Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 8.5x · EV/EBITDA 5.7x · ROE N/A. (1989–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2015 | FY 2014 | FY 2012 | FY 2011 | FY 2010 | FY 2009 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $7.6B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $8.5B | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | 8.48 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 0.50 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 1.07 | 1.29 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/FCF | 8.19 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | 7.17 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2015 | FY 2014 | FY 2012 | FY 2011 | FY 2010 | FY 2009 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | 5.67 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | 10.05 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2015 | FY 2014 | FY 2012 | FY 2011 | FY 2010 | FY 2009 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | — | — | 13.4% | 6.1% | 9.2% | 12.2% | 11.8% | 10.0% | 11.8% | 14.0% | 6.5% |
| Operating Margin | — | — | 7.9% | -0.4% | 6.9% | 5.5% | 6.2% | 3.9% | 5.5% | 9.0% | 0.6% |
| Net Profit Margin | — | — | 6.7% | 0.1% | 5.4% | 3.1% | 3.7% | 1.4% | 2.8% | 4.3% | -0.9% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2015 | FY 2014 | FY 2012 | FY 2011 | FY 2010 | FY 2009 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | — | — | 14.1% | 0.2% | 14.0% | 9.6% | 14.4% | 5.7% | 10.4% | 16.5% | -3.8% |
| ROA | — | — | 7.8% | 0.1% | 7.3% | 4.5% | 6.2% | 2.4% | 4.8% | 6.8% | -1.4% |
| ROIC | 8.2% | 8.2% | 10.0% | -0.4% | 10.5% | 8.9% | 11.5% | 7.5% | 10.5% | 15.5% | 0.9% |
| ROCE | 8.5% | 8.5% | 11.1% | -0.5% | 11.4% | 9.3% | 12.7% | 8.5% | 11.4% | 17.0% | 1.0% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2015 | FY 2014 | FY 2012 | FY 2011 | FY 2010 | FY 2009 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.34 | 0.34 | 0.39 | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.47 | 0.59 | 0.81 | 0.58 | 0.60 | 1.09 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 2.03 | 2.03 | 1.62 | 6.64 | 1.59 | 2.23 | 2.35 | 3.30 | 2.03 | 1.60 | 9.86 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.12 | 0.23 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.32 | 0.50 | 0.71 | 0.48 | 0.49 | 0.93 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 0.73 | 0.73 | 0.97 | 4.79 | 1.23 | 1.54 | 1.97 | 2.89 | 1.70 | 1.32 | 8.38 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 1.19 | 1.80 | 2.81 | 10.74 | 3.75 | 4.48 | — | 5.87 | 3.98 | 30.62 |
| Interest Coverage | 15.87 | 15.87 | 17.08 | -0.70 | 13.03 | 5.84 | 5.85 | 2.36 | 4.02 | 4.09 | 0.19 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2015 | FY 2014 | FY 2012 | FY 2011 | FY 2010 | FY 2009 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 2.97 | 2.97 | 2.46 | 2.01 | 2.14 | 2.42 | 2.55 | 2.03 | 2.90 | 2.72 | 2.79 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.63 | 1.63 | 1.05 | 0.97 | 1.01 | 1.06 | 1.05 | 0.69 | 1.08 | 1.07 | 1.23 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.88 | 0.88 | 0.55 | 0.28 | 0.21 | 0.46 | 0.30 | 0.18 | 0.29 | 0.31 | 0.38 |
| Asset Turnover | — | — | 1.28 | 1.10 | 1.17 | 1.46 | 1.48 | 1.71 | 1.76 | 1.60 | 1.45 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | 5.08 | 5.42 | 5.01 | 6.04 | 6.01 | 5.07 | 5.57 | 5.19 | 5.63 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | 14.40 | 14.39 | 17.03 | 19.21 | 20.98 | 18.31 | 17.41 | 21.23 | 20.25 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2015 | FY 2014 | FY 2012 | FY 2011 | FY 2010 | FY 2009 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 5.2% | 4.4% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | 30.2% | 1900.0% | 57.0% | 6.6% | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2015 | FY 2014 | FY 2012 | FY 2011 | FY 2010 | FY 2009 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 11.8% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | 12.2% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 5.2% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $0 | $380M | $393M | $380M | $380M | $380M | $146M | $164M | $167M | $157M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
Live VCP patterns, Cup & Handle overlays, support/resistance, and AI trade plans.
High-probability breakout stocks crossing their pivot across 5 pattern engines.
DCF models, multiple analysis, and analyst estimates.
10-year return with dividends reinvested.
Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying SFD stock.
Smithfield Foods, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is 8.5x. This places it at the 50th percentile of its historical range.
Smithfield Foods, Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 5.7x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA.
Based on historical data, Smithfield Foods, Inc. is trading at a P/E of 8.5x. This is at the 50th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Smithfield Foods, Inc.'s current dividend yield is 5.22%.
Smithfield Foods, Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 2.0x, indicating moderate leverage. A ratio between 2-4x is manageable but warrants monitoring.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Feed cost compression on shrinking margins
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Processing Overhead Amplifies Margin Loss
Gross margin has compressed to 9.1% in 2026Q3 from 14.2% a year earlier, with operating margin falling to 3.7% from 10.4%, according to Smithfield's quarterly filings, indicating that fixed processing overhead is amplifying a roughly one-third decline in gross profit.
