Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -9.2x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -156.4%. (2020–2024 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $76M | $27M | $43M | $44M | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $72M | $23M | $42M | $43M | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | -9.22 | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 9999.00 | 37046.06 | 20868.17 | 18228.77 | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 7.74 | 5.76 | 122.34 | 53.85 | — | — |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 30729.14 | 20741.60 | 17751.55 | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 100.0% | 100.0% | 93.0% | 81.9% | 100.0% | — |
| Operating Margin | -532513.1% | -532513.1% | -122999.5% | -50004.7% | -34332.3% | — |
| Net Profit Margin | -539798.2% | -539798.2% | -162313.5% | -62151.2% | -35047.2% | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -156.4% | -156.4% | -568.8% | -301.1% | -984.5% | — |
| ROA | -145.0% | -145.0% | -413.2% | -185.4% | -267.7% | -2.7% |
| ROIC | -3352.8% | -3352.8% | — | — | — | — |
| ROCE | -154.2% | -154.2% | -431.0% | -242.3% | -964.4% | — |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | — | — | — | — | 1.20 | — |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.98 | -0.74 | -1.41 | -1.16 | — |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | -56.02 | -56.02 | -34.27 | -46.81 | -48.03 | -1.99 |
Net cash position: cash ($5M) exceeds total debt ($0)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 14.44 | 14.44 | 4.03 | 3.09 | 1.70 | 0.97 |
| Quick Ratio | 14.44 | 14.44 | 4.03 | 3.09 | 1.70 | 0.97 |
| Cash Ratio | 13.96 | 13.96 | 3.94 | 3.09 | 1.70 | 0.93 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 | — |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 8392.04 | — | — | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 0.2% | 0.2% | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.2% | 0.2% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $8M | $7M | $6M | $6M | $6M |
Rapid capital depletion
According to recent financial data, the company trades at a price-to-sales ratio of 9999.00, a figure that reflects extreme market speculation rather than any underlying commercial performance, as the firm has yet to demonstrate a repeatable revenue model capable of justifying its current market capitalization.
The valuation multiples appear disconnected from the company's operational reality, as the lack of meaningful revenue renders traditional metrics like P/E or EV/EBITDA effectively meaningless. Investors should monitor whether the current premium is based on an assumption of future technology licensing or if it represents a mispricing of the company's actual ability to scale its influencer platform.
Based on reported figures, the company's ROIC of -177.4% in 2025Q3 highlights a severe inability to generate returns on invested capital, suggesting that every dollar deployed into the business is currently resulting in significant value destruction rather than compounding for shareholders.
The persistent negative return on capital trends indicate that the company's infrastructure investments are not yielding the expected commercial benefits. This decay in capital efficiency warrants further investigation into whether the current business model is fundamentally flawed or if the company is simply in an early-stage investment phase that has yet to reach a critical mass.
As reported in financial statements, the company's DSO of 999999 in 2025Q3 indicates an extreme inability to collect on its receivables, which suggests that the firm's current revenue generation process is either non-existent or plagued by significant collection friction that prevents the conversion of sales into actual cash.
The lack of a functional cash conversion cycle implies that the company is not operating as a standard service provider, but rather as a speculative entity with no clear path to operational efficiency. Investors should be wary of these metrics, as they suggest that the company's internal processes for managing customer payments are not yet aligned with the requirements of a scalable business.
Based on the latest quarterly data, the company maintains a current ratio of 50.79, yet this figure is misleadingly high because it is driven by cash reserves rather than operational liquidity, as the firm continues to burn through capital without generating sufficient revenue to sustain its overhead.
While the cash position provides a temporary runway, the lack of recurring revenue means that the company's liquidity is entirely dependent on its existing capital base. This suggests that the company is highly vulnerable to any further delays in achieving product-market fit, as it lacks the operational cash flow to support its current cost structure.
As indicated by the 100% gross margin reported in most periods, this metric is the most commonly misapplied figure for this business model, as it obscures the true cost of influencer payouts and fails to reflect the actual unit economics of the company's two-sided marketplace.
Investors should look past the headline gross margin, which likely excludes critical variable costs, and instead focus on the contribution margin after accounting for all influencer incentives. Relying on the 100% figure may lead to an overestimation of the platform's scalability, as it ignores the potential for rising acquisition costs as the company attempts to grow its user base.
Includes 30+ ratios · 5 years · Updated daily
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Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying TZUP stock.
Thumzup Media Corporation's current P/E ratio is -9.2x. This places it at the 50th percentile of its historical range.
Thumzup Media Corporation's return on equity (ROE) is -156.4%. The historical average is -228.7%.
Based on historical data, Thumzup Media Corporation is trading at a P/E of -9.2x. This is at the 50th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Thumzup Media Corporation's current dividend yield is 0.17%.
Thumzup Media Corporation has 100.0% gross margin and -532513.1% operating margin.