Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -985.0x · EV/EBITDA 4.2x · ROE 8.1%. (2020–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $1.8B | $3.0B | $3.6B | $5.6B | $4.6B | $6.0B | $3.5B |
| Enterprise Value | $4.6B | $5.9B | $8.5B | $10.8B | $10.1B | $12.3B | $11.0B |
| P/E Ratio → | -985.00 | — | 9.29 | 35.60 | 16.55 | 90.34 | — |
| P/S Ratio | 0.72 | 1.21 | 1.43 | 2.20 | 1.78 | 1.46 | 1.11 |
| P/B Ratio | 1.22 | 1.92 | 1.75 | 2.85 | 2.33 | 3.03 | 2.22 |
| P/FCF | — | — | 4.09 | 6.23 | 6.26 | 8.08 | 5.68 |
| P/OCF | — | — | 3.50 | 5.35 | 5.13 | 6.11 | 4.01 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 2.33 | 3.38 | 4.28 | 3.87 | 3.00 | 3.52 |
| EV / EBITDA | 4.18 | 5.31 | 7.50 | 9.18 | 8.61 | 8.58 | 13.64 |
| EV / EBIT | 5.23 | 8.86 | 11.55 | 15.37 | 10.09 | 13.86 | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | 9.63 | 12.13 | 13.64 | 16.56 | 17.95 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 50.5% | 50.5% | 53.1% | 54.3% | 46.1% | 47.9% | 36.5% |
| Operating Margin | 35.1% | 35.1% | 29.0% | 30.3% | 28.8% | 22.1% | 7.6% |
| Net Profit Margin | 5.9% | 5.9% | 13.9% | 6.2% | 10.6% | 11.8% | -28.8% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 8.1% | 8.1% | 17.3% | 7.9% | 13.9% | 27.3% | -57.5% |
| ROA | 1.5% | 1.5% | 3.4% | 1.5% | 2.5% | 4.0% | -6.9% |
| ROIC | 11.7% | 11.7% | 7.7% | 7.8% | 7.2% | 7.8% | 2.0% |
| ROCE | 12.9% | 12.9% | 8.9% | 8.8% | 8.3% | 9.1% | 2.3% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 2.67 | 2.67 | 2.65 | 2.96 | 3.05 | 3.48 | 5.51 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 3.85 | 3.85 | 4.84 | 4.89 | 5.16 | 4.81 | 10.70 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 1.76 | 2.37 | 2.70 | 2.75 | 3.18 | 4.80 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 2.54 | 2.54 | 4.32 | 4.46 | 4.66 | 4.39 | 9.32 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | 5.54 | 5.90 | 7.38 | 8.48 | 12.27 |
| Interest Coverage | 3.26 | 3.26 | 3.43 | 3.25 | 4.45 | 2.49 | -1.03 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.76 | 0.76 | 2.29 | 1.26 | 1.15 | 1.30 | 1.32 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.72 | 0.72 | 2.25 | 1.19 | 1.01 | 1.20 | 1.25 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.47 | 0.47 | 0.22 | 0.30 | 0.32 | 0.31 | 0.42 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.27 | 0.24 | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.36 | 0.24 |
| Inventory Turnover | 10.72 | 10.72 | 10.43 | 10.52 | 5.51 | 11.64 | 11.70 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 76.46 | 71.05 | 66.10 | 144.90 | 123.90 | 144.26 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 39.7% | 25.2% | 4.5% | 2.9% | 3.5% | 0.7% | 1.2% |
| Payout Ratio | 523.8% | 523.8% | 46.3% | 102.6% | 58.5% | 8.5% | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | 10.8% | 2.8% | 6.0% | 1.1% | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | 24.5% | 16.0% | 16.0% | 12.4% | 17.6% |
| Buyback Yield | 15.0% | 8.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 2.5% | 0.7% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 54.7% | 34.1% | 4.5% | 2.9% | 6.0% | 1.4% | 1.2% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $197M | $204M | $203M | $203M | $207M | $205M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 6 years · Updated daily
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10-year return with dividends reinvested.
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying BRSL stock.
Brightstar Lottery PLC's current P/E ratio is -985.0x. The historical average is 37.9x.
Brightstar Lottery PLC's current EV/EBITDA is 4.2x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 8.8x.
Brightstar Lottery PLC's return on equity (ROE) is 8.1%. The historical average is 2.8%.
Based on historical data, Brightstar Lottery PLC is trading at a P/E of -985.0x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Brightstar Lottery PLC's current dividend yield is 39.68% with a payout ratio of 523.8%.
Brightstar Lottery PLC has 50.5% gross margin and 35.1% operating margin. Operating margin above 20% indicates strong pricing power and cost efficiency.
