Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -89.1x · EV/EBITDA 14.4x · ROE -1.0%. (2007–2024 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $746M | $606M | $1.2B | $1.2B | $1.0B | $519M | $449M | $239M | $388M | $459M | $150M |
| Enterprise Value | $1.6B | $1.4B | $2.0B | $1.7B | $1.8B | $1.3B | $1.6B | $1.4B | $1.4B | $1.3B | $1.1B |
| P/E Ratio → | -89.12 | — | 8.46 | 2.96 | 3.45 | — | 5.45 | 2.26 | 22.61 | 24.72 | — |
| P/S Ratio | 0.16 | 0.13 | 0.24 | 0.18 | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.12 | 0.16 | 0.05 |
| P/B Ratio | 0.92 | 0.74 | 1.35 | 1.30 | 1.86 | 3.57 | 2.51 | 3.15 | — | — | — |
| P/FCF | 7.09 | 5.76 | 5.07 | 2.92 | — | 2.06 | 3.05 | 12.57 | — | 191.36 | 0.63 |
| P/OCF | 3.64 | 2.96 | 3.38 | 2.31 | 28.96 | 1.87 | 2.33 | 4.16 | — | 18.08 | 0.58 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.31 | 0.39 | 0.28 | 0.32 | 0.38 | 0.35 | 0.31 | 0.40 | 0.47 | 0.35 |
| EV / EBITDA | 14.39 | 13.10 | 6.82 | 2.74 | 3.01 | 11.06 | 5.77 | 7.13 | 8.63 | 7.64 | 7.36 |
| EV / EBIT | 49.82 | 41.07 | 8.58 | 3.04 | 4.15 | 18.73 | 8.08 | 6.34 | 12.59 | 10.02 | 11.42 |
| EV / FCF | — | 13.57 | 8.15 | 4.41 | — | 5.20 | 10.55 | 72.05 | — | 559.19 | 4.73 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 18.1% | 18.1% | 20.0% | 20.7% | 20.2% | 17.9% | 18.4% | 17.2% | 17.3% | 20.0% | 17.9% |
| Operating Margin | 0.7% | 0.7% | 4.5% | 9.2% | 9.6% | 1.9% | 4.7% | 3.2% | 3.3% | 4.7% | 3.4% |
| Net Profit Margin | -0.2% | -0.2% | 2.9% | 6.2% | 5.2% | -1.9% | 1.8% | 2.4% | 0.5% | 0.7% | -0.0% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -1.0% | -1.0% | 16.1% | 54.4% | 85.3% | -40.7% | 64.8% | 309.5% | — | — | — |
| ROA | -0.3% | -0.3% | 5.9% | 16.6% | 14.1% | -3.4% | 4.0% | 5.6% | 1.0% | 1.2% | -0.0% |
| ROIC | 1.4% | 1.4% | 10.9% | 30.8% | 35.9% | 4.4% | 12.7% | 9.6% | 9.2% | 12.0% | 8.6% |
| ROCE | 1.7% | 1.7% | 12.5% | 34.8% | 37.7% | 4.6% | 13.8% | 9.8% | 8.7% | 10.8% | 8.0% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 1.03 | 1.03 | 0.88 | 0.70 | 1.56 | 5.88 | 6.25 | 15.19 | — | — | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | 7.80 | 7.80 | 2.77 | 0.98 | 1.41 | 7.20 | 4.14 | 6.00 | 6.66 | 5.48 | 6.79 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 1.00 | 0.82 | 0.66 | 1.46 | 5.46 | 6.18 | 14.89 | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 7.54 | 7.54 | 2.58 | 0.92 | 1.33 | 6.69 | 4.10 | 5.88 | 6.16 | 5.02 | 6.38 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 7.82 | 3.08 | 1.48 | — | 3.15 | 7.50 | 59.48 | — | 367.83 | 4.10 |
| Interest Coverage | 0.73 | 0.73 | 6.57 | 17.43 | 10.69 | 0.85 | 2.26 | 1.40 | 1.21 | 1.48 | 1.13 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 2.08 | 2.08 | 2.18 | 2.33 | 2.12 | 2.09 | 2.60 | 2.48 | 2.74 | 3.00 | 3.04 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.90 | 0.90 | 0.95 | 1.04 | 1.01 | 0.95 | 1.09 | 1.07 | 1.21 | 1.31 | 1.28 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.09 | 0.06 | 0.07 | 0.12 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.19 | 0.24 | 0.20 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 1.89 | 1.99 | 2.71 | 2.40 | 1.92 | 2.23 | 2.11 | 1.97 | 1.83 | 2.04 |
| Inventory Turnover | 5.50 | 5.50 | 5.22 | 6.28 | 5.44 | 4.71 | 4.95 | 4.53 | 4.51 | 4.06 | 4.68 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 35.35 | 33.42 | 30.87 | 40.57 | 39.89 | 34.47 | 43.14 | 40.82 | 41.61 | 35.23 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 3.3% | 4.1% | 2.0% | 1.7% | 0.6% | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | 17.0% | 5.1% | 2.2% | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 | FY 2015 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | 11.8% | 33.7% | 29.0% | — | 18.3% | 44.3% | 4.4% | 4.0% | — |
| FCF Yield | 14.1% | 17.4% | 19.7% | 34.2% | — | 48.6% | 32.8% | 8.0% | — | 0.5% | 158.2% |
| Buyback Yield | 6.8% | 8.4% | 9.2% | 4.3% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 10.1% | 12.5% | 11.2% | 6.0% | 0.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $33M | $36M | $38M | $39M | $38M | $38M | $38M | $37M | $34M | $32M |
Cyclical margin and leverage
According to current market data, Ryerson trades at a negative trailing P/E of -89.12, while its forward P/E of 18.39 suggests that investors are pricing in a recovery that remains highly speculative given the company's recent inability to maintain positive net margins in a volatile industrial environment.
