Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 30.8x · EV/EBITDA 14.8x · ROE 29.7%. (1996–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $94.4B | $88.8B | $81.4B | $72.9B | $65.1B | $70.6B | $50.1B | $48.7B | $38.5B | $38.1B | $31.7B |
| Enterprise Value | $117.1B | $111.5B | $104.9B | $88.6B | $79.7B | $83.9B | $63.4B | $58.7B | $48.4B | $47.6B | $40.9B |
| P/E Ratio → | 30.77 | 32.79 | 29.63 | 31.64 | 29.11 | 38.90 | 33.50 | 29.15 | 20.00 | 19.57 | 26.76 |
| P/S Ratio | 3.62 | 3.52 | 3.69 | 3.57 | 3.31 | 3.94 | 3.29 | 3.15 | 2.58 | 2.63 | 2.33 |
| P/B Ratio | 9.56 | 8.89 | 9.86 | 10.57 | 9.49 | 9.90 | 6.73 | 6.89 | 6.13 | 6.31 | 5.95 |
| P/FCF | 25.25 | 31.54 | 37.70 | 39.95 | 33.40 | 29.00 | 28.31 | 23.70 | 20.50 | 22.82 | 19.53 |
| P/OCF | 15.63 | 14.70 | 15.10 | 15.44 | 14.35 | 16.27 | 14.73 | 12.58 | 10.77 | 11.99 | 10.70 |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 4.42 | 4.75 | 4.34 | 4.05 | 4.68 | 4.17 | 3.80 | 3.25 | 3.29 | 3.01 |
| EV / EBITDA | 14.77 | 20.87 | 16.02 | 14.72 | 14.27 | 16.39 | 14.91 | 13.55 | 11.50 | 11.91 | 11.03 |
| EV / EBIT | 25.43 | 25.71 | 25.86 | 25.18 | 24.19 | 30.90 | 27.35 | 23.31 | 17.68 | 18.73 | 18.72 |
| EV / FCF | — | 39.60 | 48.58 | 48.60 | 40.91 | 34.46 | 35.79 | 28.53 | 25.81 | 28.49 | 25.26 |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 29.1% | 29.1% | 29.1% | 28.1% | 27.2% | 26.9% | 27.6% | 28.4% | 28.1% | 28.2% | 28.1% |
| Operating Margin | 18.3% | 18.3% | 18.8% | 18.7% | 17.5% | 16.8% | 16.3% | 17.8% | 18.3% | 18.1% | 17.7% |
| Net Profit Margin | 10.7% | 10.7% | 12.4% | 11.3% | 11.4% | 10.1% | 9.8% | 10.8% | 12.9% | 13.5% | 8.7% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 29.7% | 29.7% | 36.3% | 33.5% | 32.0% | 24.9% | 20.6% | 25.0% | 31.3% | 34.3% | 22.1% |
| ROA | 6.0% | 6.0% | 7.1% | 7.2% | 7.4% | 6.2% | 5.2% | 6.6% | 8.7% | 9.1% | 5.7% |
| ROIC | 10.7% | 10.7% | 11.4% | 13.0% | 12.3% | 11.0% | 9.9% | 12.4% | 12.9% | 13.1% | 12.5% |
| ROCE | 11.7% | 11.7% | 12.4% | 13.8% | 13.2% | 11.8% | 9.8% | 12.5% | 14.4% | 14.3% | 13.4% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 2.29 | 2.29 | 2.90 | 2.35 | 2.18 | 1.88 | 1.85 | 1.91 | 1.60 | 1.57 | 1.75 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 4.29 | 4.29 | 3.65 | 2.69 | 2.68 | 2.62 | 3.25 | 3.12 | 2.38 | 2.38 | 2.51 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 2.27 | 2.85 | 2.29 | 2.13 | 1.86 | 1.78 | 1.41 | 1.59 | 1.57 | 1.74 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 4.25 | 4.25 | 3.59 | 2.62 | 2.62 | 2.60 | 3.12 | 2.30 | 2.37 | 2.37 | 2.50 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 8.06 | 10.88 | 8.65 | 7.51 | 5.46 | 7.49 | 4.83 | 5.31 | 5.67 | 5.72 |
| Interest Coverage | 4.76 | 4.76 | 6.78 | 7.04 | 8.72 | 7.44 | 5.45 | 6.12 | 7.55 | 7.24 | 5.99 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.89 | 0.89 | 0.76 | 0.90 | 0.81 | 0.75 | 1.00 | 1.97 | 0.85 | 0.80 | 0.85 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.85 | 0.85 | 0.73 | 0.86 | 0.77 | 0.72 | 0.96 | 1.94 | 0.82 | 0.77 | 0.82 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.11 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 0.16 | 1.13 | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.55 | 0.50 | 0.62 | 0.63 | 0.62 | 0.52 | 0.56 | 0.66 | 0.66 | 0.65 |
| Inventory Turnover | 79.44 | 79.44 | 75.97 | 84.84 | 87.39 | 97.11 | 88.81 | 104.43 | 105.16 | 108.30 | 108.74 |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 58.72 | 61.00 | 51.29 | 50.99 | 51.83 | 62.94 | 54.77 | 55.68 | 59.82 | 57.18 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 1.4% | 1.5% | 1.5% | 1.6% | 1.7% | 1.4% | 1.8% | 1.8% | 2.1% | 2.0% | 2.3% |
| Payout Ratio | 49.3% | 49.3% | 44.1% | 49.3% | 48.1% | 53.4% | 62.0% | 52.5% | 41.7% | 38.5% | 61.4% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 3.3% | 3.0% | 3.4% | 3.2% | 3.4% | 2.6% | 3.0% | 3.4% | 5.0% | 5.1% | 3.7% |
