Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 27.4x · EV/EBITDA 21.5x · ROE 19.8%. (1999–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $55.1B | $39.8B | $40.5B | $24.7B | $17.8B | $26.3B | $23.0B | $18.6B | $12.0B | $11.2B | $9.2B |
| Enterprise Value | $53.0B | $37.7B | $38.6B | $23.1B | $16.7B | $24.9B | $21.6B | $17.6B | $10.8B | $10.4B | $8.3B |
| P/E Ratio → | 27.41 | 23.92 | 28.68 | 19.16 | 18.31 | 24.27 | 23.15 | 19.55 | 17.30 | 16.19 | 17.96 |
| P/S Ratio | 6.98 | 5.49 | 6.43 | 4.72 | 3.67 | 5.28 | 5.48 | 4.96 | 3.59 | 3.64 | 3.04 |
| P/B Ratio | 6.16 | 4.43 | 5.16 | 3.52 | 2.87 | 4.30 | 4.16 | 3.89 | 2.89 | 2.96 | 2.69 |
| P/FCF | 39.27 | 29.19 | 32.69 | 20.90 | 32.87 | 37.40 | 24.23 | 32.21 | 15.83 | 22.09 | 15.08 |
| P/OCF | 33.72 | 24.36 | 28.28 | 17.94 | 22.60 | 25.96 | 20.23 | 26.66 | 13.07 | 17.01 | 13.01 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 5.20 | 6.13 | 4.42 | 3.43 | 4.99 | 5.15 | 4.70 | 3.23 | 3.35 | 2.76 |
| EV / EBITDA | 21.47 | 18.26 | 21.75 | 18.20 | 13.97 | 18.10 | 18.27 | 16.78 | 12.36 | 13.71 | 11.73 |
| EV / EBIT | 28.25 | 18.72 | 22.76 | 19.25 | 15.64 | 20.60 | 20.47 | 18.66 | 13.89 | 15.14 | 13.17 |
| EV / FCF | — | 27.67 | 31.15 | 19.56 | 30.72 | 35.37 | 22.77 | 30.52 | 14.24 | 20.34 | 13.69 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 58.7% | 58.7% | 58.7% | 57.5% | 57.7% | 58.0% | 59.3% | 59.5% | 59.1% | 57.8% | 55.6% |
| Operating Margin | 25.9% | 25.9% | 25.3% | 20.9% | 21.1% | 24.5% | 25.2% | 25.2% | 23.3% | 21.7% | 20.7% |
| Net Profit Margin | 23.0% | 23.0% | 22.4% | 24.7% | 20.0% | 21.7% | 23.7% | 25.3% | 20.7% | 22.5% | 16.9% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 19.8% | 19.8% | 19.0% | 19.5% | 15.8% | 18.6% | 19.3% | 21.3% | 17.4% | 19.2% | 15.1% |
| ROA | 16.1% | 16.1% | 15.5% | 15.8% | 12.5% | 14.5% | 15.0% | 16.5% | 13.4% | 14.6% | 11.3% |
| ROIC | 21.9% | 21.9% | 21.0% | 15.6% | 15.9% | 20.7% | 19.9% | 20.9% | 19.9% | 18.3% | 18.4% |
| ROCE | 21.6% | 21.6% | 20.7% | 15.8% | 15.9% | 19.9% | 19.2% | 19.7% | 18.0% | 16.9% | 16.9% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | — | — | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.05 | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.23 | -0.24 | -0.23 | -0.19 | -0.23 | -0.25 | -0.20 | -0.29 | -0.23 | -0.25 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | -1.01 | -1.01 | -1.08 | -1.24 | -0.98 | -1.04 | -1.17 | -0.93 | -1.37 | -1.18 | -1.19 |
| Debt / FCF | — | -1.53 | -1.55 | -1.34 | -2.15 | -2.03 | -1.46 | -1.69 | -1.58 | -1.75 | -1.39 |
| Interest Coverage | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Net cash position: cash ($2.3B) exceeds total debt ($196M)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 3.63 | 3.63 | 3.54 | 3.41 | 3.26 | 2.94 | 3.15 | 2.95 | 2.89 | 2.85 | 2.89 |
| Quick Ratio | 2.60 | 2.60 | 2.56 | 2.38 | 2.01 | 2.10 | 2.50 | 2.22 | 2.28 | 2.23 | 2.27 |
| Cash Ratio | 1.59 | 1.59 | 1.66 | 1.50 | 1.20 | 1.27 | 1.59 | 1.36 | 1.50 | 1.27 | 1.42 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.66 | 0.65 | 0.61 | 0.63 | 0.63 | 0.60 | 0.61 | 0.62 | 0.62 | 0.67 |
| Inventory Turnover | 1.69 | 1.69 | 1.76 | 1.65 | 1.36 | 1.70 | 2.24 | 2.02 | 2.43 | 2.52 | 2.76 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 63.12 | 57.00 | 56.91 | 49.33 | 61.78 | 74.06 | 68.65 | 62.13 | 69.86 | 63.73 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 1.2% | 1.7% | 1.4% | 2.3% | 3.8% | 1.9% | 2.0% | 2.2% | 2.5% | 3.4% | 5.2% |
