Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -4.7x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE -55.7%. (2007–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $3.0B | $2.5B | $2.2B | $794M | $602M | $605M | $993M | — | — | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $2.2B | $1.6B | $1.8B | $700M | $461M | $437M | $692M | — | — | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | -4.68 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 2.14 | 2.58 | 3.52 | 8.70 | 2.39 | 1.64 | 2.90 | — | — | — | — |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | -479.4% | -67.0% |
| Operating Margin | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | -81.4% | -46.9% |
| Net Profit Margin | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 15.0% | -90.8% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -55.7% | -55.7% | -88.0% | -137.3% | -54.2% | -42.0% | -33.0% | -295.6% | -0.5% | 3.9% | -50.0% |
| ROA | -47.5% | -47.5% | -74.1% | -100.1% | -45.9% | -38.3% | -31.8% | -109.6% | -0.1% | 0.6% | -10.1% |
| ROIC | -221.2% | -221.2% | -239.4% | -337.0% | -82.5% | -93.2% | -215.0% | — | -0.1% | -3.2% | -5.1% |
| ROCE | -52.4% | -52.4% | -90.1% | -123.5% | -50.6% | -40.6% | -32.9% | -127.8% | -0.1% | -3.6% | -5.6% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.30 | 0.12 | 0.09 | — | — | — | 4.44 | 4.40 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 18.53 | 71.26 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.90 | -0.65 | -1.03 | -0.56 | -0.46 | -0.88 | -1.04 | — | 4.24 | 3.53 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 17.73 | 57.17 |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 22.35 | 20.58 |
| Interest Coverage | -71.06 | -71.06 | — | — | -56.63 | — | -149.09 | — | -962.20 | 0.13 | -1.06 |
Net cash position: cash ($893M) exceeds total debt ($20M)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 22.25 | 22.25 | 15.60 | 2.53 | 9.46 | 13.31 | 31.83 | 6.26 | 11.47 | 1.45 | 3.26 |
| Quick Ratio | 22.25 | 22.25 | 15.60 | 2.53 | 9.46 | 13.31 | 31.83 | 6.26 | 11.47 | 1.03 | 2.78 |
| Cash Ratio | 21.94 | 21.94 | 15.20 | 2.41 | 9.11 | 13.11 | 31.49 | 6.21 | 11.43 | 0.38 | 2.08 |
| Asset Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.04 | 0.10 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 6.59 | 5.13 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 370.05 | 103.14 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — | — | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | — | — | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $128M | $94M | $60M | $52M | $51M | $47M | $45M | $10M | $162M | $129M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 19 years · Updated daily
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10-year return with dividends reinvested.
Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying DYN stock.
Dyne Therapeutics, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -4.7x. This places it at the 50th percentile of its historical range.
Dyne Therapeutics, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is -55.7%. The historical average is -46.4%.
Based on historical data, Dyne Therapeutics, Inc. is trading at a P/E of -4.7x. This is at the 50th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Accelerating R&D burn rate
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Liquidity Cushion Shrinking Rapidly
Dyne's current ratio fell from 26.63 in Q2 2024 to 12.02 in Q2 2026, while cash dropped to $676M, implying roughly five quarters of runway at current burn, per reported figures.
The current ratio remains exceptionally high, but the trend is unmistakably downward, reflecting the accelerating cash consumption as clinical programs expand. With annualized operating expenses exceeding $700M, the liquidity buffer is being consumed faster than it can be replenished without new financing. Investors should monitor whether management can extend runway through partnerships or additional raises before the cushion erodes further.
Minimal Debt Masks Future Needs
Dyne's debt-to-equity ratio is a mere 0.03, with total debt of $19.9M, indicating negligible leverage, but the annualized burn of over $700M suggests substantial future financing requirements, based on balance sheet data.
The company's balance sheet is virtually unlevered, which provides flexibility but also signals that the current capital structure is insufficient to fund operations to profitability. Interest coverage is deeply negative, reflecting the absence of earnings, but this is typical for a clinical-stage biotech. The real risk is not current debt service but the inevitable need to access capital markets, which could be dilutive or constrained by market conditions.
Return on Capital Deeply Negative
ROIC deteriorated from -25.4% in Q2 2024 to -153.8% in Q2 2026, while ROE fell to -22.8%, reflecting escalating losses relative to a shrinking equity base, as per quarterly data.
The return on invested capital is not just negative but worsening at an alarming pace, driven by the surge in R&D spending without any revenue to offset it. The equity base is being eroded by cumulative losses, which further depresses ROE. This pattern is typical for a pre-revenue biotech, but the magnitude of the decline suggests that the company is burning through capital faster than it is creating value, a trend that must reverse with successful clinical milestones.
Working Capital Efficiency Distorted
Dyne's cash conversion cycle is unmeasurable due to lack of revenue, but DPO spiked to 1778 days in Q4 2025, indicating unusual payable terms, while asset turnover remains nil, per reported figures.
The absence of revenue renders traditional efficiency metrics like asset turnover and DSO meaningless, but the DPO figure is striking, suggesting either extended payment terms with suppliers or a data artifact. The company's asset-light model, with minimal PP&E, means that efficiency must be judged on clinical execution rather than operational metrics. Investors should focus on how effectively R&D dollars translate into clinical data, not on working capital ratios that are distorted by the pre-revenue stage.
Peer Comparison Highlights Burn Disparity
Dyne's ROIC of -153.8% is far worse than peers like Sarepta (-31.4%) and CRISPR (-22.3%), while its D/E of 0.03 is the lowest, indicating a cleaner balance sheet but higher cash burn, per peer data.
Relative to its peer group, Dyne is burning cash at a much faster rate, as evidenced by its ROIC, which is more than four times worse than Sarepta's. However, its minimal leverage provides a strategic advantage, allowing it to weather clinical setbacks without immediate solvency concerns. The gap in returns is structural, reflecting Dyne's earlier stage and heavier investment in platform development, but it also underscores the urgency of achieving clinical proof-of-concept to justify the burn.
Misapplied Metric: P/B Ratio
Dyne's P/B of 3.45 is misleading for a pre-revenue biotech, as book value is dominated by cash and does not reflect the value of its FORCE platform, per current valuation data.
The price-to-book ratio is commonly used to gauge relative valuation, but for Dyne, book value is largely composed of cash and short-term investments, which will be consumed over time. The true value lies in the intellectual property and clinical pipeline, which are not captured on the balance sheet. A more appropriate metric would be EV/Invested Capital or a risk-adjusted NPV of the pipeline, which better reflects the potential upside from the FORCE platform. Investors should avoid over-reliance on P/B and instead focus on clinical catalysts and cash runway.