Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 7.0x · EV/EBITDA 4.5x · ROE 9.5%. (1996–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $75.3B | $87.8B | $50.7B | $31.3B | $32.9B | $45.1B | $35.3B | $41.6B | $32.8B | $47.1B | $46.9B |
| Enterprise Value | $62.2B | $78.0B | $26.3B | $-16769850000 | $-40094350000 | $-26909750000 | $-11817170000 | $37.0B | $5.2B | $15.7B | $43.8B |
| P/E Ratio → | 6.96 | 14.14 | 9.49 | 7.30 | 6.50 | 7.19 | 23.50 | 17.00 | 20.38 | — | 27.50 |
| P/S Ratio | 1.83 | 3.01 | 1.63 | 1.13 | 1.33 | 2.05 | 1.64 | 2.07 | 1.66 | 2.35 | 1.90 |
| P/B Ratio | 0.74 | 1.12 | 0.70 | 0.44 | 0.47 | 0.64 | 0.53 | 0.63 | 0.51 | 0.71 | 0.66 |
| P/FCF | — | — | 9.16 | — | 1.15 | 0.95 | 0.63 | — | 4.61 | 0.79 | 4.89 |
| P/OCF | — | — | 7.13 | — | 1.09 | 0.92 | 0.61 | — | 3.85 | 0.78 | 4.15 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 2.68 | 0.85 | -0.60 | -1.62 | -1.23 | -0.55 | 1.84 | 0.26 | 0.79 | 1.78 |
| EV / EBITDA | 4.52 | 7.16 | 2.64 | -2.04 | -4.57 | -2.73 | -2.56 | 6.32 | 1.06 | 3.36 | 9.11 |
| EV / EBIT | 5.10 | 8.54 | 3.19 | -2.60 | -5.70 | -3.28 | -4.10 | 8.67 | 1.45 | 4.67 | 12.62 |
| EV / FCF | — | — | 4.75 | — | -1.41 | -0.57 | -0.21 | — | 0.73 | 0.27 | 4.58 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 100.0% | 100.0% | 93.4% | 93.1% | 95.2% | 100.0% | 79.5% | 90.6% | 92.2% | 88.7% | 89.6% |
| Operating Margin | 31.4% | 31.4% | 26.6% | 23.2% | 28.5% | 37.3% | 13.4% | 21.5% | 18.6% | 17.2% | 14.4% |
| Net Profit Margin | 24.6% | 24.6% | 20.7% | 18.6% | 24.1% | 31.9% | 10.4% | 16.2% | 12.5% | -5.9% | 9.3% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 9.5% | 9.5% | 8.9% | 7.3% | 8.5% | 10.2% | 3.4% | 5.0% | 3.8% | -1.7% | 3.3% |
| ROA | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.4% | 0.3% | 0.4% | 0.5% | 0.2% | 0.3% | 0.2% | -0.1% | 0.2% |
| ROIC | 2.5% | 2.5% | 2.5% | 1.9% | 2.2% | 2.7% | 1.0% | 1.5% | 1.3% | 1.4% | 1.6% |
| ROCE | 1.1% | 1.1% | 1.0% | 0.8% | 0.9% | 1.0% | 0.4% | 0.7% | 0.5% | 0.5% | 0.5% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 2.81 | 2.81 | 2.56 | 2.46 | 2.65 | 2.38 | 2.15 | 2.22 | 2.34 | 2.12 | 1.39 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 20.19 | 20.19 | 18.61 | 21.44 | 20.92 | 16.88 | 31.17 | 24.90 | 30.29 | 29.87 | 20.65 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.13 | -0.34 | -0.67 | -1.05 | -1.03 | -0.70 | -0.07 | -0.43 | -0.48 | -0.04 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | -0.90 | -0.90 | -2.45 | -5.84 | -8.33 | -7.30 | -10.19 | -0.79 | -5.58 | -6.70 | -0.63 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | -4.41 | — | -2.56 | -1.53 | -0.84 | — | -3.88 | -0.53 | -0.32 |
| Interest Coverage | 0.42 | 0.42 | 0.32 | 0.29 | 0.82 | 2.59 | 0.81 | 0.71 | 0.63 | 0.92 | 0.70 |
Net cash position: cash ($229.8B) exceeds total debt ($219.9B)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.58 | 0.58 | 0.77 | 0.84 | 0.82 | 0.86 | 0.83 | 0.75 | 0.85 | 0.90 | 0.47 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.58 | 0.58 | 0.77 | 0.84 | 0.82 | 0.86 | 0.83 | 0.75 | 0.85 | 0.90 | 0.47 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.33 | 0.33 | 0.32 | 0.35 | 0.39 | 0.40 | 0.35 | 0.31 | 0.38 | 0.39 | 0.24 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 3.8% | 2.5% | 4.5% | 7.2% | 5.9% | 3.0% | 2.7% | 4.6% | 5.1% | 2.7% | 2.8% |
| Payout Ratio | 30.8% | 30.8% | 35.1% | 43.7% | 32.5% | 19.4% | 41.7% | 58.8% | 67.1% | — | 57.0% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 14.4% | 7.1% | 10.5% | 13.7% | 15.4% | 13.9% | 4.3% | 5.9% | 4.9% | — | 3.6% |
| FCF Yield | — | — | 10.9% | — | 86.6% | 104.7% | 159.2% | — | 21.7% | 125.8% | 20.4% |
| Buyback Yield | 10.9% | 7.0% | 9.9% | 16.8% | 12.6% | 3.7% | 4.0% | 7.4% | 12.4% | 4.1% | 3.7% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 14.7% | 9.5% | 14.4% | 24.0% | 18.4% | 6.7% | 6.7% | 12.0% | 17.5% | 6.8% | 6.5% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $3.5B | $3.8B | $4.0B | $4.2B | $4.4B | $4.4B | $4.4B | $4.3B | $4.3B | $4.3B |
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying BCS stock.
