Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 16.7x · EV/EBITDA 12.1x · ROE 33.2%. (1996–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $17.0B | $22.4B | $27.1B | $24.0B | $16.2B | $22.8B | $16.0B | $15.1B | $10.0B | $14.9B | $6.8B |
| Enterprise Value | $16.2B | $21.6B | $25.6B | $21.9B | $14.7B | $21.8B | $14.8B | $14.7B | $9.9B | $14.8B | $7.1B |
| P/E Ratio → | 16.71 | 16.71 | 16.14 | 15.11 | 9.38 | 18.44 | 17.73 | 17.22 | 12.51 | 27.67 | 16.11 |
| P/S Ratio | 1.82 | 2.17 | 2.57 | 2.52 | 1.54 | 2.54 | 2.12 | 2.04 | 1.39 | 2.36 | 1.17 |
| P/B Ratio | 5.00 | 5.79 | 6.45 | 5.51 | 4.61 | 7.59 | 5.15 | 6.46 | 5.51 | 9.26 | 5.25 |
| P/FCF | 20.78 | 20.41 | 20.18 | 16.32 | 8.74 | 18.62 | 17.58 | 17.93 | 14.18 | 27.11 | 18.92 |
| P/OCF | 15.16 | 19.96 | 19.75 | 16.05 | 8.65 | 18.35 | 17.27 | 17.46 | 13.79 | 26.15 | 17.82 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 2.09 | 2.42 | 2.30 | 1.39 | 2.44 | 1.96 | 1.98 | 1.37 | 2.34 | 1.21 |
| EV / EBITDA | 12.09 | 12.75 | 12.74 | 11.91 | 6.71 | 14.65 | 14.80 | 15.14 | 10.77 | 18.01 | 10.95 |
| EV / EBIT | 9.72 | 12.07 | 11.92 | 11.20 | 6.40 | 13.29 | 12.94 | 13.97 | 10.02 | 17.02 | 10.33 |
| EV / FCF | — | 19.71 | 19.00 | 14.87 | 7.92 | 17.82 | 16.27 | 17.39 | 14.01 | 26.99 | 19.47 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 23.0% | 23.0% | 25.5% | 26.0% | 27.3% | 24.5% | 21.3% | 21.0% | 20.7% | 21.0% | 19.2% |
| Operating Margin | 16.2% | 16.2% | 18.9% | 19.1% | 20.6% | 16.4% | 13.0% | 12.8% | 12.5% | 12.7% | 10.7% |
| Net Profit Margin | 13.0% | 13.0% | 16.0% | 16.7% | 16.4% | 13.8% | 11.9% | 11.9% | 11.1% | 8.5% | 7.3% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 33.2% | 33.2% | 39.2% | 40.4% | 53.0% | 40.5% | 33.1% | 42.3% | 46.7% | 36.9% | 33.4% |
| ROA | 21.9% | 21.9% | 25.9% | 26.0% | 30.0% | 21.3% | 18.8% | 25.2% | 25.9% | 19.1% | 16.5% |
| ROIC | 43.8% | 43.8% | 61.7% | 65.0% | 81.1% | 56.1% | 38.6% | 39.7% | 41.6% | 39.4% | 32.0% |
| ROCE | 32.9% | 32.9% | 37.5% | 36.8% | 47.6% | 31.7% | 25.3% | 34.9% | 38.8% | 39.0% | 33.3% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.31 | 0.31 | 0.24 | 0.23 | 0.29 | 0.53 | 0.51 | 0.29 | 0.33 | 0.37 | 0.46 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 0.71 | 0.71 | 0.51 | 0.55 | 0.46 | 1.07 | 1.59 | 0.71 | 0.65 | 0.73 | 0.93 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.20 | -0.38 | -0.49 | -0.43 | -0.33 | -0.38 | -0.20 | -0.06 | -0.04 | 0.15 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | -0.45 | -0.45 | -0.79 | -1.17 | -0.69 | -0.66 | -1.19 | -0.47 | -0.12 | -0.08 | 0.31 |
| Debt / FCF | — | -0.69 | -1.18 | -1.46 | -0.82 | -0.80 | -1.31 | -0.54 | -0.16 | -0.13 | 0.56 |
| Interest Coverage | 62.10 | 62.10 | 77.14 | 70.52 | 58.01 | 30.91 | 27.97 | 41.38 | 39.22 | 35.97 | 31.43 |
Net cash position: cash ($2.0B) exceeds total debt ($1.2B)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 3.95 | 3.95 | 5.07 | 4.90 | 4.53 | 4.35 | 4.96 | 4.37 | 3.76 | 3.40 | 3.04 |
| Quick Ratio | 2.12 | 2.12 | 3.29 | 3.31 | 2.97 | 2.78 | 3.38 | 2.66 | 2.11 | 1.82 | 1.57 |
| Cash Ratio | 2.08 | 2.08 | 2.27 | 2.59 | 2.20 | 2.07 | 2.56 | 1.45 | 0.94 | 0.85 | 0.53 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 1.76 | 1.65 | 1.44 | 1.86 | 1.54 | 1.31 | 1.94 | 2.27 | 2.11 | 2.21 |