| Payout Ratio | 39.9% | 39.9% | 40.6% | 43.3% | 69.8% | 45.4% | 45.4% | 43.8% | 42.7% | 55.1% | 94.3% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 3.6% | 4.2% | 3.5% | 5.2% | 5.5% | 4.1% | 4.3% | 5.1% | 5.8% | 6.2% | 5.6% |
| FCF Yield | 2.5% | 3.4% | 3.1% | 4.8% | 3.0% | 2.7% | 4.1% | 3.1% | 6.3% | 4.5% | 6.6% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.4% | 0.6% | 0.2% | 0.4% | 1.3% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.1% | 0.8% | 1.1% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 1.6% | 2.3% | 1.6% | 2.7% | 5.1% | 2.0% | 2.1% | 2.4% | 2.6% | 4.2% | 6.3% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $194M | $193M | $192M | $193M | $193M | $192M | $191M | $190M | $189M | $189M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 27 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying GRMN stock.
Garmin Ltd.'s current P/E ratio is 27.4x. The historical average is 20.0x. This places it at the 85th percentile of its historical range.
Garmin Ltd.'s current EV/EBITDA is 21.5x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 14.7x.
Garmin Ltd.'s return on equity (ROE) is 19.8%. The historical average is 23.2%.
Based on historical data, Garmin Ltd. is trading at a P/E of 27.4x. This is at the 85th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Garmin Ltd.'s current dividend yield is 1.20% with a payout ratio of 39.9%.
Garmin Ltd. has 58.7% gross margin and 25.9% operating margin. Operating margin above 20% indicates strong pricing power and cost efficiency.
Garmin Ltd.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 0.1x, indicating low leverage. A ratio below 2x is generally considered financially healthy.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Premium multiple versus modest capital returns
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Premium Multiple Prices Beyond Growth
At a 31.7x trailing P/E and 7.2x sales against revenue growth that has cooled to 12.2%, market pricing appears to embed sustained margin expansion rather than volume-led growth, with a PEG of 2.97 well above the 1.0 threshold typically associated with growth-at-reasonable-price.
The 26.7x forward P/E and 20.7x forward EV/EBITDA imply the market expects roughly mid-teens earnings growth to persist, which sits uncomfortably beside the deceleration from 24.1% to 12.2% top-line growth documented in the income statement analysis. The 38.6x P/FCF is notably higher than the earnings multiple, and given the cash conversion volatility flagged in cash flow work, investors should treat that figure as a weaker anchor than headline earnings. Relative to the peer set, GRMN is the only name combining positive earnings with premium multiples, so the valuation gap versus Fossil, Sonos and GoPro appears structural rather than cyclical — but it also leaves little tolerance for margin reversal.
Margin Expansion Structural, Not Cosmetic
According to recent SEC filings, Garmin's gross margin has climbed roughly 600 basis points to 63.3% while operating margin reached 30.8%, an 810 basis point gain over ten quarters that appears driven by mix and pricing rather than one-off cost relief.
