Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -15.6x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -0.8%. (2009–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $155M | $273M | $325M | $408M | $287M | $319M | $232M | $174M | $130M | $129M | $122M |
| Enterprise Value | $522M | $641M | $722M | $823M | $700M | $538M | $398M | $320M | $244M | $217M | $180M |
| P/E Ratio → | -15.63 | — | — | — | 13.49 | 11.45 | 36.78 | 8.92 | 9.96 | 13.52 | — |
| P/S Ratio | 3.28 | 37.84 | 192.40 | — | 10.77 | 9.58 | 22.47 | 8.18 | 8.70 | 17.86 | — |
| P/B Ratio | 0.41 | 0.86 | 0.97 | 1.26 | 0.90 | 1.30 | 1.09 | 0.95 | 0.97 | 0.96 | 0.87 |
| P/FCF | 1.01 | 4.82 | 8.19 | 8.14 | — | — | — | 9.93 | — | — | 2.32 |
| P/OCF | 2.73 | 4.82 | 8.19 | 8.14 | — | — | — | 9.93 | — | — | 2.32 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 88.76 | 428.11 | — | 26.29 | 16.18 | 38.57 | 15.02 | 16.37 | 29.94 | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | 611.90 | — | — | 29.84 | 18.39 | 52.40 | 16.21 | 17.94 | 16.52 | 10.24 |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | 32.03 | 19.10 | 60.50 | 16.21 | 12.57 | 14.66 | 205.03 |
| EV / FCF | — | 11.31 | 18.22 | 16.44 | — | — | — | 18.22 | — | — | 3.44 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 86.8% | 124.1% |
| Operating Margin | -22.1% | -22.1% | -246.4% | 159.0% | 82.1% | 84.7% | 63.7% | 92.7% | 87.5% | 170.3% | -222.8% |
| Net Profit Margin | -36.9% | -36.9% | -333.9% | 174.1% | 79.4% | 83.5% | 61.6% | 91.5% | 87.3% | 132.5% | 64.3% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -0.8% | -0.8% | -1.7% | -5.3% | 7.5% | 12.1% | 3.2% | 12.3% | 9.7% | 7.0% | -3.3% |
| ROA | -0.3% | -0.3% | -0.7% | -2.2% | 3.3% | 6.0% | 1.7% | 6.4% | 5.2% | 4.1% | -1.9% |
| ROIC | -0.2% | -0.2% | -0.4% | -1.5% | 2.6% | 4.7% | 1.3% | 5.0% | 4.0% | 4.0% | 5.0% |
| ROCE | -0.2% | -0.2% | -0.5% | -2.0% | 3.5% | 6.3% | 1.8% | 6.6% | 6.6% | 9.0% | 11.4% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 1.49 | 1.49 | 1.39 | 1.43 | 1.36 | 1.05 | 0.87 | 0.83 | 0.94 | 0.70 | 0.69 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 451.79 | 451.79 | — | — | 18.50 | 8.80 | 24.44 | 7.70 | 9.33 | 7.17 | 5.44 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 1.15 | 1.18 | 1.28 | 1.30 | 0.89 | 0.78 | 0.79 | 0.85 | 0.65 | 0.42 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 351.01 | 351.01 | — | — | 17.62 | 7.50 | 21.87 | 7.38 | 8.40 | 6.67 | 3.33 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 6.49 | 10.03 | 8.30 | — | — | — | 8.29 | — | — | 1.12 |
| Interest Coverage | -0.05 | -0.05 | -0.13 | -0.54 | 1.14 | 2.34 | 0.68 | 2.37 | 3.05 | 2.86 | 0.15 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 1.24 | 1.24 | 5.08 | 3.92 | 2.59 | 4.14 | 2.92 | 1.66 | 2.94 | 0.11 | 0.43 |
| Quick Ratio | 1.24 | 1.24 | 5.08 | 3.92 | 2.59 | 4.14 | 2.92 | 1.66 | 2.94 | 0.11 | 0.43 |
| Cash Ratio | 1.11 | 1.11 | 3.96 | 2.89 | 1.44 | 3.46 | 2.23 | 0.82 | 2.23 | 0.07 | 0.37 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.01 | 0.00 | -0.01 | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.03 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.03 | -0.03 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 40.6% | 19.4% | 14.3% | 9.9% | 10.4% | 7.7% | 9.2% | 8.9% | 10.5% | 10.6% | 12.9% |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | 141.1% | 88.4% | 334.9% | — | 105.1% | 142.3% | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | 7.4% | 8.7% | 2.7% | 11.2% | 10.0% | 7.4% | — |
| FCF Yield | 99.1% | 20.7% | 12.2% | 12.3% | — | — | — | 10.1% | — | — | 43.0% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.4% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 40.6% | 19.4% | 14.3% | 9.9% | 10.4% | 7.7% | 9.2% | 8.9% | 10.5% | 10.6% | 13.3% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $42M | $36M | $31M | $25M | $20M | $18M | $13M | $12M | $12M | $12M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 17 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying HRZN stock.
Horizon Technology Finance Corporation's current P/E ratio is -15.6x. The historical average is 17.8x.
Horizon Technology Finance Corporation's return on equity (ROE) is -0.8%. The historical average is 5.6%.
Based on historical data, Horizon Technology Finance Corporation is trading at a P/E of -15.6x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Horizon Technology Finance Corporation's current dividend yield is 40.57%.
