Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 0.7x · EV/EBITDA 1.1x · ROE 14.4%. (2015–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $111M | $581M | $984M | $331M | $373M | $801M | $1.4B | $2.6B | $1.3B | $2.4B | — |
| Enterprise Value | $249M | $1.5B | $4.0B | $3.2B | $8.1B | $5.8B | $9.1B | $8.8B | $5.4B | $12.1B | — |
| P/E Ratio → | 0.71 | 0.36 | 0.89 | 0.29 | 0.43 | 0.34 | 2.15 | 1.14 | 0.67 | 9.93 | — |
| P/S Ratio | 0.06 | 0.05 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.07 | 0.12 | 0.25 | 0.17 | 0.43 | — |
| P/B Ratio | 0.07 | 0.05 | 0.09 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.10 | 0.25 | 0.40 | 0.32 | 1.41 | — |
| P/FCF | — | 0.18 | 1.18 | 0.13 | — | 0.31 | — | — | 0.48 | 1.47 | — |
| P/OCF | 0.21 | 0.16 | 0.91 | 0.12 | 3.77 | 0.30 | — | — | 0.47 | 1.44 | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 0.12 | 0.28 | 0.25 | 0.83 | 0.51 | 0.79 | 0.84 | 0.71 | 2.20 | — |
| EV / EBITDA | 1.13 | 0.63 | 1.67 | 1.59 | 16.86 | 1.81 | 5.94 | 3.25 | 2.92 | 24.53 | — |
| EV / EBIT | 0.73 | 0.66 | 2.93 | 2.34 | 7.50 | 2.05 | 11.98 | 3.22 | 2.54 | 25.50 | — |
| EV / FCF | — | 0.46 | 4.79 | 1.26 | — | 2.28 | — | — | 1.97 | 7.47 | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 73.7% | 73.7% | 35.4% | 34.7% | 30.9% | 50.8% | 31.4% | 47.3% | 39.8% | 24.0% | 14.0% |
| Operating Margin | 18.0% | 18.0% | 16.1% | 14.4% | 3.4% | 27.1% | 12.4% | 24.9% | 24.1% | 8.6% | 0.3% |
| Net Profit Margin | 13.0% | 13.0% | 7.8% | 8.2% | 8.4% | 20.6% | 5.1% | 21.7% | 26.1% | 4.4% | -2.7% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 14.4% | 14.4% | 10.8% | 11.6% | 9.8% | 34.3% | 9.8% | 42.9% | 68.1% | 28.0% | -113.5% |
| ROA | 7.2% | 7.2% | 4.8% | 4.6% | 3.7% | 11.3% | 3.0% | 14.5% | 14.5% | 2.0% | -1.9% |
| ROIC | 10.4% | 10.4% | 11.0% | 8.5% | 1.5% | 15.0% | 7.2% | 16.3% | 12.5% | 3.5% | 0.1% |
| ROCE | 13.9% | 13.9% | 19.5% | 17.8% | 3.2% | 32.0% | 16.1% | 37.8% | 57.7% | 36.5% | 2.3% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.49 | 0.57 | 1.07 | 0.95 | 1.69 | 1.26 | 1.28 | 6.38 | 557.47 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 2.02 | 2.02 | 2.20 | 2.72 | 19.18 | 2.39 | 6.06 | 3.06 | 2.83 | 21.96 | 496.64 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | 0.08 | 0.28 | 0.30 | 0.90 | 0.62 | 1.40 | 0.94 | 1.00 | 5.72 | 523.02 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 0.39 | 0.39 | 1.26 | 1.43 | 16.08 | 1.56 | 5.04 | 2.29 | 2.21 | 19.68 | 465.94 |
| Debt / FCF | — | 0.28 | 3.61 | 1.13 | — | 1.97 | — | — | 1.49 | 5.99 | 20.94 |
| Interest Coverage | 9.25 | 9.25 | 151.30 | 27.28 | 19.49 | 44.87 | 9.84 | 70.02 | 92.48 | 6.30 | 0.23 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 4.10 | 4.10 | 1.86 | 1.50 | 1.42 | 1.63 | 1.37 | 1.68 | 1.29 | 0.99 | 0.94 |
| Quick Ratio | 4.10 | 4.10 | 1.86 | 1.50 | 1.42 | 1.63 | 1.37 | 1.68 | 1.29 | 0.99 | 0.94 |
| Cash Ratio | 1.16 | 1.16 | 0.23 | 0.21 | 0.12 | 0.26 | 0.13 | 0.21 | 0.14 | 0.09 | 0.06 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.54 | 0.64 | 0.56 | 0.43 | 0.54 | 0.57 | 0.55 | 0.61 | 0.37 | 0.49 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | 49.0% | 66.0% | 16.7% | 41.0% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | 23.5% | 23.5% | 14.9% | 12.7% | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 100.0% | 280.1% | 112.1% | 344.6% | 232.6% | 296.9% | 46.6% | 88.0% | 150.3% | 10.1% | — |
| FCF Yield | — | 561.8% | 84.8% | 772.6% | — | 317.9% | — | — | 208.4% | 67.8% | — |