| Inventory Turnover | 4.61 | 4.61 | 3.81 | 3.62 | 4.28 | 3.47 | 3.47 | 4.34 | 4.54 | 4.00 | 4.31 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 1.16 | 1.13 | 1.11 | 0.72 | 0.76 | 0.89 | 0.90 | 0.95 | 1.16 | 1.19 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 6.0% | 6.0% | 6.2% | 6.6% | 10.7% | 5.4% | 5.6% | 5.8% | 8.0% | 3.6% | 6.2% |
| FCF Yield | 4.8% | 4.9% | 5.0% | 6.1% | 11.4% | 5.4% | 5.7% | 5.6% | 7.1% | 3.7% | 5.3% |
| Buyback Yield | 10.8% | 8.2% | 7.6% | 4.5% | 9.3% | 6.7% | 2.3% | 4.6% | 8.5% | 2.8% | 6.6% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 10.8% | 8.2% | 7.6% | 4.5% | 9.3% | 6.7% | 2.3% | 4.6% | 8.5% | 2.8% | 6.6% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $3M | $3M | $3M | $4M | $4M | $4M | $4M | $4M | $4M | $4M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
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10-year return with dividends reinvested.
Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying NVR stock.
NVR, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is 16.7x. The historical average is 15.2x. This places it at the 60th percentile of its historical range.
NVR, Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 12.1x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 9.8x.
NVR, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is 33.2%. This is above the typical threshold of 15-20% considered good for most companies. The historical average is 41.9%.
Based on historical data, NVR, Inc. is trading at a P/E of 16.7x. This is at the 60th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
NVR, Inc. has 23.0% gross margin and 16.2% operating margin. Operating margin between 10-20% is typical for established companies.
NVR, Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 0.7x, indicating low leverage. A ratio below 2x is generally considered financially healthy.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Structural gross margin erosion
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Gross Margin Gives Back Cycle Gains
NVR's gross margin has compressed roughly 550 basis points from 25.6% in 2024Q2 to 20.1% in 2026Q3, according to the company's reported quarterly figures, with operating margin falling to 13.5%; this erosion appears structural given six consecutive quarters of sequential decline.
The margin decay looks broader than typical input-cost volatility: operating margin has fallen from 18.9% to 13.5% over the same span, a steeper drop than gross margin alone would explain, which suggests SG&A has not adjusted to the lower revenue base. Net margin of 10.3% versus 15.3% in 2024Q2 implies that even with a variable cost structure and near-zero capex, pricing power in the Mid-Atlantic appears to be eroding as affordability constraints deepen. Investors should monitor whether the 2026Q3 gross margin represents a cyclical trough or a new structural level, given the absence of any sequential stabilization in reported results.
Return Decay Driven by Margins, Not Efficiency
Return on invested capital has nearly halved from 14.8% in 2024Q4 to 7.3% in 2026Q3, based on NVR's quarterly ratio history, with ROE declining in parallel from 10.8% to 7.3%; the decay reflects margin contraction rather than capital inefficiency, as asset turnover remained near 0.44.