| FCF Yield | 4.0% | 3.2% | 2.7% | 2.5% | 3.0% | 3.4% | 3.5% | 4.2% | 4.9% | 4.4% | 5.1% |
| Buyback Yield | 0.0% | 0.0% | 0.3% | 1.8% | 2.3% | 1.9% | 0.8% | 0.5% | 2.6% | 2.0% | 2.3% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 1.4% | 1.5% | 1.8% | 3.3% | 4.0% | 3.3% | 2.7% | 2.3% | 4.7% | 3.9% | 4.6% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $404M | $403M | $407M | $415M | $423M | $425M | $428M | $432M | $442M | $447M |
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying WM stock.
Waste Management, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is 30.8x. The historical average is 24.1x. This places it at the 75th percentile of its historical range.
Waste Management, Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 14.8x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 10.6x.
Waste Management, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is 29.7%. This is above the typical threshold of 15-20% considered good for most companies. The historical average is 16.5%.
Based on historical data, Waste Management, Inc. is trading at a P/E of 30.8x. This is at the 75th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Waste Management, Inc.'s current dividend yield is 1.40% with a payout ratio of 49.3%.
Waste Management, Inc. has 29.1% gross margin and 18.3% operating margin. Operating margin between 10-20% is typical for established companies.
Waste Management, Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 4.3x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Stericycle goodwill impairment exposure
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Premium Multiple Defies Subpar Returns
Waste Management's TTM P/E of 35.2 and 9.54x price-to-book appear rich versus Republic Services at 34.4x and 6.14x, especially given WM's ROE near 8% versus RSG's 18.3%, suggesting the premium rests on scale and RNG narratives rather than delivered returns, per current peer data.
The valuation gap is difficult to justify on returns alone: WM's ROIC of roughly 3-4% in recent quarters sits far below RSG's 13.5%, yet WM trades at a higher EV/EBITDA (15.66x versus 13.91x) and a materially higher P/B (9.54x versus 6.14x). The 2.56 PEG ratio, alongside a forward P/E of 29.09 versus TTM 35.2, implies consensus expects mid-teens earnings growth, which may be achievable if Stericycle synergies and RNG scaling materialize, but appears to leave little tolerance for integration stumbles. Investors should also note the P/FCF of 33.47, which suggests even the cash-based valuation is not obviously cheap relative to the 1.4% dividend yield on offer.
Stable Operating Mask, Shifting Cost Floor
Operating margin held near 18.7% in 2026Q3 per WM's reported statements, with net margin at 12.0%, even as reported gross margin swung from 29.3% in 2025Q4 to 40.8% in 2026Q2, a discontinuity that appears more consistent with cost reclassification around Stericycle than with pricing power.
The durability of the 18.7-18.9% operating margin across the last four reported quarters is encouraging and likely reflects genuine overhead leverage, as SG&A held near $655-707M while revenue grew to $6.8B. However, the absence of a reported gross margin for 2026Q3 and the unexplained step-change in the COGS line warrant verification before treating the improvement as structural; if the shift reflects changed cost classification rather than mix or automation gains, the apparent margin expansion may not be repeatable. Net margin volatility between 9.4% and 13.5% over the ten-quarter window, against a steadier operating income trajectory, suggests non-operating items are distorting bottom-line comparisons quarter to quarter.