The roughly twofold amplification from gross to operating line implies that SG&A and plant-level fixed costs were held nearly flat while gross profit fell, consistent with the prior finding that a fixed-cost base sits on top of a commodity-exposed top line. The 2.6% net margin in 2026Q3 compares with an 8.8% print in 2024Q3, and because the decline appears driven by feed and livestock price spreads rather than mix, the branded packaged-meats business may be masking a structurally weaker fresh pork and hog production complex. Investors should treat the 13.45% structural gross margin cited for the group as an average across a cycle that has apparently turned against the company, rather than a stable run-rate.
Returns Fall Below Cost of Capital
ROIC has decayed from a 4.1% peak in 2025Q4 to 1.1% in 2026Q3, per Smithfield's reported ratios, and ROE has mirrored the slide to 1.2%, a level that appears insufficient to cover an estimated cost of capital and suggests returns are being destroyed rather than compounded.
The decomposition indicates the decay is margin-driven rather than efficiency-driven alone: ROA fell from 2.8% to 0.7% while asset turnover slipped only from 0.36 to 0.28, meaning the majority of the return loss comes from the income statement, not the balance sheet. This matters because the balance sheet shows retained earnings accumulating to roughly $4.0B against a nearly static PPE base of $3.5-3.6B, implying accumulated capital is not being recycled into higher-returning assets. If 2026Q3's 1.1% ROIC persists even two more quarters, the cumulative effect would make the $2.6B debt load and 5.5% dividend yield harder to justify from internally generated returns, a dynamic that warrants monitoring into the next reporting cycle.
Inventory Build Extends Cash Cycle
The cash conversion cycle has stretched to 82 days from 64 in 2025Q4, based on Smithfield's quarterly working-capital data, driven mostly by days inventory rising to 72 from 60 while payables shortened to 16 days, implying inventory is being built as demand softens.
Simultaneous lengthening of DSO (22 to 27 days) and DPO compression (18 to 16 days) suggests weaker leverage over both customers and suppliers, which is atypical for a processor of Smithfield's scale and may indicate loosening terms to protect volume in a contracting revenue environment. Asset turnover of 0.28 in 2026Q3 against 0.36 in 2025Q4 confirms that each dollar of the enlarged $12.2B asset base is now producing materially less revenue, and given that working capital release masked the cash conversion story, this cycle lengthening may further pressure FCF if the inventory is eventually sold at the current 9.1% gross margin. The earlier observation that working capital swung nearly $930M within one fiscal year means these ratios should be read as range-bound noise around a livestock cycle, but the direction of travel across two consecutive quarters warrants investigation.
Earnings Thinning, Not Debt Growing
Debt-to-equity held near 0.36 with borrowings of roughly $2.6 billion, yet D/EBITDA has jumped to 20.4x from 4.56x at 2025Q4 and interest coverage has more than halved to 21.2x, according to recent quarterly filings, suggesting the cushion is thinning from the earnings side rather than new leverage.
The static debt/equity ratio of 0.33-0.40 across all reported quarters means there is no evidence of covenant stress or refinancing risk in the traditional sense; the deterioration in leverage metrics is entirely a function of an EBITDA base that has compressed with the margin cycle. Coverage at 21.2x remains generous in absolute terms, but the trajectory from 50.25x at 2025Q4 to 21.17x implies that one more quarter of 2026Q3-level profitability could push the ratio into the low teens, where market attention typically turns to the balance sheet regardless of absolute headroom. Given that dividend distributions consumed roughly 86% of cumulative free cash flow over the last ten quarters, the company may have limited flexibility to both service debt and defend the payout if EBITDA stays near current levels.
Cheap Multiple Prices Peak Earnings
Smithfield trades at 7.3x trailing earnings and 4.97x EV/EBITDA versus Hormel's 23.99x and Tyson's 40.99x, based on current market data, yet the 5.5% yield and 1.02x book multiple may simply discount earnings that the latest quarter suggests are not reproducible.
The forward P/E of 8.45x sits above the trailing 7.30x, which conventionally implies expected earnings decline — consistent with the -8.3% revenue print and 3.7% operating margin at 2026Q3 rather than the consensus $0.26 EPS assumption. Against Pilgrim's Pride at 5.97x P/E and 4.42x EV/EBITDA, Smithfield is not the cheapest name in integrated protein, and the modest premium may reflect the bioscience segment and branded portfolio rather than any view on the core cycle. The decision to skip forward guidance at the October 2026 report removes the anchor that would otherwise let an analyst test whether the current multiple reflects trough or mid-cycle economics, so the discount to Hormel should be treated as justified caution rather than automatic mispricing.
Why Trailing P/E Misleads on SFD
The P/E is the ratio most often misapplied here: at 7.3x it reads as deep value, but cyclically peaky meat-processing earnings and biological-asset fair-value swings mean the multiple may reflect a crest rather than normalized power, where EV/EBITDA through the cycle is more reliable.
For a vertically integrated protein processor whose earnings swing with the hog-to-corn ratio and feed complex, a low trailing P/E is the classic signature of a cycle top, not a bargain — the same dynamic that produced Tyson's absurd 40.99x when its earnings troughed. A more informative frame is the 1.02x price-to-book against a retained-earnings base of $4.0B that has not been redeployed into productive assets, which raises the question of whether book value itself reflects earning power. Analysts should instead anchor on normalized EV/EBITDA against a through-cycle EBITDA and cross-check against intercompany transfer pricing with WH Group and biological-asset valuation movements, since headline net margin of 2.6% to 6.5% may not cleanly separate operational performance from accounting treatment.