The fact that asset turnover has held in a narrow 0.40-0.46 band throughout the period indicates the return compression is almost entirely a profitability story, not a working-capital or utilization failure. ROIC at 7.3% now sits below D.R. Horton's 12.1% and PulteGroup's 17.2%, narrowing or reversing what has historically been NVR's structural advantage, though the comparison is flattered for peers still riding earlier-cycle margins. If gross margins stabilize near current levels, ROIC may find a floor, but the trend as reported does not yet evidence that inflection.
Minimal Debt Masks Rising Earnings Leverage
With debt-to-equity holding near 0.31% and interest coverage at 49.09x in 2026Q3, NVR's balance sheet carries minimal financial risk, per the company's reported figures; however, debt-to-EBITDA has climbed from 1.90x in 2024Q2 to 3.13x as earnings contract.
The rise in debt-to-EBITDA appears driven almost entirely by the denominator shrinking rather than any new borrowing, which means covenant or refinancing risk is effectively nonexistent at present. The more relevant leverage signal is not financial but operational: the lot purchase option commitments that sit off balance sheet represent a future claim on capital that the 0.31% debt-to-equity ratio cannot capture, an exposure NVR's own filings acknowledge. Interest coverage volatility (14.86x in 2026Q2 versus 65.97x a year earlier) reflects quarterly earnings swings rather than any deterioration in debt service capacity.
Liquid Cushion Drawn Down by Buybacks
NVR's current ratio eased from 5.21 in 2025Q3 to 3.71 in 2026Q3 while the quick ratio fell from 3.15 to 1.48, according to recent SEC filings, signaling a meaningful drawdown of the liquid cushion that once buffered the company against demand shocks.
The quick ratio's decline is the more telling figure, as it strips out inventory that in homebuilding largely consists of homes under construction dependent on settlement for conversion to cash; a 1.48x quick ratio is still comfortable in absolute terms but represents a sharp change in character from the 3x levels of 2024. Under a severe stress scenario in which closings stall and working capital turns negative as it did in 2026Q2, the remaining cash of roughly $1.1 billion would need to fund both operations and the ongoing repurchase program. The balance sheet can still absorb a downturn, but the margin of safety is materially thinner than the headline current ratio suggests.
Premium Multiple on Contracting Earnings
NVR trades at 13.30x trailing earnings versus a peer median near 10.9x, per market pricing data, while its 4.61x price-to-book dwarfs peers in the 1.7-1.9x range; the forward EV/EBITDA of 10.49x above the trailing 8.79x embeds continued earnings contraction.
The forward multiple trading above the trailing multiple is an unusual configuration that typically signals the market expects earnings to fall further, consistent with the six quarters of revenue decline and the recent ~20% EPS miss against consensus. The PEG of 0.97 suggests the premium is defensible only if growth recovers, yet no forward guidance was offered to support that assumption. Relative to Toll Brothers at 10.52x and PulteGroup at 10.94x, NVR's premium may be justified by its lower balance-sheet risk, but that case weakens materially if the current margin trajectory persists into 2027.
Price-to-Book Misreads Asset-Light Model
NVR's 4.61x price-to-book is the ratio most likely to mislead investors in residential construction, as decades of aggressive buybacks have compressed equity to $3.4 billion; the asset-light model means book value understates the true economic base generating returns, favoring ROIC instead.
Because NVR controls land through options rather than owning it, the balance sheet carries minimal fixed assets and essentially no goodwill, so book equity is not measuring the productive capital base the way it would for a land-heavy builder. A low debt-to-equity ratio of 0.31% compounds the distortion, since the lots controlled through purchase options represent real future commitments excluded from reported leverage. Analysts should anchor on ROIC relative to cost of capital and EV/EBITDA adjusted for implied lot option obligations rather than price-to-book, which structurally overstates NVR's expensiveness relative to peers like D.R. Horton that carry land on balance sheet.