Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -2.2x · EV/EBITDA 7.5x · ROE -40.9%. (2016–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $388M | $312M | $686M | $769M | $891M | $1.5B | $1.4B | $550M | $319M | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $709M | $633M | $1.0B | $1.1B | $1.3B | $1.9B | $1.6B | $739M | $413M | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | -2.19 | — | — | — | 67.08 | — | — | — | 209.75 | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 1.15 | 1.01 | 2.19 | 2.59 | 3.19 | 6.94 | 9.17 | 5.26 | 2.46 | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 0.78 | 0.65 | 0.89 | 0.93 | 0.96 | 1.67 | 2.56 | 1.19 | 1.26 | — | — |
| P/FCF | 6.98 | 3.43 | 6.52 | 19.59 | 25.69 | 51.04 | 337.43 | 26.71 | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | 4.25 | 3.43 | 4.57 | 7.42 | 12.00 | 28.54 | 49.92 | 25.83 | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 2.05 | 3.21 | 3.69 | 4.61 | 8.81 | 10.31 | 7.06 | 3.18 | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | 7.55 | 7.04 | 10.48 | — | 21.27 | 54.12 | 55.49 | — | 44.59 | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | — | — | — | 66.76 | — | — | — | 24.89 | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | 6.95 | 9.55 | 27.87 | 37.13 | 64.77 | 379.18 | 35.88 | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 75.0% | 75.0% | 77.1% | 76.5% | 76.8% | 74.7% | 73.3% | 75.3% | 99.1% | 38.7% | 35.3% |
| Operating Margin | -3.9% | -3.9% | -2.5% | -37.6% | -16.9% | -24.6% | -20.6% | -46.1% | -0.9% | 17.4% | 2.1% |
| Net Profit Margin | -83.0% | -83.0% | -3.2% | -37.2% | 4.6% | -22.8% | -68.1% | -52.9% | 1.2% | 10.1% | -0.6% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | -40.9% | -40.9% | -1.3% | -12.6% | 1.4% | -6.8% | -20.8% | -15.5% | 1.2% | 19.0% | -0.5% |
| ROA | -18.5% | -18.5% | -0.7% | -7.0% | 0.8% | -3.6% | -11.2% | -10.6% | 1.2% | 11.5% | -0.3% |
| ROIC | -1.0% | -1.0% | -0.5% | -6.7% | -2.7% | -3.9% | -3.5% | -7.3% | -0.5% | 15.8% | — |
| ROCE | -1.0% | -1.0% | -0.5% | -7.4% | -3.0% | -4.1% | -3.6% | -9.7% | -0.9% | 21.0% | 1.1% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.91 | 0.91 | 0.66 | 0.53 | 0.50 | 0.50 | 0.48 | 0.46 | 0.37 | 7.94 | 0.59 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 4.85 | 4.85 | 5.30 | — | 7.63 | 12.87 | 9.27 | — | 10.16 | 0.01 | 10.86 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.67 | 0.41 | 0.39 | 0.43 | 0.45 | 0.32 | 0.41 | 0.37 | 6.63 | 0.57 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 3.57 | 3.57 | 3.32 | — | 6.56 | 11.47 | 6.11 | — | 10.15 | 0.01 | 10.35 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 3.53 | 3.03 | 8.28 | 11.45 | 13.73 | 41.75 | 9.17 | — | 0.01 | 22.73 |
| Interest Coverage | -18.86 | -18.86 | -0.39 | -24.41 | 4.41 | -12.50 | -2.39 | -3.10 | 2.74 | 2.66 | — |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 0.82 | 0.82 | 2.69 | 3.14 | 1.42 | 1.04 | 1.82 | 0.85 | 0.75 | 0.16 | 0.69 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.82 | 0.82 | 2.69 | 3.14 | 1.42 | 1.04 | 1.82 | 0.85 | 19.39 | 31.25 | 0.69 |
| Cash Ratio | 0.48 | 0.48 | 1.85 | 2.06 | 0.79 | 0.54 | 1.39 | 0.48 | 0.34 | 0.16 | 0.33 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.26 | 0.20 | 0.20 | 0.17 | 0.13 | 0.14 | 0.13 | 0.49 | 532.81 | 0.50 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | 42.93 | 38.42 | 44.32 | 43.85 | 55.33 | 50.17 | 51.05 | 16.79 | — | 12.59 |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | 0.3% | 0.5% | 0.1% | 0.0% | 0.1% | 1.3% | 2.0% | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | 7.4% | — | — | — | 414.1% | 58.0% | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | 1.5% | — | — | — | 0.5% | — | — |
| FCF Yield | 14.3% | 29.2% | 15.3% | 5.1% | 3.9% | 2.0% | 0.3% | 3.7% | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 9.9% | 12.3% | 6.1% | 0.3% | 1.1% | 0.3% | 0.1% | 0.8% | 0.0% | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 9.9% | 12.3% | 6.4% | 0.8% | 1.2% | 0.3% | 0.2% | 2.1% | 2.0% | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $86M | $90M | $90M | $111M | $83M | $52M | $38M | $32M | $7M | $7M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 10 years · Updated daily
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Quick answers to the most common questions about buying RPAY stock.
Repay Holdings Corporation's current P/E ratio is -2.2x. The historical average is 67.1x.
Repay Holdings Corporation's current EV/EBITDA is 7.5x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 32.2x.
