Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -25.5x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -26.7%. (2014–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $2.0B | $2.0B | $1.1B | $715M | $513M | $854M | $2.4B | $1.7B | $427M | $162M | — |
| Enterprise Value | $2.0B | $2.0B | $1.1B | $585M | $140M | $685M | $2.1B | $1.6B | $385M | $126M | — |
| P/E Ratio → | -25.46 | — | — | — | 4.14 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 19.09 | 18.72 | 14.56 | 9.41 | 1.24 | 32.03 | 61.13 | 58.51 | 8.05 | 3.13 | — |
| P/B Ratio | 7.72 | 7.39 | 3.28 | 1.54 | 1.04 | 3.43 | 5.81 | 7.04 | — | 1.39 | — |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | 3.92 | — | — | — | 20.57 | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | 3.56 | — | — | — | 17.66 | 739.24 | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 18.50 | 13.93 | 7.69 | 0.34 | 25.67 | 55.14 | 54.39 | 7.26 | 2.43 | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | 0.98 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | 1.07 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | 1.07 | — | — | — | 18.54 | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 100.0% | 100.0% | 100.0% | -88.1% | 100.0% | 100.0% | -338.7% | -296.3% | -7.4% | 20.5% | -222.9% |
| Operating Margin | -87.3% | -87.3% | -179.7% | -181.6% | 31.6% | -808.2% | -481.3% | -512.1% | -62.5% | -17.4% | -343.9% |
| Net Profit Margin | -76.6% | -76.6% | -160.8% | -156.1% | 30.1% | -794.0% | -463.5% | -492.3% | -68.9% | -20.1% | -307.1% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -26.7% | -26.7% | -30.5% | -24.8% | 33.5% | -64.3% | -55.1% | -289.7% | — | -16.6% | -248.2% |
| ROA | -20.0% | -20.0% | -23.5% | -19.3% | 24.0% | -45.7% | -39.8% | -47.5% | -19.4% | -9.2% | -57.7% |
| ROIC | -25.9% | -25.9% | -32.9% | -45.6% | 98.0% | -126.3% | -93.5% | -91.4% | — | -17.4% | -1528.4% |
| ROCE | -27.3% | -27.3% | -30.5% | -25.6% | 30.0% | -56.0% | -50.8% | -60.5% | -20.0% | -9.2% | -79.1% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.06 | 0.06 | 0.13 | 0.02 | 0.03 | — | 0.00 | 0.49 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | 0.20 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.09 | -0.14 | -0.28 | -0.76 | -0.68 | -0.57 | -0.49 | — | -0.31 | -1.33 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | -2.62 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | -2.85 | — | — | — | -2.03 | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | -200.99 | -6.96 | -39.93 |
Net cash position: cash ($41M) exceeds total debt ($18M)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 5.52 | 5.52 | 3.40 | 7.41 | 5.70 | 4.01 | 5.31 | 3.78 | 6.82 | 6.30 | 2.81 |
| Quick Ratio | 5.52 | 5.52 | 3.40 | 7.41 | 5.70 | 4.01 | 5.31 | 3.78 | 6.82 | 6.30 | 2.81 |
| Cash Ratio | 5.41 | 5.41 | 2.56 | 6.71 | 5.15 | 3.52 | 4.98 | 3.62 | 6.68 | 5.99 | 2.43 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.31 | 0.16 | 0.13 | 0.64 | 0.07 | 0.07 | 0.08 | 0.22 | 0.39 | 0.12 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 15.98 | 266.99 | 93.53 | 29.56 | 213.61 | 143.31 | 26.99 | 2.46 | 16.43 | 142.80 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | 24.2% | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | 25.5% | — | — | — | 4.9% | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 2.1% | 2.1% | 2.7% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 2.1% | 2.1% | 2.7% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $75M | $76M | $69M | $65M | $52M | $50M | $38M | $29M | $21M | $20M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 12 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying ZYME stock.
Zymeworks Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -25.5x. The historical average is 4.1x.
Zymeworks Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -26.7%. The historical average is -74.6%.
