Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -3.5x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE 15.0%. (2019–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $283M | $229M | $35M | $38M | $26M | $214M | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $278M | $225M | $31M | $-12674527 | $17M | $189M | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | -3.51 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | — | — | 26.54 | 16.96 | 1.07 | 3.51 | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 1.23 | 1.51 | 1.35 | 0.66 | 0.83 | 5.54 | — | — |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | 107.47 | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | — | 23.35 | -5.66 | 0.69 | 3.10 | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | 16.64 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | — | — | -262.4% | -67.3% | 86.2% | 97.3% | 100.0% | 100.0% |
| Operating Margin | — | — | -3244.9% | -1700.5% | -121.0% | -22.0% | 37.2% | -252.0% |
| Net Profit Margin | — | — | -2579.0% | -1884.5% | -78.4% | -28.2% | 36.4% | -261.1% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 15.0% | 15.0% | -81.9% | -95.5% | -53.8% | -44.2% | 109.6% | — |
| ROA | 12.2% | 12.2% | -53.2% | -62.6% | -28.4% | -24.9% | 54.0% | -49.9% |
| ROIC | -43.5% | -43.5% | -226.8% | -199.8% | -121.2% | -41.5% | 92.0% | — |
| ROCE | -49.4% | -49.4% | -78.5% | -69.8% | -63.8% | -26.7% | 69.8% | -64.8% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.18 | 0.10 | 0.19 | 0.22 | 0.21 | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.39 | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.03 | -0.16 | -0.88 | -0.29 | -0.64 | -0.11 | — |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | -0.21 | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | 56.15 | 56.15 | -106.11 | -132.83 | -61.06 | -57.22 | 43.88 | -19.97 |
Net cash position: cash ($11M) exceeds total debt ($6M)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 9.46 | 9.46 | 2.98 | 5.45 | 1.47 | 1.90 | 3.11 | 2.01 |
| Quick Ratio | 9.46 | 9.46 | 2.98 | 5.45 | 1.47 | 1.90 | 3.11 | 2.01 |
| Cash Ratio | 9.04 | 9.04 | 2.60 | 5.23 | 1.00 | 1.26 | 1.14 | 1.37 |
| Asset Turnover | — | — | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.47 | 0.75 | 0.98 | 0.19 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | 15.17 | — | 84.85 | 48.03 | 135.92 | 298.91 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 21.5% | 0.0% | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 21.5% | 0.0% | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $61M | $9M | $6M | $4M | $3M | $3M | $4M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 7 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying SABS stock.
SAB Biotherapeutics, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -3.5x. This places it at the 50th percentile of its historical range.
SAB Biotherapeutics, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is 15.0%. The historical average is -25.1%.
Based on historical data, SAB Biotherapeutics, Inc. is trading at a P/E of -3.5x. This is at the 50th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Runway risk from accelerating burn
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Book Multiple Unmoored From Earning Power
At a P/B of 1.24 and a negative trailing P/E of -3.89, SABS's valuation offers no earnings-based anchor, per recent SEC filings, so market pricing appears to rest primarily on the $214.8M contributed-capital equity base rather than any demonstrated profitability trajectory.
The price-to-book multiple near 1.24 suggests the market is valuing SABS at a modest premium to its liquidation-basis accounting equity, which is itself dominated by paid-in capital while retained earnings sit at -$152.3M — an equity base created by repeated raises, not compounding. Standard earnings and EBITDA multiples (EV/EBITDA, forward P/E) are unavailable, which is typical for a pre-commercial biotech but leaves investors without a growth-implied pricing benchmark; the P/B ratio becomes the de facto anchor and, in this case, may primarily reflect option value on pipeline assets rather than fundamental earnings capacity.
Negative Margins With Structural Distortion
With gross margin negative in every reporting period — from -110.1% in 2024Q1 to -5.9% in 2024Q4 — and operating margin widening to -87.3%, the company's cost base bears no relationship to any revenue stream, per SABS's reported financial statements. No true earning power can be measured.
