Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio N/A · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE N/A. (2011–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | — | $155M | $206M | $241M | $351M | $570M | $666M | $688M | $546M | $860M | $990M |
| Enterprise Value | — | $496M | $581M | $643M | $736M | $948M | $844M | $897M | $714M | $1.0B | $1.2B |
| P/E Ratio → | — | 18.97 | 28.84 | — | 58.25 | — | 59.56 | 14.69 | 20.23 | 67.36 | 43.41 |
| P/S Ratio | — | 0.53 | 0.67 | 0.74 | 0.99 | 1.73 | 2.50 | 2.44 | 2.57 | 4.39 | 5.62 |
| P/B Ratio | — | — | — | — | 11.54 | 8.25 | 5.91 | 6.99 | 6.89 | 12.39 | 16.31 |
| P/FCF | — | 4.62 | 3.88 | 11.05 | 5.74 | 20.95 | 10.41 | 10.46 | 8.00 | 14.08 | 16.53 |
| P/OCF | — | 3.79 | 3.45 | 8.54 | 4.94 | 13.43 | 9.40 | 8.71 | 7.18 | 13.59 | 15.38 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 1.70 | 1.89 | 1.97 | 2.08 | 2.88 | 3.17 | 3.18 | 3.36 | 5.30 | 6.60 |
| EV / EBITDA | — | 6.95 | 8.34 | 29.52 | 9.95 | 44.29 | 13.04 | 9.88 | 3.27 | 4.56 | 6.58 |
| EV / EBIT | — | 9.66 | 13.69 | — | 18.86 | — | 21.68 | 12.71 | 9.95 | 10.50 | 16.47 |
| EV / FCF | — | 14.79 | 10.96 | 29.42 | 12.02 | 34.85 | 13.20 | 13.64 | 10.46 | 16.99 | 19.43 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | — | 57.6% | 74.3% | 74.2% | 74.4% | 75.0% | 75.8% | 74.4% | 90.3% | 89.5% | 90.9% |
| Operating Margin | — | 15.6% | 13.1% | -3.3% | 10.8% | -3.0% | 14.5% | 24.4% | 36.6% | 51.2% | 41.1% |
| Net Profit Margin | — | 2.8% | 2.3% | -21.2% | 1.7% | -4.7% | 4.2% | 9.0% | 12.7% | 6.5% | 12.9% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | — | — | — | — | 12.3% | -17.2% | 10.7% | 28.5% | 36.4% | 19.7% | 45.4% |
| ROA | — | 1.4% | 1.2% | -10.9% | 0.8% | -2.3% | 2.0% | 5.2% | 6.5% | 3.0% | 5.5% |
| ROIC | — | 10.9% | 9.4% | -2.2% | 6.6% | -2.0% | 9.7% | 18.7% | 23.6% | 31.2% | 29.8% |
| ROCE | — | 10.5% | 9.4% | -2.1% | 6.3% | -1.9% | 8.8% | 16.9% | 21.0% | 26.6% | 20.1% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | — | — | — | — | 16.21 | 7.30 | 2.48 | 2.97 | 2.87 | 3.30 | 3.80 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | 6.44 | 6.77 | 22.22 | 6.67 | 23.56 | 4.32 | 3.22 | 1.04 | 1.01 | 1.31 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | — | — | — | 12.64 | 5.47 | 1.58 | 2.12 | 2.12 | 2.57 | 2.85 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | 4.78 | 5.38 | 18.43 | 5.20 | 17.66 | 2.75 | 2.30 | 0.77 | 0.78 | 0.98 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 10.17 | 7.08 | 18.37 | 6.29 | 13.90 | 2.79 | 3.18 | 2.46 | 2.92 | 2.89 |
| Interest Coverage | — | 1.62 | 1.17 | -0.16 | 1.87 | -0.95 | 4.22 | 5.77 | 5.96 | 9.89 | 8.21 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | — | 1.69 | 1.41 | 1.18 | 1.61 | 1.44 | 1.42 | 1.33 | 1.87 | 1.83 | 1.75 |
| Quick Ratio | — | 1.69 | 1.41 | 1.18 | 1.37 | 1.22 | 1.25 | 1.14 | 1.87 | 1.83 | 1.75 |
| Cash Ratio | — | 0.84 | 0.62 | 0.55 | 0.91 | 0.86 | 0.86 | 0.78 | 1.28 | 1.17 | 1.24 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.50 | 0.53 | 0.56 | 0.51 | 0.42 | 0.48 | 0.52 | 0.50 | 0.48 | 0.40 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | 3.07 | 2.56 | 3.24 | 3.51 | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | 0.3% | 5.6% | 5.2% | 3.1% | 2.5% | 2.2% | 2.6% | 1.5% | 1.1% |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | 8.4% | — | 297.6% | — | 145.4% | 59.6% | 52.9% | 99.8% | 46.5% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | 5.3% | 3.5% | — | 1.7% | — | 1.7% | 6.8% | 4.9% | 1.5% | 2.3% |
| FCF Yield | — | 21.6% | 25.8% | 9.0% | 17.4% | 4.8% | 9.6% | 9.6% | 12.5% | 7.1% | 6.0% |
| Buyback Yield | — | 3.0% | 1.5% | 1.4% | 9.7% | 0.9% | 0.4% | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.1% | 0.1% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | — | 3.0% | 1.8% | 7.0% | 14.9% | 4.1% | 2.8% | 2.4% | 2.8% | 1.6% | 1.1% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $20M | $19M | $18M | $19M | $19M | $18M | $18M | $18M | $18M | $18M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 15 years · Updated daily
Live VCP patterns, Cup & Handle overlays, support/resistance, and AI trade plans.