Horizon Technology Finance Corporation has 100.0% gross margin and -22.1% operating margin.
Horizon Technology Finance Corporation's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 451.8x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Warrant marks eroding tangible book value
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Deep Discount to Tangible Book
At 0.53x price-to-tangible book, HRZN trades near TPVG's 0.51x and far below HTGC's 1.46x, implying investors price its venture-debt book as a commodity balance sheet rather than a differentiated asset-management franchise, per recent market pricing data.
The $4.02 share price sits roughly 37% below the $6.43 tangible book value per share reported for 2026Q2, a discount that appears to reflect the ten-quarter pattern of negative or erratic reported earnings rather than any disclosed credit event. A TTM P/E of negative 64.0 against a forward P/E of 5.95 suggests the market is discounting current losses as transitory, but that optimism rests on warrant marks normalizing — an outcome that warrants further investigation given the portfolio's demonstrated volatility. The 31.2% listed dividend yield may be read by some as deep value, though it could equally signal a market-implied expectation of a distribution cut.
Volatility Obscures Lending Spread Economics
ROE swung from 10.2% in 2025Q3 to negative 9.9% in 2026Q2, while NIM held a narrow 1.5-2.2% band, indicating that reported profitability is driven by non-interest income swings rather than core spread performance, as reported in HRZN's financial statements.
Decomposing DuPont, the near-stable NIM of 2.0% in 2026Q2 and an equity-to-assets ratio of 0.50 imply underlying ROA of roughly 1.0% on a spread-only basis, yet the reported ROA of negative 4.6% reveals that warrant and equity marks, not lending economics, dominate the outcome. The unusually thick 50% equity cushion actually dampens ROE mechanically — leverage of only about 2x means each dollar of mark-to-market loss hits a large equity base with minimal offset. For analysts, this suggests HRZN's earnings quality should be assessed through NII and fee-normalized ROE rather than headline returns, which have been negative in five of the last ten quarters.
Efficiency Ratio Rendered Inoperable
The efficiency ratio printed 2.1% in 2026Q2 and 25.1% in 2026Q1, with several quarters showing no meaningful calculation, indicating that negative non-interest income renders the standard cost-control metric analytically useless for this business model.
NIM has compressed modestly from 2.2% in 2024Q1 to 2.0% in 2026Q2, a drift that appears consistent with rising funding costs on a venture-lending book, though the company's 1.5% trough in 2025Q4 suggests the pressure is cyclical rather than structural. The fee income line, printed at negative 31.3% of revenue in 2026Q2 versus positive 41.6% in 2025Q3, means total revenue itself has been negative in multiple periods, making any efficiency calculation arithmetically incoherent. Investors should monitor NIM on a standalone basis and disregard the efficiency ratio entirely until fee income stabilizes.
Overcapitalized Cushion Signals Under-Deployment
Equity reached $417.5M against $832.0M of total assets in 2026Q2, lifting equity-to-assets to 0.50 from 0.39 a year earlier, a cushion far thicker than typical BDC peers that may indicate capacity for capital return rather than balance-sheet strain.
This leverage profile is the inverse of most business development companies — peers such as TPVG and PFLT carry debt-to-equity ratios of 1.33 and 1.65 respectively, while HRZN's implied leverage sits near 2x assets-to-equity. The interpretation is two-sided: the buffer provides genuine protection against the venture-portfolio marks that have driven repeated losses, but it also depresses ROE structurally and suggests the balance sheet is not being deployed at franchise-economics efficiency. Given that dividends accelerated 142% over ten quarters to $25.2M in 2026Q2 alongside a $37.3M net loss, the cushion's sufficiency relative to distribution policy is a metric investors should monitor closely.
Priced With Weakest Peer, Not Best-in-Class
HRZN's 0.53x P/B and negative TTM earnings place it alongside TPVG at the bottom of the peer set, while HTGC commands 1.46x on 17.2% ROE, suggesting the valuation gap reflects earnings consistency rather than asset-class differences within venture lending.
The peer table shows a clean relationship between ROE stability and multiple: HTGC's 17.2% ROE supports a premium multiple, whereas HRZN's ROE, negative in five of ten quarters, appears to cap valuation near the 0.5x tangible book floor shared by lower-returning peers. Notably, even TPVG's 11.0% ROE does not translate into a premium multiple, implying the market applies a structural venture-asset discount across the group, within which HRZN's mark-to-market volatility adds a company-specific penalty. Whether this discount is cyclical — tied to the current venture funding winter — or structural remains the central question for any re-rating thesis.
P/E Misleads on Negative-Number Banks
The most misapplied ratio for HRZN is P/E — a TTM figure of negative 64.0 and a forward figure of 5.95 describe entirely different companies, obscuring the fact that warrant marks, not lending operations, drive the reported loss.
For an asset-heavy lender whose equity-linked marks swing between positive 41.6% and negative 39.8% of revenue across ten quarters, earnings-based multiples are essentially uninterpretable; the same criticism applies to the 27.89x P/S, which is inflated by a near-zero or negative revenue denominator in loss quarters. Investors should instead anchor on price to tangible book value adjusted for normalized warrant marks, or on a NII-based return on equity that isolates the venture-lending spread. The related risk this obscures is that tangible book itself has declined from $9.89 to $6.43 per share over the period, meaning a constant or falling P/B multiple can coincide with genuine economic value erosion, not merely market pessimism.