The synchronized step-up in gross and operating margins from 2026Q1 onward, with R&D and SG&A as a share of revenue falling from about 34.7% to 32.3%, suggests genuine operating leverage rather than expense deferral — the most reliable indicator of true earning power here is operating margin, since net margin of 27.3% is flattered by Garmin's net cash interest income, a benefit that would shrink if the balance sheet ever re-levered. Compared with Sonos at 43.7% and GoPro at 33.6% gross margins, the premium is wide enough to imply either durable brand pricing power or exposure to premium end-markets that could soften first in a consumer downturn. The key judgment call is whether mix shift toward higher-margin categories can repeat; the prior income statement work already flagged that margin gains are increasingly compensating for slowing volume, which caps how far this can extrapolate.
Returns Trail the Multiple They Support
Based on EDBL's reported figures... quarterly ROIC of 6.3% and ROE of 5.8% in 2026Q3 translate to roughly 25% and 23% annualized respectively, but the equity return has moved only within a 4.2% to 6.1% quarterly band across ten quarters while the valuation multiple has expanded.
Decomposing the ROIC trend, the improvement from 4.1% in 2025Q1 to 6.3% in 2026Q3 appears almost entirely margin-driven, since asset turnover drifted lower from 0.20 to 0.17 as the asset base expanded from $8.9B to $12.0B largely through acquisition-funded goodwill. That matters because capital deployed into intangibles is being added to the denominator faster than it is demonstrably contributing to returns, which may indicate the acquisition program is diluting near-term capital efficiency even as it positions future growth. Investors should monitor whether turnover stabilizes over the next several quarters; continued decline would suggest the ROIC plateau is a floor rather than a stepping stone, and would weaken the fundamental case for a 5.9x price-to-book premium.
Working Capital Absorbs Rising Cash
As reported in financial statements, Garmin's cash conversion cycle has stretched from roughly 190 to 260 days over ten quarters, driven almost entirely by days inventory outstanding rising from 185 to 264 while receivables and payables remained comparatively stable.
The inventory build is the dominant working capital signal and, read alongside declining asset turnover, it suggests either deliberate channel stocking ahead of new product cycles or a slower sell-through profile than the top line implies — the distinction matters because only the former is benign. This ties directly to the cash flow analysis, where $263.2M and $304.5M working capital outflows swamped quarterly capex and explain most of the OCF-to-net-income shortfall. Payables at 56 days versus inventory at 264 indicates Garmin is financing its own supply chain rather than leaning on suppliers, which is consistent with its balance sheet strength but structurally caps the cash conversion quality of reported earnings.
Balance Sheet Carries No Debt Risk
With a debt-to-equity ratio of 0.02, debt-to-EBITDA of 0.26, and $2.0B of cash covering total borrowings of $173.5M roughly twelvefold, per Garmin's quarterly statements, refinancing and covenant risk are effectively absent from the investment case.
The current ratio of 3.05 and quick ratio of 1.99 sit far above the 0.91–1.55 peer range, implying that even under severe stress — a scenario where the 264 days of inventory proved difficult to liquidate — near-term obligations would still be covered without asset sales. The absence of reported interest coverage is consistent with immaterial debt service rather than a data gap that changes the assessment. The analytical implication is that Garmin's balance sheet is a strategic asset, not a risk factor: it funds the acquisition program and elevated capex internally, but it also means the premium valuation cannot be justified on any deleveraging or financial-engineering thesis.
ROIC Misreads an Acquisition-Led Model
The ratio most likely misapplied to Garmin is ROIC, because goodwill of $978.6M and acquired intangibles carried at purchase price inflate invested capital without reflecting the economic capital actually at risk, mechanically depressing a 6.3% quarterly figure that understates returns on the operating business.
A more informative measure would be return on tangible or gross operating capital, stripping out goodwill built through roughly $515M of acquisitions over the period; on that basis the operating returns implied by a 30.8% operating margin would look materially higher than headline ROIC suggests. Conversely, the equally misapplied complement is the trailing P/E of 31.7x, which ignores Garmin's $2.0B net cash position and therefore overstates the true enterprise cost of the equity story relative to the 24.4x EV/EBITDA. Both distortions point the same way: the fundamentals appear stronger than ROIC implies and the price less extreme than P/E implies, but the real risk — consistent with the income statement findings — remains whether margin-led returns can persist once growth normalization finishes playing out.