Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -60.5x · EV/EBITDA 56.9x · ROE 0.5%. (2008–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $7.3B | $17.3B | $16.6B | $13.2B | $7.6B | $15.6B | $30.4B | $9.4B | $6.2B | $7.6B | $6.6B |
| Enterprise Value | $7.1B | $17.1B | $16.2B | $13.6B | $8.0B | $14.8B | $31.2B | $10.8B | $6.4B | $7.6B | $6.7B |
| P/E Ratio → | -60.54 | 753.92 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 2.55 | 6.71 | 7.42 | 6.81 | 3.86 | 7.29 | 18.74 | 3.44 | 4.67 | 7.05 | 7.76 |
| P/B Ratio | 1.58 | 3.55 | 3.42 | 2.93 | 1.69 | 2.91 | 6.42 | 2.75 | 1.90 | 2.85 | 2.59 |
| P/FCF | 22.80 | 73.78 | 58.19 | 70.10 | 1.73 | — | 96.39 | — | — | 42.30 | — |
| P/OCF | 19.82 | 47.12 | 38.75 | 37.42 | 1.68 | — | 71.74 | — | 1615.94 | 29.42 | 759.56 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 6.62 | 7.23 | 6.98 | 4.06 | 6.96 | 19.24 | 3.94 | 4.81 | 7.09 | 7.90 |
| EV / EBITDA | 56.92 | 65.52 | 304.95 | — | 91.48 | 37.86 | 105.79 | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | 397.71 | — | — | — | 64.80 | 167.99 | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | 72.77 | 56.71 | 71.88 | 1.82 | — | 98.98 | — | — | 42.49 | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 74.1% | 74.1% | 76.4% | 78.4% | 81.3% | 84.8% | 84.3% | 47.8% | 88.5% | 92.1% | 91.5% |
| Operating Margin | -1.2% | -1.2% | -8.8% | -13.9% | -4.7% | 11.2% | 9.9% | -9.0% | -9.7% | -15.0% | -22.8% |
| Net Profit Margin | 0.9% | 0.9% | -5.0% | -8.1% | -5.2% | -24.8% | -10.0% | -11.1% | -9.0% | -8.8% | -26.0% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 0.5% | 0.5% | -2.4% | -3.5% | -2.1% | -10.5% | -4.0% | -9.1% | -4.0% | -3.6% | -8.5% |
| ROA | 0.4% | 0.4% | -1.8% | -2.4% | -1.2% | -5.8% | -2.4% | -5.9% | -3.2% | -3.0% | -7.0% |
| ROIC | -0.5% | -0.5% | -3.2% | -4.2% | -1.5% | 3.5% | 2.3% | -4.5% | -3.1% | -4.5% | -5.4% |
| ROCE | -0.6% | -0.6% | -3.7% | -4.5% | -1.4% | 3.6% | 2.7% | -5.4% | -3.6% | -5.3% | -6.3% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.11 | 0.11 | 0.14 | 0.40 | 0.42 | 0.30 | 0.53 | 0.73 | 0.26 | 0.14 | 0.15 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 2.05 | 2.05 | 12.45 | — | 21.46 | 4.09 | 8.53 | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.05 | -0.09 | 0.07 | 0.09 | -0.13 | 0.17 | 0.40 | 0.06 | 0.01 | 0.05 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | -0.91 | -0.91 | -7.96 | — | 4.61 | -1.81 | 2.76 | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | -1.01 | -1.48 | 1.78 | 0.09 | — | 2.59 | — | — | 0.19 | — |
| Interest Coverage | 2.39 | 2.39 | -1.97 | -3.28 | -1.43 | 1.79 | 1.20 | -2.04 | -2.66 | -5.69 | -28.74 |
Net cash position: cash ($773M) exceeds total debt ($536M)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 3.13 | 3.13 | 2.81 | 3.24 | 13.34 | 1.98 | 5.46 | 3.81 | 6.58 | 7.11 | 5.98 |
| Quick Ratio | 3.13 | 3.13 | 2.81 | 3.25 | 13.19 | 0.97 | 4.92 | 2.90 | 6.02 | 7.11 | 5.98 |
| Cash Ratio | 1.91 | 1.91 | 2.24 | 2.90 | 12.45 | 0.73 | 4.32 | 2.63 | 5.41 | 6.44 | 5.21 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.45 | 0.38 | 0.29 | 0.30 | 0.20 | 0.22 | 0.45 | 0.31 | 0.33 | 0.27 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | 8.53 | 0.08 | 0.52 | 1.71 | 0.94 | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 24.87 | 16.98 | 18.02 | 13.42 | 13.18 | 15.72 | 8.92 | 18.09 | 18.44 | 17.47 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | 0.1% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | 4.4% | 1.4% | 1.7% | 1.4% | 57.7% | — | 1.0% | — | — | 2.4% | — |
| Buyback Yield | 9.2% | 3.9% | 1.8% | 3.2% | 12.5% | 1.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 9.2% | 3.9% | 1.8% | 3.2% | 12.5% | 1.9% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $254M | $234M | $234M | $242M | $250M | $224M | $206M | $198M | $186M | $180M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 18 years · Updated daily
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Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying ZG stock.