Brightstar Lottery PLC's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 3.9x, indicating high leverage. A ratio between 2-4x is manageable but warrants monitoring.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Concession renewal and integration
Margin Volatility Masks Underlying Leverage
Gross margin swung from 51.2% to 37.6% over the past year, while operating margin peaked at 35.0% in 2025Q4, indicating prize payout variability and fixed-cost leverage. According to quarterly data, net margin remains thin at 5.7%.
The wide swings in gross margin, from 37.6% to 51.2%, reflect the inherent unpredictability of prize payouts and regulatory costs, which are largely outside management's control. Operating margin's peak of 35.0% in 2025Q4 suggests that when revenue spikes, fixed costs are well covered, but the latest quarter's 20.7% shows that this leverage is inconsistent. The persistent gap between operating and net margins, with net margin averaging around 6%, points to significant non-operating charges, likely amortization of concession rights and interest expense, which depress bottom-line profitability despite strong operational performance.
ROIC Stagnant Despite Scale Expansion
ROIC has remained below 4.2% over the last ten quarters, with the latest at 1.7%, despite the UK license ramp. As reported in financial statements, this suggests that the capital invested in new concessions is not yet generating adequate returns.
ROIC has been consistently low, ranging from 1.2% to 4.2%, indicating that the company is not compounding returns on its invested capital. The modest ROE of 8.1% and ROA of 0.4% further underscore that the asset base, heavily weighted toward goodwill and intangibles, is not translating into shareholder value creation. The flat revenue growth and high capital expenditure, with CapEx/Revenue rising to 20.9%, suggest that the UK license ramp is consuming capital without yet delivering proportional returns, warranting close monitoring of future margin and efficiency improvements.
Negative CCC Masks Working Capital Strain
The cash conversion cycle has been consistently negative, averaging -83 days, driven by DPO of 208 days versus DSO of 87 days. Based on reported figures, this indicates the company is using supplier financing, but the recent cash flow swings suggest underlying strain.
The negative CCC, with DPO exceeding DSO by over 100 days, suggests that BRSL is effectively using its suppliers and partners as a source of financing, which is common in lottery operations where prize payouts and retailer commissions are deferred. However, the extreme volatility in working capital changes, from -$715.5M to +$120M, indicates that this efficiency is not stable and may be driven by timing of large payouts. The recent deterioration in cash flow, with operating cash flow turning negative, suggests that the working capital advantage is not sufficient to offset the heavy investment phase, and investors should monitor whether the negative CCC persists as the UK license matures.
Reported Leverage Understates True Indebtedness
While the reported debt-to-equity is 2.19, the balance sheet shows total debt of $4.4B against equity of $846M, implying a true D/E of 5.2. According to financial statements, this discrepancy suggests off-balance-sheet liabilities or understated equity.
The reported D/E of 2.19 is misleading, as the actual debt-to-equity ratio based on total debt and equity is 5.2, indicating a highly leveraged balance sheet. Interest coverage has been volatile, falling to 0.80 in 2025Q2, which suggests that debt service is not consistently comfortable. The high leverage, combined with the capital-intensive nature of concession bids, implies that refinancing risk is elevated, especially in a higher-rate environment. Investors should scrutinize the discrepancy between reported and actual leverage, as it may indicate off-balance-sheet financing or recent equity reductions that are not fully captured in the headline ratio.
Liquidity Buffer Thinning Rapidly
The current ratio improved to 1.10 in 2026Q2, but cash has plummeted from $1.4B to $558M over the past year. As reported in the balance sheet, this suggests a shrinking cash cushion despite short-term asset coverage.
While the current ratio has recovered to 1.10, the sharp decline in cash from $1.4B to $558M indicates that the company's liquidity buffer is eroding. The quick ratio of 1.00 suggests that the company relies heavily on receivables and other short-term assets to cover liabilities, which may be less reliable in a stress scenario. Given the negative free cash flow in recent quarters, including -$531.8M in 2025Q3, the liquidity position appears vulnerable to further deterioration if cash generation does not improve. The company's ability to withstand a severe downturn or unexpected regulatory shock is questionable, given the thin cash reserves relative to the scale of operations.
EV/EBITDA Misleads on Concession Value
The EV/EBITDA of 4.38 appears attractively low, but it fails to account for the amortization of concession rights and the true cost of capital. Based on reported figures, this metric obscures the high leverage and capital intensity of the business.
EV/EBITDA is commonly used to value lottery operators, but for BRSL it is misleading because EBITDA excludes the significant amortization of concession rights, which is a real economic cost given the finite life of licenses. The low multiple of 4.38 may suggest undervaluation, but when adjusted for the high leverage (true D/E of 5.2) and the capital expenditure required to maintain concessions, the implied value is less compelling. A more appropriate metric would be EV/EBIT or EV/EBITDA minus maintenance capex, which would better reflect the cash-generative capacity of the business after accounting for the necessary reinvestment in licenses and technology.