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.08 | 0.12 | 0.18 | 0.19 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.29 | 0.49 | 0.10 | 0.87 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | -0.33 | -0.33 | 0.73 | 1.25 | — | 0.36 | 0.31 | 2.04 | 3.31 | 0.03 | 0.19 |
| Debt / FCF | — | -0.77 | 0.65 | 4.17 | 3.89 | 4.42 | 0.43 | — | 5.00 | 2.00 | 7.66 |
| Interest Coverage | 28.00 | 28.00 | 18.27 | 14.74 | -1.59 | 9.16 | 11.15 | 5.67 | 5.91 | 7.43 | 8.84 |
Net cash position: cash ($7.7B) exceeds total debt ($6.0B)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | — | — | — | — | 1.42 | 11.17 | 0.25 | — | 0.39 | 10.85 | 0.16 |
| Quick Ratio | — | — | — | — | 1.42 | 11.17 | 0.25 | — | 0.39 | 10.85 | 0.16 |
| Cash Ratio | — | — | — | — | 0.56 | 15.10 | 2.39 | — | 0.39 | 10.85 | 0.16 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.13 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.14 | 0.07 | 0.21 | 0.04 | 0.13 | 0.15 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 1.8% | 1.5% | 2.5% | 3.5% | 2.5% | 1.9% | 3.5% | 2.6% | 3.0% | 2.5% | 3.2% |
| Payout Ratio | 14.9% | 14.9% | 24.2% | 31.3% | — | — | 38.1% | 157.5% | 41.4% | 65.6% | 66.0% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 12.1% | 9.8% | 10.5% | 11.0% | — | — | 9.1% | 3.1% | 7.2% | 3.8% | 4.8% |
| FCF Yield | 6.8% | 5.4% | 16.2% | 5.1% | 4.5% | 1.1% | 10.5% | — | 4.9% | 1.7% | 3.4% |
| Buyback Yield | 3.9% | 3.1% | 4.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 5.7% | 4.6% | 6.5% | 3.5% | 2.5% | 1.9% | 3.5% | 2.6% | 3.0% | 2.5% | 3.2% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $1.3B | $1.4B | $687M | $684M | $657M | $649M | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.3B | $1.3B |
Includes 30+ ratios · 26 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying PUK stock.
Prudential plc's current P/E ratio is 8.3x. The historical average is 25.9x.
Prudential plc's current EV/EBITDA is 5.9x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 9.4x.
Prudential plc's return on equity (ROE) is 19.9%. The historical average is 10.5%.
Based on historical data, Prudential plc is trading at a P/E of 8.3x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Prudential plc's current dividend yield is 1.82% with a payout ratio of 14.9%.
Prudential plc has 100.0% gross margin and 17.8% operating margin. Operating margin between 10-20% is typical for established companies.
Prudential plc's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 1.2x, indicating moderate leverage. A ratio below 2x is generally considered financially healthy.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Mainland visitor sales slowdown
Cheap Earnings, Full Book Value
At a trailing P/E of 8.18 against a P/B of 1.52, the market appears to price Prudential at a discount to Asian life peers such as AIA and Manulife while anchoring on book value rather than depressed current earnings.
The gap between the trailing P/E of 8.18 and the forward P/E of 10.50 suggests the market expects earnings to normalize upward, which would be consistent with reported ROE of 17.1% sustaining above the 12-14% range seen at most listed life peers. However, the P/B of 1.52 sits below Manulife at 1.97 and Sun Life at 2.49 despite a higher reported ROE, so the discount may reflect governance, geographic and accounting complexity rather than underwriting franchise quality per se. The historical P/B series in the ratio table (11.89 to 16.33) is inconsistent with the quoted 1.52 figure and should be verified before anchoring any trend inference on it.
Single-Quarter Underwriting Profit
The only disclosed combined ratio of 92.1% in Q2 2026 implies underwriting profitability, with a loss ratio of 29.4% and an expense ratio of 62.7% that compares favorably with the 78.9% expense ratio recorded in Q4 2025.
