Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 19.1x · EV/EBITDA -12.1x · ROE 11.1%. (1996–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $49.8B | $37.3B | $29.7B | $25.3B | $28.7B | $33.3B | $26.0B | $29.6B | $23.7B | $37.1B | $30.8B |
| Enterprise Value | $-51753778350 | $-64271658810 | $-49645518100 | $-42050042720 | $-58645644870 | $-61582534000 | $-73289825320 | $-28318019400 | $-37298658680 | $-16735409070 | $-24181885200 |
| P/E Ratio → | 19.14 | 13.72 | 11.95 | 13.88 | 10.79 | 12.93 | 11.52 | 14.70 | 9.85 | 18.63 | 15.64 |
| P/S Ratio | 3.57 | 2.67 | 2.30 | 2.12 | 2.37 | 2.77 | 2.22 | 2.51 | 1.96 | 3.29 | 3.02 |
| P/B Ratio | 1.87 | 1.34 | 1.17 | 1.06 | 1.14 | 1.22 | 0.99 | 1.21 | 0.96 | 1.66 | 1.45 |
| P/FCF | 11.61 | 8.69 | — | — | 2.56 | — | 8.75 | 5.96 | 2.48 | 5.89 | 18.36 |
| P/OCF | 9.32 | 6.97 | — | 36.66 | 2.40 | — | 7.36 | 5.19 | 2.33 | 5.35 | 13.44 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | -4.61 | -3.84 | -3.52 | -4.84 | -5.12 | -6.27 | -2.41 | -3.07 | -1.49 | -2.37 |
| EV / EBITDA | -12.08 | -15.00 | -12.41 | -13.15 | -13.08 | -13.03 | -16.62 | -6.99 | -8.67 | -4.10 | -7.93 |
| EV / EBIT | -13.87 | -17.23 | -14.62 | -18.16 | -17.63 | -19.42 | -25.28 | -10.44 | -12.03 | -5.59 | -11.41 |
| EV / FCF | — | -14.98 | — | — | -5.23 | — | -24.66 | -5.71 | -3.90 | -2.66 | -14.42 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 61.4% | 61.4% | 58.5% | 64.8% | 88.6% | 100.2% | 96.2% | 89.5% | 92.3% | 94.9% | 95.9% |
| Operating Margin | 16.5% | 16.5% | 15.5% | 12.6% | 24.3% | 26.4% | 24.0% | 20.7% | 23.6% | 25.2% | 19.9% |
| Net Profit Margin | 13.0% | 13.0% | 12.2% | 10.6% | 20.3% | 22.4% | 20.1% | 17.1% | 19.8% | 18.2% | 20.2% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 11.1% | 11.1% | 10.9% | 7.9% | 10.6% | 10.1% | 9.6% | 9.1% | 11.0% | 9.9% | 10.1% |
| ROA | 0.8% | 0.8% | 0.8% | 0.6% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 0.9% | 1.1% | 0.9% | 0.9% |
| ROIC | 4.7% | 4.7% | 4.6% | 3.8% | 5.8% | 5.3% | 5.0% | 5.2% | 6.0% | 5.9% | 4.1% |
| ROCE | 4.5% | 4.5% | 4.6% | 4.3% | 8.7% | 8.1% | 7.5% | 7.5% | 8.9% | 9.0% | 6.5% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 1.07 | 1.07 | 1.45 | 1.02 | 0.73 | 0.55 | 0.81 | 0.59 | 0.62 | 0.70 | 0.82 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 6.96 | 6.96 | 9.20 | 7.62 | 4.08 | 3.21 | 4.81 | 3.57 | 3.55 | 3.83 | 5.71 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -3.65 | -3.13 | -2.83 | -3.47 | -3.47 | -3.79 | -2.37 | -2.47 | -2.41 | -2.59 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | -23.70 | -23.70 | -19.83 | -21.06 | -19.49 | -20.07 | -22.52 | -14.29 | -14.18 | -13.20 | -18.03 |
| Debt / FCF | — | -23.67 | — | — | -7.79 | — | -33.41 | -11.67 | -6.38 | -8.55 | -32.78 |
| Interest Coverage | 0.43 | 0.43 | 0.37 | 0.36 | 2.15 | 1057.00 | 7.73 | 1.97 | 3.13 | 4.96 | 4.95 |
Net cash position: cash ($131.4B) exceeds total debt ($29.8B)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.68 | 0.68 | 0.51 | 0.63 | 0.57 | 0.68 | 0.69 | 0.64 | 0.63 | 0.66 | 0.78 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.68 | 0.68 | 0.51 | 0.63 | 0.57 | 0.68 | 0.69 | 0.64 | 0.63 | 0.66 | 0.78 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.47 | 0.47 | 0.42 | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.44 | 0.35 | 0.37 | 0.34 | 0.34 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.05 | 0.04 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 1.7% | 2.4% | 3.5% | 3.8% | 3.4% | 2.3% | 3.4% | 3.1% | 3.5% | 2.1% | 2.3% |
| Payout Ratio | 30.4% | 30.4% | 38.4% | 49.9% | 35.0% | 27.9% | 36.7% | 41.5% | 31.9% | 35.6% | 33.7% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 5.2% | 7.3% | 8.4% | 7.2% | 9.3% | 7.7% | 8.7% | 6.8% | 10.1% | 5.4% | 6.4% |
| FCF Yield | 8.6% | 11.5% | — | — | 39.1% | — | 11.4% | 16.8% | 40.3% | 17.0% | 5.4% |
| Buyback Yield | 2.6% | 3.5% | 9.8% | 15.3% | 5.7% | 4.3% | 4.2% | 8.2% | 2.0% | 3.8% | 4.8% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 4.3% | 5.9% | 13.3% | 19.2% | 9.0% | 6.6% | 7.6% | 11.3% | 5.5% | 5.9% | 7.2% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $289M | $302M | $327M | $370M | $358M | $357M | $374M | $376M | $380M | $396M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
Live VCP patterns, Cup & Handle overlays, support/resistance, and AI trade plans.