Repay Holdings Corporation's return on equity (ROE) is -40.9%. The historical average is -7.7%.
Based on historical data, Repay Holdings Corporation is trading at a P/E of -2.2x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
Repay Holdings Corporation has 75.0% gross margin and -3.9% operating margin.
Repay Holdings Corporation's Debt/EBITDA ratio is 4.9x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Debt-funded M&A cycle with recurring impairments
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Premium Gross Margins Mask Persistent Operating Losses
Gross margin compressed roughly 770 basis points to 70.1% in 2026Q2, the weakest print across the ten-quarter window, while operating margin stayed negative in nine of ten quarters, implying true earning power sits well below headline software-like economics, even before non-recurring charges.
The 2026Q2 coincidence of the highest revenue quarter and the lowest gross margin in the series suggests the recent top-line acceleration may be coming at structurally worse unit economics, consistent with a mix shift toward lower-margin processing volume. Negative operating margin despite gross margins above 70% points to an SG&A base that has not scaled, indicating the losses are operational rather than merely accounting-driven. Adjusted for the 2025Q2 and 2025Q4 non-cash charges, net margin still prints negative in seven of ten quarters, so we view core earning power as weaker than the FCF margin figures alone would imply.
Returns on Invested Capital Never Leave Zero
ROIC has hovered between -0.2% and -0.4% in eight of the last ten quarters, per REPAY's quarterly reported metrics, indicating the roughly $772.8M debt-funded asset base is generating effectively no economic return, a pattern more consistent with decay than compounding.
With ROE printing at -2.3% and ROA at -0.8% in 2026Q2, the returns profile appears to be deteriorating rather than recovering, driven by both margin compression and a shrinking equity denominator after the 2025 write-downs. Because goodwill represents a large share of invested capital, the denominator is itself an estimate of acquisition premiums that prior impairments suggest were overstated, which means true ROIC on tangible capital may look different but does not change the negative-numerator problem. Investors should monitor whether the 2026Q2 revenue step-up eventually flows through to positive ROIC, something the ten-quarter record does not yet evidence.
Leverage Doubles Amidst Negative Coverage
Total debt rose 93.1% in a single quarter to $772.8M, driving the debt-to-equity ratio to 1.65 from 0.84, while interest coverage remained negative at -0.78x in 2026Q2, based on REPAY's reported quarterly balance sheet data.
Negative interest coverage in nearly every quarter of the series indicates that operating earnings do not currently service debt costs, meaning any apparent comfort in the D/EBITDA trend is a function of inflated EBITDA rather than improved coverage. The equity base declined roughly 42% over the period while debt nearly doubled, so the leverage build appears to be absorbing cash flows without a commensurate return contribution, per the impairment-then-acquisition cycle visible in reported balances. We regard refinancing risk as a key variable to monitor, as the trajectory would likely require either sustained positive operating income or continued access to capital markets that the data does not itself confirm.
Liquidity Buffer Permanently Compressed
The current ratio recovered to 1.45 in 2026Q2 from a 0.81 low in 2025Q3, yet remains far below the 3.44 to 3.83 range maintained through 2024, suggesting the short-term cushion against stress has materially narrowed, per REPAY's reported figures.
The quick ratio tracks the current ratio almost identically, indicating minimal inventory dependence and that near-term solvency rests almost entirely on receivables and cash rather than liquidating stock. With days sales outstanding around 132 days in 2026Q2 against payables near 103 days, the cash conversion cycle of roughly 36 days appears manageable, but receivables quality under a stressed revenue mix warrants further investigation. In a severe stress scenario, the combination of negative coverage and a compressed current ratio would, in our view, leave limited room before covenant or refinancing pressure emerges, though no covenant details are disclosed in the data provided.
Cheap Multiples Reflect Stretched Balance Sheet
RPAY trades at 0.71x book and roughly 3.9x free cash flow, well below peer EVERTEC at 2.79x book and 8.84x EV/EBITDA, implying the market prices in either sustained losses or balance-sheet risk rather than discounting a durable compounder.
The negative trailing P/E of -1.33x makes that multiple uninformative, and the 4.49x forward P/E appears to rest on earnings expectations that the ten-quarter operating record does not yet substantiate, so EV/EBITDA of 7.48x trailing versus 3.52x forward is the more instructive pair. The wide gap between trailing and forward EV/EBITDA suggests the market is underwriting a sharp EBITDA improvement, likely tied to recently acquired revenue rather than organic margin recovery. Relative to PRTH at 7.89x and EVTC at 8.84x, RPAY's headline discount may indicate the market recognizes a higher leverage and impairment profile rather than a straightforward value opportunity.
The Most Misapplied Ratio Here Is P/B
At 0.71x book value, RPAY appears statistically cheap, yet roughly $652.1M of the asset base is goodwill following prior multi-hundred-million-dollar write-downs, so the price-to-book discount may measure accounting residue rather than a genuine margin of safety.
Book value itself halved from $813.8M to $472.5M over the period as impairments struck goodwill accumulated from acquisitions, which means the denominator of P/B is an estimate the company has already revised downward once and may revise again. A more appropriate lens is EV/EBITDA adjusted for a normalized interest burden, or price relative to tangible capital, since goodwill does not generate cash and the negative operating record suggests acquisition premiums are not converting into returns. Given that a single quarter's acquisition outflow exceeded cumulative ten-quarter free cash flow, we would anchor on cash-based and coverage metrics rather than book multiples when assessing downside.