ESPR is no longer listed. Its last trade on record was Jul 14, 2026. The price and figures on this page are from its last trading day and final filings, and are no longer updated.
Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio N/A · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE N/A. (1999–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | — | $769M | $412M | $308M | $414M | $145M | $714M | $1.6B | $1.2B | $1.6B | $282M |
| Enterprise Value | — | $1.1B | $858M | $767M | $550M | $196M | $595M | $1.5B | $1.2B | $1.5B | $247M |
| P/E Ratio → | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | — | 1.91 | 1.24 | 2.65 | 5.48 | 1.84 | 3.14 | 10.89 | 6.67 | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 80.97 | — | 6.44 | 1.23 |
| P/FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 2.85 | 2.58 | 6.59 | 7.29 | 2.50 | 2.61 | 9.78 | 6.47 | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | — | 19.03 | 15.76 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | 18.02 | 114.34 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | — | 67.9% | 79.4% | 62.8% | 64.3% | 81.9% | 98.9% | 100.0% | 99.9% | — | — |
| Operating Margin | — | 15.0% | 16.4% | -133.7% | -237.8% | -289.0% | -53.3% | -62.8% | -110.9% | — | — |
| Net Profit Margin | — | -5.6% | -15.6% | -179.9% | -309.6% | -343.0% | -63.1% | -65.5% | -109.4% | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | -487.0% | — | -70.6% | -29.1% |
| ROA | — | -5.6% | -18.8% | -92.2% | -74.2% | -73.2% | -50.6% | -54.3% | -95.8% | -63.9% | -27.7% |
| ROIC | — | 66.5% | 132.8% | — | — | — | — | — | — | -62.7% | -28.0% |
| ROCE | — | 45.9% | 73.9% | -151.6% | -77.4% | -79.9% | -59.6% | -81.9% | -126.4% | -71.3% | -29.3% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | 0.08 | — | 0.00 | 0.01 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | 9.08 | 10.85 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | -8.25 | — | -0.14 | -0.16 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | — | 6.30 | 8.20 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | — | 0.75 | 0.13 | -2.55 | -3.11 | -4.81 | -5.33 | -10.97 | -2045.85 | -842.37 | -198.41 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | — | 1.54 | 1.37 | 1.29 | 2.67 | 4.48 | 3.68 | 3.20 | 2.22 | 6.15 | 13.70 |
| Quick Ratio | — | 1.19 | 0.99 | 0.87 | 2.29 | 4.02 | 3.51 | 3.20 | 2.22 | 6.15 | 13.70 |
| Cash Ratio | — | 0.56 | 0.59 | 0.53 | 1.81 | 3.54 | 3.24 | 3.04 | 0.57 | 1.04 | 2.45 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.87 | 0.97 | 0.57 | 0.30 | 0.21 | 0.64 | 0.69 | 1.29 | — | — |
| Inventory Turnover | — | 1.23 | 0.73 | 0.66 | 0.77 | 0.41 | 0.15 | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 126.93 | 88.02 | 152.15 | 163.11 | 106.71 | 19.87 | — | — | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | — | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 7.7% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | — | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 7.7% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.0% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $208M | $187M | $103M | $66M | $29M | $27M | $27M | $27M | $24M | $23M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 19 years · Updated daily
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Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying ESPR stock.
Based on historical data, Esperion Therapeutics, Inc. is trading at valuation metrics that vary. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Commercial ramp-up execution risk
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Market Skepticism Reflects Commercial Uncertainty
Based on reported figures, Esperion's P/S ratio of 1.63 suggests the market is pricing the company as a high-risk commercial-stage entity rather than a growth-stage biotech, reflecting significant skepticism regarding the long-term adoption curve of its oral cardiovascular therapies compared to established injectable biologics and generic statins.
The negative P/E ratio underscores the company's ongoing struggle to achieve consistent profitability, leaving investors to rely on sales-based multiples that are highly sensitive to lumpy milestone payments. This valuation appears to discount the potential for long-term margin expansion, suggesting that the market requires further evidence of sustained, organic revenue growth before re-rating the stock.
Working Capital Cycles Impede Liquidity
As reported in financial statements, Esperion's cash conversion cycle remains highly inefficient, peaking at 389 days in 2024Q1 and currently sitting at 252 days, which indicates significant friction in converting inventory and receivables into cash compared to more mature pharmaceutical peers with optimized supply chain logistics.
The elevated days inventory outstanding (DIO) suggests that the company may be struggling to align manufacturing output with actual prescription pull-through, leading to potential inventory obsolescence risks. Investors should monitor whether the company can compress these cycles as it scales, as persistent inefficiency here directly exacerbates the company's reliance on external financing.
Debt Service Capacity Remains Precarious
According to recent SEC filings, Esperion's interest coverage ratio has been dangerously volatile, swinging from a positive 5.35 in 2024Q1 to a negative 0.33 in 2026Q1, which highlights the company's inability to consistently generate sufficient operating income to cover its debt obligations without relying on non-recurring capital inflows.
The lack of a stable interest coverage profile suggests that the company's debt structure may be ill-suited for its current stage of commercial development. This vulnerability warrants close investigation, as any further deterioration in operating margins could force the company into dilutive refinancing events to maintain its operational runway.
Misapplication of P/S Valuation Multiples
As evidenced by the company's financial history, the Price-to-Sales ratio is frequently misapplied to Esperion, as it fails to distinguish between high-quality recurring product revenue and lumpy, non-recurring milestone payments from collaboration partners, thereby obscuring the true underlying demand for the company's cardiovascular drug portfolio.
Analysts should instead focus on normalized product revenue growth and the gross-to-net yield, which provide a more accurate picture of the company's commercial health. Relying on headline P/S multiples risks overestimating the company's revenue quality and underestimating the operational challenges inherent in the current commercialization phase.