High-probability breakout stocks crossing their pivot across 5 pattern engines.
DCF models, multiple analysis, and analyst estimates.
10-year return with dividends reinvested.
Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying STT stock.
State Street Corporation's current P/E ratio is 19.1x. The historical average is 17.3x. This places it at the 66th percentile of its historical range.
State Street Corporation's current EV/EBITDA is -12.1x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 13.3x.
State Street Corporation's return on equity (ROE) is 11.1%. The historical average is 12.5%.
Based on historical data, State Street Corporation is trading at a P/E of 19.1x. This is at the 66th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
State Street Corporation's current dividend yield is 1.72% with a payout ratio of 30.4%.
State Street Corporation has 61.4% gross margin and 16.5% operating margin. Operating margin between 10-20% is typical for established companies.
State Street Corporation's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 7.0x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Net Interest Margin Compression
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Market Pricing Reflects Cyclical Utility
According to current market data, State Street trades at a forward P/E of 13.51, which, when compared to the broader financial services sector, suggests investors are pricing the firm as a cyclical utility rather than a high-growth technology-enabled service provider despite its integrated Alpha platform.
The current valuation multiple appears to discount the potential for higher-margin software-like revenue streams, reflecting skepticism regarding the firm's ability to decouple from interest rate sensitivity. Investors should monitor whether the forward P/E expansion occurs as the market begins to recognize the stickiness of the Charles River-integrated client base.
Capital Efficiency Constrained by Scale
Based on reported financial statements, State Street's ROIC has remained stagnant, hovering between 0.3% and 1.3% over the last ten quarters, which indicates that the firm is struggling to compound returns on its massive invested capital base despite its dominant position in global asset servicing.
The low ROIC suggests that the high capital requirements inherent in maintaining a G-SIB infrastructure significantly dilute the returns generated by the core servicing business. This trend warrants further investigation into whether the ongoing technology transformation can eventually drive the efficiency gains necessary to improve capital productivity.
Working Capital Volatility Obscures Efficiency
As reported in recent SEC filings, State Street's DSO has fluctuated between 75 and 84 days over the past ten quarters, revealing that the firm's cash conversion cycle is heavily influenced by institutional client deposit movements rather than traditional operational efficiency in its service delivery model.
The lack of a clear trend in DSO suggests that the firm's working capital is more a function of macro-driven liquidity flows than internal billing or collection processes. Analysts should be cautious in interpreting these metrics as indicators of operational performance, as they are largely secondary to the firm's role as a global custodian.
Disciplined Leverage Amidst Regulatory Burden
According to recent quarterly filings, State Street maintains a debt-to-equity ratio of 1.09, which remains well within its historical range of 1.02 to 1.51, suggesting that management is successfully navigating the complex capital requirements mandated for a systemically important financial institution.
The stability of the leverage profile indicates a conservative approach to capital structure, which is essential given the firm's sensitivity to regulatory capital surcharges. Investors should monitor the interest coverage ratio, which has remained low, as it may indicate limited flexibility to absorb further shocks to net interest income.
Misapplication of Traditional Banking Multiples
Data from the past ten quarters suggests that the P/B ratio is the most commonly misapplied metric for State Street, as it fails to account for the intangible value of the firm's proprietary Alpha platform and the high switching costs inherent in its institutional custody ecosystem.
Relying on P/B ratios obscures the shift toward a data-centric business model, as it treats the firm's technology infrastructure as a commodity rather than a competitive moat. A more appropriate analysis would involve adjusting for the value of the integrated software suite, which likely provides a premium that traditional book value metrics ignore.