Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 9.4x · EV/EBITDA 4.3x · ROE 5.9%. (2016–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $848M | $2.9B | $3.2B | $3.5B | $3.2B | $3.4B | $2.5B | $2.5B | $1.3B | $839M | — |
| Enterprise Value | $1.1B | $3.1B | $3.5B | $3.7B | $3.6B | $3.9B | $3.0B | $2.5B | $1.4B | $1.0B | — |
| P/E Ratio → | 9.40 | 28.07 | 22.89 | 26.11 | 29.18 | 84.17 | 72.54 | — | 35.25 | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 0.58 | 2.00 | 2.40 | 2.80 | 2.71 | 3.42 | 3.06 | 4.82 | 3.07 | 2.12 | — |
| P/B Ratio | 0.54 | 1.61 | 1.85 | 2.21 | 2.20 | 2.90 | 2.19 | 3.54 | 1.97 | 1.40 | — |
| P/FCF | 5.37 | 18.40 | 15.38 | 22.25 | 30.38 | 27.45 | 43.66 | 35.08 | 22.47 | — | — |
| P/OCF | 4.75 | 16.29 | 14.92 | 20.64 | 28.79 | 26.06 | 42.38 | 34.58 | 21.82 | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 2.14 | 2.63 | 2.99 | 3.04 | 3.85 | 3.70 | 4.68 | 3.26 | 2.52 | — |
| EV / EBITDA | 4.35 | 12.84 | 14.07 | 16.02 | 15.51 | 18.94 | 22.63 | 27.91 | 19.60 | 16.45 | — |
| EV / EBIT | 4.82 | 19.55 | 16.52 | 18.06 | 20.62 | 34.40 | 27.07 | 480.09 | 21.39 | 36.76 | — |
| EV / FCF | — | 19.71 | 16.84 | 23.79 | 34.08 | 30.84 | 52.90 | 34.03 | 23.82 | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 35.1% | 35.1% | 37.2% | 35.1% | 36.6% | 39.1% | 37.8% | 40.1% | 40.1% | 43.1% | — |
| Operating Margin | 15.1% | 15.1% | 16.6% | 16.5% | 17.4% | 18.0% | 13.9% | 15.3% | 14.9% | 12.9% | -0.1% |
| Net Profit Margin | 7.1% | 7.1% | 10.5% | 10.7% | 9.3% | 4.1% | 8.0% | -4.8% | 16.3% | -0.5% | -0.0% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 5.9% | 5.9% | 8.4% | 8.9% | 8.3% | 3.5% | 7.1% | -3.6% | 11.1% | -0.4% | -0.0% |
| ROA | 4.2% | 4.2% | 6.0% | 6.3% | 5.2% | 2.0% | 4.1% | -2.3% | 7.3% | -0.3% | -0.0% |
| ROIC | 8.1% | 8.1% | 8.6% | 8.5% | 8.9% | 8.3% | 7.4% | 8.7% | 6.4% | 6.7% | — |
| ROCE | 9.4% | 9.4% | 10.0% | 10.1% | 10.2% | 9.2% | 7.4% | 7.8% | 6.9% | 7.9% | -0.1% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.17 | 0.17 | 0.25 | 0.21 | 0.32 | 0.42 | 0.55 | 0.27 | 0.28 | 0.36 | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | 1.26 | 1.26 | 1.76 | 1.41 | 1.98 | 2.45 | 4.67 | 2.17 | 2.67 | 3.58 | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.11 | 0.18 | 0.15 | 0.27 | 0.36 | 0.46 | -0.11 | 0.12 | 0.27 | -0.00 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 0.85 | 0.85 | 1.22 | 1.03 | 1.69 | 2.08 | 3.95 | -0.86 | 1.11 | 2.65 | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | 1.30 | 1.47 | 1.54 | 3.71 | 3.39 | 9.24 | -1.05 | 1.35 | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | 6.85 | 6.85 | 8.15 | 6.84 | 7.88 | 3.56 | 3.41 | 0.37 | 5.23 | — | — |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 3.64 | 3.64 | 4.05 | 4.14 | 3.44 | 2.63 | 3.64 | 7.45 | 6.07 | 4.03 | 4.13 |
| Quick Ratio | 2.30 | 2.30 | 2.75 | 2.84 | 2.21 | 1.77 | 2.81 | 6.65 | 5.09 | 3.15 | 4.13 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.79 | 0.79 | 1.22 | 0.98 | 0.66 | 0.66 | 1.34 | 5.55 | 3.66 | 1.70 | 3.05 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.61 | 0.54 | 0.58 | 0.55 | 0.48 | 0.40 | 0.45 | 0.43 | 0.43 | 1.06 |
| Inventory Turnover | 5.63 | 5.63 | 5.89 | 6.92 | 5.90 | 6.30 | 8.59 | 8.23 | 8.62 | 7.76 | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 41.50 | 41.32 | 42.61 | 41.43 | 40.45 | 40.11 | 30.83 | 30.98 | 34.26 | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 10.6% | 3.6% | 4.4% | 3.8% | 3.4% | 1.2% | 1.4% | — | 2.8% | — | — |
| FCF Yield | 18.6% | 5.4% | 6.5% | 4.5% | 3.3% | 3.6% | 2.3% | 2.9% | 4.4% | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 6.0% | 1.8% | 0.0% | 0.5% | 1.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 6.0% | 1.8% | 0.0% | 0.5% | 1.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $102M | $101M | $101M | $101M | $97M | $98M | $85M | $74M | $71M | $11M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 10 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying SMPL stock.