The valuation discount relative to peers like Reliance Steel & Aluminum appears structural, reflecting the market's skepticism toward Ryerson's lower operating margins and higher cyclical sensitivity. Investors should monitor whether the forward multiple is justified by a genuine turnaround in industrial demand or if it merely reflects overly optimistic analyst consensus regarding future metal spreads.
Based on reported financial statements, Ryerson's ROIC has decayed from 2.9% in 2023Q2 to a negligible -0.0% in 2025Q3, indicating that the company is currently failing to generate returns that exceed its cost of capital, thereby eroding shareholder value during this period of industrial demand contraction.
The consistent decline in ROIC suggests that the company's heavy investment in its 'Service Center of the Future' initiatives has yet to translate into meaningful operational leverage. This trend warrants further investigation into whether the capital-intensive nature of the business model is fundamentally incompatible with the current low-margin, high-volatility environment.
As reported in recent quarterly filings, Ryerson's cash conversion cycle has expanded to 226 days in 2025Q3, driven by a bloated inventory position of 258 days, which suggests that the company is struggling to manage its working capital efficiently amidst a cooling North American manufacturing sector.
The persistent elevation of days inventory outstanding relative to historical norms indicates that the company may be holding excess stock that risks obsolescence or write-downs if metal prices continue to soften. This inefficiency ties up critical liquidity, leaving the firm with limited flexibility to navigate cyclical troughs without increasing its reliance on external debt.
According to recent balance sheet disclosures, Ryerson's debt-to-equity ratio has crept upward to 1.07 in 2025Q3, signaling that the company's leverage profile is becoming increasingly strained as internal cash generation fails to cover capital requirements and debt service obligations in a high-interest rate environment.
The deterioration in interest coverage, which has turned negative at -0.10, suggests that the company's ability to service its debt from operating income is currently compromised. Investors should monitor whether management will be forced to prioritize debt reduction over necessary capital expenditures, potentially hindering the long-term modernization of their processing fleet.
Based on the company's cyclical nature, the trailing P/E ratio is a fundamentally flawed metric for Ryerson, as it obscures the massive earnings volatility caused by LIFO inventory accounting and the inherent cyclicality of metal spreads that define the company's true, albeit inconsistent, cash-generating capacity.
Analysts should instead prioritize EV/EBITDA or Price-to-Book ratios, which better account for the company's capital-intensive asset base and debt structure. Relying on P/E in this context risks misinterpreting temporary accounting-driven losses as permanent impairments of the business model, leading to potentially erroneous conclusions about the company's intrinsic value.
Includes 30+ ratios · 18 years · Updated daily
DCF models, multiple analysis, and analyst estimates.
10-year return with dividends reinvested.
See how regular investing compounds over time.
Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying RYI stock.
Ryerson Holding Corporation's current P/E ratio is -89.1x. The historical average is 10.0x.
Ryerson Holding Corporation's current EV/EBITDA is 14.4x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 7.7x.
Ryerson Holding Corporation's return on equity (ROE) is -1.0%. The historical average is 43.7%.
Based on historical data, Ryerson Holding Corporation is trading at a P/E of -89.1x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Ryerson Holding Corporation's current dividend yield is 3.27%.
Ryerson Holding Corporation has 18.1% gross margin and 0.7% operating margin.
Ryerson Holding Corporation's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 7.8x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.