Based on historical data, Zymeworks Inc. is trading at a P/E of -25.5x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Zymeworks Inc. has 100.0% gross margin and -87.3% operating margin.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Revenue collapse and cash burn
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Margin Collapse After Licensing Peak
Gross margin swung from 100% in 2025Q2 to -18.2% in 2026Q1, as reported in financial statements, signaling the end of licensing revenue and onset of cost recognition without offsetting sales.
The gross margin reversal indicates that Zymeworks is now expensing cost of goods sold with no corresponding revenue, a stark departure from its asset-light licensing model. Operating margin deteriorated to -19.6% in 2026Q1, reflecting fixed R&D and SG&A costs no longer absorbed by revenue. Net margin remained deeply negative, with the only profitable quarter in 2025Q2 (net margin 4.8%) now appearing as an anomaly tied to a one-time licensing milestone.
Return on Capital Decays Sharply
ROIC fell from -0.2% in 2025Q2 to -38.8% in 2026Q1, per reported figures, indicating that capital deployed is generating increasingly negative returns as revenue vanishes.
The deterioration in ROIC is driven by both margin collapse and a shrinking capital base, as equity eroded from $438.0M in 2024Q1 to $80.4M in 2026Q2. ROE swung from +0.7% in 2025Q2 to -111.8% in 2026Q2, reflecting the combined impact of net losses and depleted equity. This suggests the company is not compounding returns but rather destroying capital, with the only positive quarter tied to a non-recurring licensing event.
Working Capital Efficiency Distorted
DSO spiked to 622 days in 2025Q4 and 174 days in 2026Q1, as per financial statements, while DPO reached 547 days in 2026Q1, indicating extreme timing distortions in revenue recognition and payables.
The erratic DSO and DPO figures reflect the unstable revenue base, with licensing milestones causing large swings in receivables and payables. The cash conversion cycle is not calculable for most quarters due to missing DIO data, but the available figures suggest that working capital management is secondary to the core issue of revenue collapse. Asset turnover remained negligible at 0.01-0.12, underscoring that the asset base is not generating sales.
Leverage Rising from Equity Erosion
Debt-to-equity climbed from 0.05 in 2024Q1 to 0.20 in 2026Q2, as reported in financial statements, while total debt stayed near $16-18M, indicating leverage is increasing due to shrinking equity, not new borrowing.
Interest coverage turned negative in 2026Q1 at -21.44, and while debt levels are modest, the equity base is being rapidly depleted by losses. The D/EBITDA ratio is unavailable for most periods, but the negative EBITDA in recent quarters suggests that debt service would be challenging without additional funding. The leverage increase is a symptom of balance sheet erosion rather than aggressive borrowing, but it still raises refinancing risk if equity continues to decline.
Liquidity Buffer Masks Underlying Burn
Current ratio improved to 6.32 in 2026Q2 from 5.52 in 2025Q4, per financial statements, but cash burn of -$77.9M in FCF during 2026Q2 suggests the buffer is temporary.
The quick ratio equals the current ratio at 6.32, indicating no inventory dependence, which is typical for a biotech with minimal physical assets. However, the cash position of $179.4M in 2026Q2, while seemingly strong, is being consumed at a rate that, based on the prior quarter's operating cash flow of -$77.7M, would cover only about two years of operations. The liquidity ratio appears healthy, but the underlying cash flow deterioration warrants close monitoring.
Misapplied P/E on Negative Earnings
The forward P/E of 21.66 is misleading for a company with negative trailing earnings, as it relies on analyst estimates of future profitability that may not materialize given the revenue collapse.
For a biotech with no recurring revenue, the P/E ratio is commonly misapplied because it assumes a normalized earnings power that does not exist. The trailing P/E is negative, and the forward P/E of 21.66 implies a return to profitability that is highly uncertain given the zero revenue in 2026Q2. A more appropriate metric would be EV/Sales or EV/EBITDA, but even those are distorted by the licensing-driven revenue spike. Investors should instead focus on cash runway and the probability of securing new partnerships, as the current valuation multiples do not capture the fundamental risk of capital depletion.