High-probability breakout stocks crossing their pivot across 5 pattern engines.
DCF models, multiple analysis, and analyst estimates.
10-year return with dividends reinvested.
Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying RMAX stock.
Based on historical data, RE/MAX Holdings, Inc. is trading at valuation metrics that vary. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Negative AFFO despite nominal dividend cushion
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Premium P/E Anchored to Volatile Earnings Base
At a P/E of 30.9 versus Douglas Elliman's 9.5 and Anywhere's negative 15.3, RMAX trades at a substantial premium to brokerage peers, yet its ten-quarter P/FFO series is uniformly negative (-1.39 to -4.21), indicating the equity is priced on recovery expectations rather than distributable earnings.
The negative P/FFO readings across all ten quarters suggest that when standard REIT add-backs are applied, RMAX's earnings base is either vanishingly small or negative, making the headline 30.9 P/E appear to rest on adjusted or forward assumptions rather than trailing GAAP results. EV/EBITDA of 8.27 sits well below Anywhere's 18.8 but must be weighed against RMAX's deteriorating FFO trajectory (-86.0% growth in 2026Q2), which implies the multiple could expand mechanically if EBITDA continues to fall. At 0.85x sales, the market appears to be pricing in structural erosion of the royalty stream, and the absence of a computable implied cap rate reflects that RMAX's asset-light franchise model generates little directly attributable property NOI to anchor a private-market valuation cross-check.
NOI Margin Swings Signal Accounting Distortion
As reported in RMAX's quarterly disclosures, NOI margin swung from 57.8% in 2025Q4 to an implausible 100.0% in 2026Q2, a dispersion that appears to reflect expense timing or reclassification rather than genuine operating leverage gains in a franchise model with largely fixed G&A.
A 100% NOI margin in a services franchisor is a strong indicator that cost-of-revenue recognition shifted between periods, and analysts should treat the series as unreliable for trend extrapolation rather than evidence of margin expansion. Because the FFO per share series (-0.19 in 2026Q1, 0.07 in 2026Q2) does not corroborate any margin improvement, the profit picture suggests any reported margin resilience is being consumed above the NOI line by interest expense and intangible amortization, leaving economics for equity holders materially weaker than the top-line margin implies.
Nominal Payout Obscures Negative Distributable Cash
According to RMAX's reported figures, the FFO payout ratio of 6.5% in 2026Q2 looks conservative in isolation, but AFFO per share of negative 0.16 that same quarter indicates the dividend is nominally covered rather than genuinely funded by distributable cash flow.
A payout ratio computed against positive but collapsing FFO ($0.07 per share, down 86% year over year) provides a false sense of safety; the AFFO deficit suggests the trivial cash dividend is being funded from the balance sheet's $112.4M cash pile rather than operations. Investors should monitor whether the dividend is retained at current levels as a signaling device despite negative AFFO, since sustaining it through prolonged cash burn, however small in absolute terms, would represent a preference for optics over capital retention.
Debt Reversal Undermines Leverage Readability
Based on EDBL-style balance sheet scrutiny, RMAX's reported total debt collapsed 95.9% from $456.9M in 2026Q1 to $18.9M in 2026Q2 while cash rose only $5.3M, a discontinuity that points to reclassification rather than genuine deleveraging and renders debt-to-gross-assets uninterpretable this quarter.
Interest coverage of 0.21 in 2026Q2, down from 2.40 two quarters earlier, suggests that regardless of how debt is classified, coverage of fixed charges has deteriorated to a level that would normally trigger refinancing scrutiny. Compounding the uncertainty, the balance sheet analysis flagged a $490M-plus reconciliation gap between liabilities and equity, so until that discrepancy is resolved, no confident statement about RMAX's leverage or solvency position can be made; the missing D/E series in the ratio table reinforces that leverage metrics here warrant caution rather than reliance.
Franchise Base Erodes as Asset Base Shrinks
As disclosed in RMAX's financial statements, net PP&E contracted 47% from $30.6M in 2024Q1 to $16.2M in 2026Q2, while 2026Q2 capex of $5.1M exceeded operating cash flow of $4.3M, a pattern suggesting the physical platform is being consumed faster than it is replenished.
For a franchisor, the meaningful occupancy analogue is franchisee network health, and ten consecutive quarters of year-over-year revenue decline point to agent-count or royalty-rate erosion that a conventional REIT occupancy metric would not capture. The concentration risk here is qualitative rather than geographic-property based: revenue depends on a handful of royalty and franchise-fee streams in a high-rate housing market, and the $9.3M of quarterly stock-based compensation, nearly six times the quarter's FFO, may indicate that retaining franchise and corporate talent is increasingly being paid in equity rather than cash.
The Ratio That Misleads Most Here Is P/E
The most commonly misapplied metric for RMAX is the trailing P/E of 30.9, which is distorted by heavy intangible amortization and depreciation charges, and analysts should instead anchor on AFFO per share, which at negative 0.16 in 2026Q2 reveals a cash-earnings profile the P/E conceals entirely.
Standard P/E treats RMAX as a conventional growth company, but its REIT election means large non-cash write-downs depress GAAP earnings while the FFO add-backs flatter the other direction; the FFO-to-net-income ratio swinging from 18.22 to -1.01 across the ten-quarter window shows both metrics are unstable in opposite directions. A related trap is applying debt-to-equity using book equity of $443.9M, which ignores both the reported reconciliation gap and the fact that a services REIT's book value carries franchise intangibles that are not readily monetizable; debt-to-gross-assets and AFFO-based payout analysis are the more defensible lenses, though even they require the underlying classification questions to be resolved first.