Because revenue was absent in seven of ten quarters and gross profit was negative across all periods, no margin decomposition can isolate operating leverage; the operating loss widening from -$10.0M in 2024Q4 to -$23.4M in 2026Q2 reflects an R&D and SG&A cost structure compounding independently of commercialization progress. The one adjustment that matters: 2025Q3's +$45.4M net income against a -$12.7M operating loss means headline net margin is unusable as an earning-power proxy across the trailing ten quarters, reinforcing that operating cash burn, not reported earnings, is the operative economic metric.
Persistent Negative ROIC Signals Capital Erosion
ROIC has remained negative across all ten quarters, ranging from -8.2% in 2025Q4 to -39.1% in 2025Q2, with the latest reading at -8.3% for 2026Q2, per SABS's quarterly disclosures, indicating every dollar of deployed capital has destroyed rather than compounded value.
The 2025Q3 ROE print of +51.3% is an artifact of the one-time non-operating gain flowing through equity, not evidence of returns inflection — ROA of 42.6% in the same quarter coexisted with a negative ROIC of -12.1%, confirming the divergence between GAAT book equity and operating capital productivity. The modest sequential improvement in ROIC from -39.1% to roughly -8.3% appears driven primarily by denominator expansion from capital raises (total assets grew eightfold to $238.2M) rather than any narrowing of operating losses, so investors should treat the apparent trend improvement as balance-sheet-driven, not operations-driven.
Nominal Debt Obscures Coverage Distortion
SABS carries a debt-to-equity ratio of just 0.02 on $5.1M of total borrowings against a $214.8M equity base, per company-reported figures, yet interest coverage of -361.76x reflects negative operating earnings rather than a debt-service burden, rendering the coverage metric analytically meaningless.
Minimal fixed obligations preserve refinancing optionality and suggest covenant risk is negligible in the near term, which is one genuine strength relative to leveraged biotech peers. However, the negative coverage ratio should not be read as distress from debt service — it reflects the absence of positive operating income; the actual financial constraint is equity-funded burn, not interest expense, so traditional leverage screens will understate SABS's true financing risk profile.
Headline Liquidity Masks Cash Concentration Risk
The current and quick ratios both stand at 9.22 in 2026Q2, implying roughly $216M of current assets, yet cash fell about 60% from $20.5M to $8.3M in a single quarter while quarterly free cash outflow reached -$26.7M, per SABS's balance sheets.
The identical current and quick readings indicate inventory is not the liquidity constraint — the constraint is asset composition: with only $8.3M in cash against a -$26.7M quarterly FCF deficit and R&D spend accelerating past $13M per quarter, the spendable runway implied by the headline ratio appears materially overstated under a severe stress scenario. Combined with 2026Q2's step-up in capex to -$2.6M from negligible prior levels, the balance sheet's apparent fortress may depend on continued external capital access; investors should monitor cash balances and any subsequent raises as the true solvency indicator rather than the current ratio.
Why P/B Misleads for Pre-Revenue Biotech
The most commonly misapplied ratio here is price-to-book: SABS's 1.24 P/B invites comparison to capital-efficient manufacturers, yet its book equity reflects $367M of gross contributed capital offset by -$152.3M of retained losses, per SABS's reported statements, making the multiple a poor proxy for asset value or downside protection.
In a pre-revenue biotech whose economics are dominated by cash burn and pipeline optionality, book value measures how much capital has been raised, not productive asset worth — the same 1.24 P/B would look like deep value for an industrial compounder but here merely prices in residual optionality after accounting losses. The superior alternatives are cash-adjusted enterprise value relative to remaining runway (months of funded operations at the current -$26.7M quarterly FCF deficit) and peak-sales risk-adjusted pipeline value; notably, if working capital swings and the non-cash $12.7M stock-comp charge are excluded, the underlying liquidity picture could look somewhat better than headline ratios imply, so the runway calculation warrants scenario-based sensitivity rather than single-point inference.