Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -17.7x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -6.3%. (2013–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $666M | $1.0B | $1.3B | $359M | $196M | $178M | $194M | $336M | $793M | $2.3B | $847M |
| Enterprise Value | $304M | $-548127135200 | $-569486823392 | $-544630492676 | $-151350009632 | $-77775611420 | $-46905579872 | $-22901855608 | $-34589639608 | $-420929152 | $-6552809441 |
| P/E Ratio → | -17.68 | — | 0.01 | 0.01 | — | — | 0.04 | — | — | — | 0.64 |
| P/S Ratio | 0.83 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.06 | 0.09 |
| P/B Ratio | 1.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | 0.03 | 0.11 | 0.07 |
| P/FCF | — | — | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | — | 0.00 | 0.02 | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | — | 0.00 | 0.01 | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | -0.45 | -0.49 | -0.45 | -0.18 | -0.18 | -0.30 | -0.28 | -0.59 | -0.01 | -0.67 |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | -2.92 | -2.11 | -15.07 | -4.63 | -2.42 | — | — | -0.26 | -3.21 |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | -3.99 | -2.89 | — | — | -3.82 | — | — | -0.66 | -3.57 |
| EV / FCF | — | — | -1.23 | -4.09 | -0.28 | -0.28 | — | -0.17 | -0.70 | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 75.1% | 75.1% | 100.4% | 101.0% | 102.6% | 89.7% | 85.1% | 82.1% | 82.6% | 85.2% | 89.8% |
| Operating Margin | -9.2% | -9.2% | 12.4% | 15.4% | -7.0% | -2.1% | 7.7% | -4.9% | -7.3% | 1.7% | 18.7% |
| Net Profit Margin | -4.6% | -4.6% | 9.0% | 9.2% | -4.1% | -2.5% | 6.5% | -5.3% | -10.8% | -3.0% | 13.4% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -6.3% | -6.3% | 13.5% | 21.8% | -17.6% | -13.6% | 24.0% | -15.2% | -27.3% | -7.2% | 18.1% |
| ROA | -0.9% | -0.9% | 2.3% | 3.4% | -2.3% | -1.9% | 3.6% | -2.1% | -3.6% | -1.0% | 2.0% |
| ROIC | -5.7% | -5.7% | 13.0% | 27.0% | -22.0% | -7.8% | 17.0% | -7.0% | -8.4% | 1.8% | 11.6% |
| ROCE | -2.6% | -2.6% | 13.4% | 27.2% | -20.8% | -6.8% | 15.2% | -5.9% | -7.6% | 1.7% | 5.9% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 1.04 | 1.04 | 0.11 | 0.01 | 0.02 | 0.05 | 0.18 | 0.40 | 0.63 | 0.67 | 0.61 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | 0.47 | 0.03 | 0.66 | 0.28 | 0.51 | — | — | 8.57 | 3.62 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.54 | -0.71 | -0.73 | -0.53 | -0.78 | -0.87 | -0.73 | -1.36 | -0.13 | -0.61 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | -2.93 | -2.12 | -15.09 | -4.64 | -2.43 | — | — | -1.71 | -3.62 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | -1.24 | -4.09 | -0.28 | -0.28 | — | -0.17 | -0.72 | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | -0.10 | -0.10 | 0.16 | 0.10 | -0.05 | -0.02 | 0.15 | -0.06 | -0.12 | 0.05 | 0.44 |
Net cash position: cash ($1.60T) exceeds total debt ($1.05T)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 4.06 | 4.06 | 0.32 | 0.23 | 0.18 | 0.31 | 0.34 | 0.43 | 0.49 | 0.42 | 0.45 |
| Quick Ratio | 4.06 | 4.06 | 0.32 | 0.23 | 0.18 | 0.31 | 0.34 | 0.43 | 0.49 | 0.42 | 0.45 |
| Cash Ratio | 4.06 | 4.06 | 0.20 | 0.16 | 0.09 | 0.14 | 0.20 | 0.28 | 0.34 | 0.19 | 0.21 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.16 | 0.26 | 0.27 | 0.39 | 0.56 | 0.42 | 0.41 | 0.27 | 0.29 | 0.10 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 3.8% | 100.0% | 100.0% | — | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 86.7% | 7.4% | 3.0% |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | 26.8% | — | — | — | 7.8% | — | — | — | 1.9% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | 9421.6% | 14358.4% | — | — | 2728.8% | — | — | — | 156.0% |
| FCF Yield | — | — | 34732.0% | 37051.7% | 274809.8% | 153750.6% | — | 40518.8% | 6236.0% | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 3.8% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | 86.7% | 7.4% | 3.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $88M | $88M | $89M | $91M | $91M | $91M | $91M | $91M | $79M | $64M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 13 years · Updated daily
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10-year return with dividends reinvested.
Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying SUPV stock.
Grupo Supervielle S.A.'s current P/E ratio is -17.7x. The historical average is 0.2x.
Grupo Supervielle S.A.'s return on equity (ROE) is -6.3%. The historical average is 5.5%.
Based on historical data, Grupo Supervielle S.A. is trading at a P/E of -17.7x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Grupo Supervielle S.A.'s current dividend yield is 3.79%.
Grupo Supervielle S.A. has 75.1% gross margin and -9.2% operating margin.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Hyperinflationary accounting obscuring real performance
P/B Discount Reflects Structural Profitability Concerns
At a P/B of 1.16, SUPV trades at a notable discount to peers like GGAL (1.41) and BMA (1.46), suggesting the market is pricing in its weaker return profile and higher sensitivity to the Argentine macro cycle.
The current P/B multiple, while above its own historical low of 0.96, remains below the peer average, indicating the market does not view SUPV as a premium franchise. This discount appears justified given the bank's recent negative ROE and the structural challenges in its cost base, which peers like BBAR have managed more effectively. The valuation implies investors are demanding a higher return on tangible equity to compensate for the bank's niche focus and operational volatility.
ROE Collapse Driven by Margin and Efficiency Pressures
ROE has deteriorated from a strong 11.1% in 2024Q1 to a negative -3.4% in 2026Q1, a collapse primarily driven by a collapsing NIM and an efficiency ratio that has frequently exceeded 80%, indicating severe operational leverage working in reverse.
The DuPont decomposition reveals a bank struggling on multiple fronts. The NIM has been highly erratic, swinging from 13.0% to 0.0% and back to 2.9%, making core spread income unreliable. Simultaneously, the efficiency ratio's spikes above 100% in quarters like 2024Q4 and 2025Q3 show that non-interest expenses are overwhelming revenue, a critical issue for a bank with a high fixed-cost physical network. This combination suggests profitability is being squeezed by both external rate volatility and internal cost rigidity.
Erratic NIM and Cost Structure Undermine Operating Leverage
The net interest margin has been extremely volatile, ranging from 0.0% to 36.4% over the past ten quarters, while the efficiency ratio has averaged approximately 85%, indicating a cost structure that is poorly calibrated to the bank's volatile revenue generation.
The NIM's wild swings are a direct reflection of the hyperinflationary environment and BCRA policy shifts, making it an unreliable predictor of future earnings. More concerning is the efficiency ratio, which has repeatedly breached the 100% threshold, meaning the bank's operating costs have at times exceeded its total revenue. This points to a fundamental mismatch between the bank's high fixed-cost physical branch network and its ability to generate consistent fee and interest income, a structural disadvantage versus more efficient peers.
Equity Ratio Erosion Signals Capital Strain
The equity-to-assets ratio has steadily declined from 0.22 in 2024Q1 to 0.12 in 2026Q2, suggesting that asset growth, likely driven by monetary revaluation, is outpacing the bank's ability to generate retained earnings and strengthen its capital base.
This declining leverage ratio is a critical warning sign. While a lower equity ratio can sometimes indicate efficient use of capital, in this context it appears to be a symptom of capital being consumed by losses and inflation-adjusted asset growth rather than being organically generated. The trend suggests the bank's regulatory buffers may be thinning, potentially limiting its capacity for capital return or forcing it to curtail balance sheet growth to maintain compliance.
Provision Volatility Masks Underlying Credit Risk
Loan loss provisions have been wildly inconsistent, swinging from a negative $87.8B in 2024Q4 to a peak of $109.4B in 2025Q4, indicating that reported credit costs are dominated by macroeconomic revaluations rather than a clear trend in borrower defaults.
The extreme volatility in provisions makes it nearly impossible to assess the true underlying asset quality of the loan book. This pattern suggests that reserve accounting is heavily influenced by IAS 29 hyperinflationary adjustments and sovereign debt revaluations, rather than a straightforward analysis of non-performing loans. Investors should be cautious about interpreting any single quarter's provision figure as indicative of the bank's credit risk profile, as the noise from accounting adjustments appears to overwhelm the signal.
P/E Ratio is Meaningless Amid Hyperinflationary Losses
The P/E ratio, currently at -20.51, is the most commonly misapplied metric for SUPV, as it is rendered meaningless by volatile, inflation-driven accounting losses that obscure the bank's underlying operational cash generation and real economic value.
Applying a standard P/E multiple to SUPV is fundamentally flawed because the bank's net income is heavily distorted by non-cash items like the 'Gain/Loss on Net Monetary Position' required under IAS 29. A quarter with a large nominal loss does not necessarily indicate operational failure, just as a profit may not reflect real value creation. Analysts should instead focus on metrics like P/B and tangible book value per share, which are less susceptible to hyperinflationary accounting distortions, to assess the bank's core valuation.