A sub-100% combined ratio is directionally positive, but for a life insurer the loss ratio of 29.4% should not be read as an analog of P&C combined-ratio economics, since life profitability is concentrated in investment spreads and contractual service margins rather than annual claims cycles. The swing in the expense ratio from 78.9% to 62.7% across adjacent reporting periods suggests either meaningful acquisition-cost normalization or an accounting presentation shift under IFRS 17, both of which warrant confirmation before extrapolating the trend. With no combined ratio disclosed in nine of the ten quarters reviewed, the sustainability of this level of underwriting profitability remains unverified.
Returns Volatile Beneath Headline ROE
Reported ROE has ranged from -7.0% in Q2 2022 to 11.9% in Q4 2024, then to 5.2% in Q2 2026, an inconsistency that sits awkwardly beside the 17.1% trailing ROE cited in current valuation materials.
The wide dispersion in quarterly ROE, combined with the absence of investment income data across all ten periods, means the contribution of underwriting profit versus investment yield on float cannot be decomposed from the disclosed figures, which is precisely the split that drives life insurer return generation. Interest coverage has swung from 3.28x to 125.26x to 13.35x in the latest quarter, a volatility that appears inconsistent with a stable earnings stream and should be probed against the underlying reported periods. Analysts should therefore treat the headline 17.1% ROE as an aggregate figure whose periodization is not evident in the quarterly data provided.
Conservative Debt, Opaque Premium Leverage
Debt-to-equity has compressed from 0.43x in Q4 2021 to 0.26x in Q2 2026, and while premium-to-surplus is not disclosed in the provided data, the debt ratio itself implies a conservatively leveraged balance sheet for an Asia-focused life insurer.
The progressive decline in debt-to-equity alongside interest coverage of 13.35x suggests corporate financial leverage has been reduced even as total assets expanded to $223.7 billion, though liabilities still represent roughly 90.8% of the balance sheet, leaving equity of $19.8 billion as the thin ultimate buffer against policyholder obligations. Premium-to-surplus, the conventional underwriting leverage metric for insurers, is unavailable in the supplied data, so the capacity of the franchise to write additional premium against its capital base cannot be assessed directly. Investors should treat the low reported corporate debt-to-equity ratio cautiously, since it excludes the policyholder liabilities that constitute the true leverage of a life insurer.
Discount to Peers on Cheap Earnings
Against a peer group trading at P/E ratios between 11.1x and 19.7x and P/B multiples of 1.12x to 2.49x, Prudential's 8.18x earnings multiple and 1.52x book multiple suggest the market applies a discount despite its reported 17.1% ROE.
Prudential screens as the cheapest large-cap name in this comparison on earnings multiples while delivering the highest reported ROE in the group, which may indicate the market discounts the durability of that return given the geographic concentration and capital-control sensitivities disclosed elsewhere in the data. Its debt-to-equity of 0.26x is the most conservative alongside Manulife at 0.28x, materially below Sun Life at 0.74x and MetLife at 0.70x, supporting a view that balance sheet risk is not the source of the valuation gap. The premium-to-peer P/E discount may instead reflect earnings volatility, as evidenced by the negative trailing P/E at Equitable and the missing investment income disclosures, rather than an assessment of underwriting franchise quality.
Combined Ratio Overstated for Life Insurer
The combined ratio is the metric most commonly misapplied to Prudential, since a 92.1% reading with a 29.4% loss ratio reflects an IFRS 17 life accounting presentation rather than the spread income, persistency and new business value that determine actual profitability.
For a life insurer, the combined ratio obscures the central economic drivers: contractual service margin build, investment yield on policyholder funds and sales of protection versus savings products, none of which are captured by an annual loss-and-expense ratio. A better adjustment would be to track operating profit growth net of non-underwriting items, new business value and the change in contract service margin, while noting that the disclosed investment income series is entirely missing and therefore cannot support the yield-on-float component of return analysis. Relying on the single 92.1% combined ratio as an underwriting quality signal risks drawing a conclusion about profitability that the underlying life insurance economics do not support.