Improving ROIC Still Below Cost of Capital
WM's ROIC improved from 2.4% in 2025Q1 to 4.4% in 2026Q3, yet appears to remain well below any reasonable estimate of its weighted average cost of capital, implying the company may not yet be compounding economic value across its $46.5B asset base, as reported in WM's quarterly ratio disclosures.
The trajectory is directionally positive, with ROIC rising for four consecutive quarters and net margin recovering to 12.0%, but the absolute level of roughly 4.4% still trails typical industrial WACC estimates of 7-8%, suggesting returns on invested capital have not kept pace with the asset build driven by acquisition. ROE tells a more flattering story, ranging from 6.4% to 9.9%, but that figure is flattered by buybacks that have compressed equity to $9.9B against $18.0B of retained earnings, rather than by superior earning power. It is also worth noting that landfill airspace depletion and asset retirement obligation accounting can depress reported invested capital and distort these ratios; the underlying economic return on the permit-locked landfill network may therefore exceed the accounting ROIC, though quantifying that adjustment requires disclosures beyond the ratio set provided.
Deleveraging Trend Clouded by Anomalous Print
Debt-to-eased from 2.90 in 2024Q4 to 2.35 in 2026Q2 before an anomalous 0.15 reading in 2026Q3, while interest coverage of 5.4x sits materially below the 8.6x recorded in 2024Q3, suggesting debt service remains workable but less comfortable than headline figures imply, per recent WM filings.
The gradual deleveraging from a peak D/E of 2.90 appears genuine through 2026Q2, driven by equity accretion from retained earnings and the rebuild to $9.9B, but the sudden drop to 0.15 in 2026Q3, alongside a D/EBITDA of 0.74 versus 11.51 in the prior quarter, is inconsistent with the reported capital structure and appears to be a data artifact rather than an operational event; investors should verify against the latest 10-Q before drawing conclusions. Interest coverage trending from 8.60x in 2024Q3 to a 4.4-5.4x range across 2025 and 2026 suggests debt service capacity has tightened, likely reflecting higher absolute debt levels from the Stericycle consolidation and the interest rate environment. Debt/EBITDA in the 11-14x range on trailing figures is elevated versus the sub-3x levels typical of investment-grade industrials, though it may be inflated by purchase accounting and depreciation conventions specific to the waste sector; covenant or refinancing risk does not appear imminent given coverage above 4x, but the cushion is thinner than historical norms.
Receivables Stretch and Turnover Dilution
Asset turnover slipped from 0.16 in 2024Q2 to 0.14-0.15 as goodwill swelled post-Stericycle, and DSO lengthened from 48 to 59 days, stretching the cash conversion cycle from 12 to 23 days over the same window, based on WM's reported working capital metrics.
The turnover decline appears driven primarily by the balance sheet expansion to $46.5B rather than revenue weakness, since PP&E and goodwill together now constitute roughly 75% of assets, meaning the ratio is diluted by acquisition accounting more than by operating deterioration. The DSO creep from 48 to 59 days is the more notable signal; while a sub-23-day cash conversion cycle remains favorable in absolute terms given WM's 44-45 day payables stretch, the eleven-day receivables elongation could reflect mix shift toward commercial or Stericycle-linked accounts and warrants monitoring for credit quality or billing delays. The 2026Q3 data is incomplete for DIO, DPO, and CCC, so the latest-quarter working capital position cannot be fully assessed from the figures supplied.
Trailing P/E Misleads on Asset-Heavy Model
With a TTM P/E of 35.2 against a forward of 29.1 and depreciation of roughly $792M per quarter on a $20.8B PP&E base, the trailing P/E appears the most commonly misapplied metric for WM, likely overstating true earnings power relative to its 14.4% free cash flow margin, per current market data.
The trailing multiple obscures two realities specific to this business model: heavy non-cash depreciation that depresses reported net income relative to cash generation, and lumpy items such as alternative fuel tax credits and ARO accretion that make EPS volatile quarter to quarter without reflecting core collection and disposal economics. As WM's own ten-quarter data shows operating cash flow running at approximately 2.1x cumulative net income, an analyst relying on P/E would systematically understate the cash economics of the landfill asset base, where reported earnings are smoothed by judgmental closure and capping reserves. A more defensible framework is EV/EBITDA for cross-firm comparison, supplemented by FCF yield and EBITDA less maintenance capex to capture the recurring reinvestment required to sustain airspace; however, even EV/EBITDA should be read alongside disclosure of asset retirement obligations, since a substantial portion of the true liability profile sits in reserves rather than funded debt.