The Simply Good Foods Company's current P/E ratio is 9.4x. The historical average is 42.6x.
The Simply Good Foods Company's current EV/EBITDA is 4.3x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 18.2x.
The Simply Good Foods Company's return on equity (ROE) is 5.9%. The historical average is 4.9%.
Based on historical data, The Simply Good Foods Company is trading at a P/E of 9.4x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
The Simply Good Foods Company has 35.1% gross margin and 15.1% operating margin. Operating margin between 10-20% is typical for established companies.
The Simply Good Foods Company's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 1.3x, indicating moderate leverage. A ratio below 2x is generally considered financially healthy.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Profitability collapse under revenue pressure
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Extreme Discount Signals Deep Concerns
SMPL trades at a significant discount to peers and its own history with a P/E of 10.3 and a PEG of 0.43, suggesting the market is pricing in substantial ongoing earnings deterioration rather than a temporary reset.
The forward P/E of 6.40 is particularly striking, implying the market expects earnings to collapse further from already depressed levels. This valuation is not necessarily attractive; it reflects severe skepticism about the company's ability to stabilize its operational model after the gross margin erosion. Compared to peers like JBSS (P/E 15.1) and the sector, SMPL's multiple reflects a potential loss of pricing power and market share.
Operating Margin Collapse Exposes Fixed Costs
Operating margin has swung from a healthy 18.4% in 2024Q3 to a loss-making -14.0% in the latest quarter, based on company financial statements, indicating a severe mismatch between revenue decline and a rigid cost structure.
The gross margin contraction of 620 basis points over two quarters is a critical driver, but the catastrophic decline in operating margin highlights significant operating leverage working against the company. Fixed SG&A and other expenses are not scaling down with revenue, turning a solid business into a loss-making one. This signals that the prior profitability was highly sensitive to volume, and the current structure may be unsustainable without significant restructuring.
Value Destruction on Invested Capital
ROIC has turned negative at -2.2% in the most recent quarter, a stark reversal from a stable 2.0-2.6% range, indicating the company is currently destroying value on its invested capital base according to reported figures.
The negative return is driven almost entirely by the collapse in operating margin, not by a meaningful change in capital efficiency, as asset turnover has remained stable. This represents a critical inflection point; the business is now failing to cover its cost of capital. The persistent low ROIC (even when positive) was already a concern, but the move to value destruction underscores the operational severity of the current downturn.
Inventory Buildup Strains Working Capital
The Cash Conversion Cycle has extended to 79 days, primarily due to Days Inventory Outstanding ballooning to 67 days from a low of 49, which may indicate slowing sales velocity and potential future markdown risks.
While Days Payable Outstanding remains stable in the mid-20s, suggesting maintained supplier leverage, the inventory buildup is the primary concern. This could force the company into promotional activity to clear stock, which would further pressure gross margins already in decline. The efficiency gains from prior years have fully reversed, tying up cash that is desperately needed amid negative net income.
Low Leverage Masked by Earnings Collapse
Despite a prudent debt-to-equity ratio of 0.28, interest coverage has plummeted to -7.63 in the latest quarter, meaning operating losses are now insufficient to service even the modest debt costs according to SEC filings.
The company's strategic deleveraging is a clear positive, providing a substantial buffer against balance sheet risk. However, the deeply negative interest coverage is a direct consequence of operational failure, not financial engineering. If operating losses persist, the debt could transition from a non-issue to a material risk requiring asset sales or refinancing at unfavorable terms.
The P/E Ratio as a False Signal
The most commonly misapplied ratio for SMPL is the trailing P/E, which at 10.3 appears attractive but obscures the fact that earnings are in severe, ongoing collapse and may not represent a sustainable power.
Investors comparing SMPL's P/E to its historical average or to peers could be misled into thinking the stock is cheap. However, the trailing P/E is based on volatile and potentially non-recurring earnings power. A more appropriate metric is the forward P/E, which at 6.4 signals the market's expectation of further decline, or EV/EBITDA, which provides a cleaner view by focusing on operational cash flow generation prior to capital structure decisions. The P/E is meaningless without understanding that the 'E' is falling rapidly.