Barclays PLC's current P/E ratio is 7.0x. The historical average is 31.8x. This places it at the 8th percentile of its historical range.
Barclays PLC's current EV/EBITDA is 4.5x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 26.0x.
Barclays PLC's return on equity (ROE) is 9.5%. The historical average is 9.8%.
Based on historical data, Barclays PLC is trading at a P/E of 7.0x. This is at the 8th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Barclays PLC's current dividend yield is 3.83% with a payout ratio of 30.8%.
Barclays PLC has 100.0% gross margin and 31.4% operating margin. Operating margin above 20% indicates strong pricing power and cost efficiency.
Barclays PLC's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 20.2x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Equity decline and securities concentration risk
P/B Discount Reflects Return Deficit
According to current market data, Barclays trades at 0.76x book value versus peers such as HSBC at 1.47x and Lloyds at 1.29x, implying the market does not underwrite the announced £10bn return program as credible against a sub-10% ROE.
The 0.76x P/B multiple places BCS among the lowest-valued universal banks in the peer set, trailing even Deutsche Bank at 0.75x on comparable fundamentals but materially below the 1.47x-1.71x commanded by HSBC and UBS. With TTM P/E at 9.54x and forward P/E at 8.33x, the market appears to be pricing BCS as a commodity balance sheet rather than a premium universal franchise — consistent with the 'complexity discount' historically applied to its investment bank. The 3.7% dividend yield is competitive but modest against NatWest's 9.0%, and the 0.24 PEG suggests earnings growth is not the primary valuation anchor. For the multiple to re-rate toward 1.0x book, investors would likely need evidence that returns on tangible equity can sustainably exceed the cost of equity, which current profitability metrics do not yet demonstrate.
ROE Erodes Into 2026
Based on the reported figures, quarterly ROE has declined from a 2025 average of 2.3% to 2.6% in 2026Q3, with 2025Q4 hitting a trough of 1.8%, indicating the universal model's revenue diversification has not translated into consistent equity returns.
The DuPont decomposition reveals the core tension: ROA is pinned at approximately 0.1% across all ten quarters, meaning the modest ROE figures are entirely a function of financial leverage rather than operating profitability. The 100% fee income classification in eight of ten quarters — interrupted only by the 24.4% fee share disclosed in 2026Q2 — suggests earnings quality is heavily weighted to capital markets cycles rather than the stable net interest income from the UK deposit franchise that investors typically underwrite. The ROE trajectory appears to be deteriorating in absolute terms, which raises the question of whether the efficiency ratio improvements seen in certain quarters are structural or simply the result of revenue timing rather than genuine cost transformation.
Efficiency Swings Betoken Cost Rigidity
As reported in quarterly filings, Barclays' efficiency ratio fluctuated between 54.4% in 2026Q1 and 82.1% in 2026Q2, with the sole disclosed NIM of 0.8% appearing in the same quarter, suggesting the investment bank's compensation and technology cost base lacks the flexibility to absorb revenue volatility.
A 27.7 percentage-point swing in the efficiency ratio over a single quarter is highly unusual for a bank of Barclays' scale and implies either significant revenue timing effects or a cost structure that cannot scale with the investment bank's variable revenue. The disclosed NIM of 0.8% in 2026Q2 is notably thin and may reflect the cost of the enlarged balance sheet rather than a structural deterioration in the UK retail lending spread. Investors should monitor whether the reported 61.9% efficiency ratio in 2026Q3 represents a stabilizing trend or simply the latest data point in an erratic series; if the former, it would support the operating leverage thesis embedded in management's return program.
Equity Buffer Contracts Sharply
According to Barclays' quarterly balance sheets, equity declined from $79.4B in 2026Q2 to $64.3B in 2026Q3, pushing the equity-to-assets ratio to 0.04, a level that warrants scrutiny against regulatory minimums and suggests the announced buyback program is already consuming capital.
The $15.1B sequential equity reduction, if sustained, would leave limited headroom for the £10bn shareholder return commitment through 2026 while maintaining CET1 buffers above regulatory requirements. The equity-to-assets ratio has slipped from a stable 0.05 to 0.04, which — when considered alongside the 2.81x debt-to-equity figure — implies the balance sheet is becoming more leveraged, not less. This trajectory is at odds with the market's expectation of robust capital returns, and investors should demand clarity on where the remaining capital generation will come from, particularly given the flat ROA and contracting ROE profile.
Leverage Flatters, Fee Volatility Obscures
The most commonly misapplied ratio for Barclays is P/E, which the 9.54x TTM multiple renders deceptively attractive by allowing IFRS 9 provision swings of up to $840.9M in 2026Q1 against zero in 2026Q2 to distort the earnings denominator.
Barclays' P/E is systematically unreliable because its earnings base is subject to large expected credit loss (ECL) modeling adjustments that can swing provisions by hundreds of millions of dollars between quarters on forward-looking economic assumptions rather than realized losses. The more appropriate valuation lens for BCS is the P/B multiple adjusted for return on tangible equity, which reveals the true economic reality: the bank is valued at a discount because it generates sub-10% returns on equity, not because of a one-time earnings distortion. Similarly, the 2.81x debt-to-equity ratio cited in some data sources is misleading in a banking context — deposits are not debt in the enterprise value sense — so EV/EBITDA and D/E comparisons to non-financial companies should be discarded entirely in favor of CET1 ratios and P/TBV analysis.