Zillow Group, Inc. Class A's current P/E ratio is -60.5x. The historical average is 140.9x.
Zillow Group, Inc. Class A's current EV/EBITDA is 56.9x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 56.3x.
Zillow Group, Inc. Class A's return on equity (ROE) is 0.5%. The historical average is -7.8%.
Based on historical data, Zillow Group, Inc. Class A is trading at a P/E of -60.5x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Zillow Group, Inc. Class A has 74.1% gross margin and -1.2% operating margin.
Zillow Group, Inc. Class A's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 2.1x, indicating moderate leverage. A ratio between 2-4x is manageable but warrants monitoring.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Competitive marketing spend pressure
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Trailing Earnings Distort Valuation Read
Based on ZG's reported figures, a trailing P/E of 335.47 against a forward P/E of 13.67 shows that near-zero GAAP earnings, not business value, drive the headline multiple, making forward earnings the more informative anchor.
The gap between trailing and forward P/E suggests the market is pricing a substantial earnings recovery rather than current profitability. Forward EV/EBITDA of 7.33 versus trailing 27.04 points to the same conclusion, indicating that investors are underwriting margin normalization that the reported quarters have not yet demonstrated. Investors should monitor whether operating margin moves decisively positive, since the current valuation depends heavily on that transition.
Gross Margin Erosion Outpaces Operating Gains
As reported in financial statements, ZG's gross margin compressed from 77.3% in Q2 2024 to 71.3% in Q3 2026, while operating margin remained negative at -22.2% in the latest quarter, indicating cost growth outpacing revenue.
The roughly six-point gross margin decline, set against a 15.5% revenue growth rate, suggests that incremental revenue is coming at lower unit economics, possibly reflecting mix shift or elevated acquisition costs. Operating margin has been negative in most recent quarters, meaning growth has not produced operating leverage. Net margin figures are further distorted by stock-based compensation, so operating trends are the more reliable signal of underlying earning power.
Deleveraging Reduces Refinancing Pressure
According to recent SEC filings, ZG's debt-to-equity ratio fell from 0.40 in Q2 2024 to 0.11 in Q3 2026, with total debt declining to $480.0M, a level that appears comfortable relative to the company's asset base.
The sharp reduction in leverage suggests the balance sheet has moved away from refinancing risk over the period. Interest coverage has swung widely between negative and positive readings, so the coverage trend is less informative than the absolute debt reduction. This warrants monitoring of whether debt levels stay low as buybacks continue to draw on cash.
Current Ratio Compresses Yet Stays Serviceable
Based on ZG's reported figures, the current ratio declined from 3.63 in Q3 2025 to 1.76 in Q3 2026 as cash fell from $874.0M to $602.0M, a trajectory that tightens but does not yet threaten near-term obligations.
The compression reflects both cash deployment into buybacks and a shrinking current asset base relative to current liabilities. A current ratio above 1.7 still indicates coverage of short-term obligations, though the downward slope merits attention. Under a severe housing downturn, the liquidity cushion would depend on whether working capital releases cash as lead volumes fall.
Asset-Light Ratios Mask Capital Deployment
Based on reported figures, ROE and ROIC remain near zero across recent quarters, which may understate the economic return on a goodwill-heavy base of $2.8B and suggests the headline return metrics reflect accounting outcomes rather than operating efficiency alone.
A low ROIC against a large goodwill balance suggests acquisition returns have not yet materialized in reported earnings, though this is an analytical inference from the ratio pattern. Investors may find that price-to-free-cash-flow of 31.04 offers a cleaner read on value than earnings-based multiples, given stock-based compensation distortions. Peer comparison, where Compass and eXp show similarly low returns, suggests the weakness is partly sector-wide rather than uniquely company-specific.