| Buyback Yield | 27.2% | 34.8% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 87.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 13.0% | 13.0% | 0.0% | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 76.2% | 100.0% | 16.7% | 41.0% | 87.6% | 0.0% | 0.0% | 13.0% | 13.0% | 0.0% | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $178M | $170M | $180M | $196M | $207M | $206M | $188M | $181M | $172M | $165M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 11 years · Updated daily
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Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying LX stock.
LexinFintech Holdings Ltd.'s current P/E ratio is 0.7x. The historical average is 1.8x. This places it at the 56th percentile of its historical range.
LexinFintech Holdings Ltd.'s current EV/EBITDA is 1.1x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 6.6x.
LexinFintech Holdings Ltd.'s return on equity (ROE) is 14.4%. The historical average is -4.0%.
Based on historical data, LexinFintech Holdings Ltd. is trading at a P/E of 0.7x. This is at the 56th percentile of its historical P/E range. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
LexinFintech Holdings Ltd.'s current dividend yield is 48.98% with a payout ratio of 23.5%.
LexinFintech Holdings Ltd. has 73.7% gross margin and 18.0% operating margin. Operating margin between 10-20% is typical for established companies.
LexinFintech Holdings Ltd.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 2.0x, indicating moderate leverage. A ratio between 2-4x is manageable but warrants monitoring.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Credit cost pressure on earnings
Deep Discount Reflects Earnings Doubt
Based on reported figures, LX trades at a P/B of 0.07 and a P/E of 0.48, a level that implies the market assigns little durable value to current book equity given that ROE has fallen to 0.8% in 2026Q2.
A P/B near 0.07 sits far below any reasonable benchmark for a lender with positive equity, and the peer set shows QFIN at 0.21 and FINV at 0.31, suggesting the discount is partly sector-wide but more severe for LX. The P/E of 0.48 looks low only because trailing earnings were inflated in 2025 before provisions rose; investors should monitor whether earnings normalize at a level that justifies any multiple, rather than treating the low multiple as a value signal. The 48.9% dividend yield may reflect a price collapse rather than sustainable distributions, and warrants further investigation before treating it as income.
ROE Collapse Driven by Provisions
As reported in the financial statements, ROE fell from 4.5% in 2025Q2 to 0.8% in 2026Q2, with ROA dropping to 0.4%, indicating that the earnings base has been largely consumed by credit costs rather than margin or cost changes alone.
Decomposing the decline, the fee-heavy revenue mix (non-interest income near 87.5% of revenue) means the return profile depends on fee volume and credit losses, not on a spread business. With equity to assets rising to 0.54, leverage has actually fallen, so the ROE compression is an earnings problem rather than a deleveraging effect. The result suggests profitability quality is weak and that the prior 2025 returns may not be a reliable baseline.
Efficiency Ratio Erodes Operating Leverage
Based on reported figures, the efficiency ratio climbed from roughly 19 to 24 percent through 2024 and 2025 to 62.8% in 2026Q2, while NIM held near 1.8% suggesting cost base is not scaling down with revenue.
The jump in efficiency ratio reflects a change in the cost-to-income relationship rather than a clean improvement in operating discipline, and the earlier low readings should be treated with caution given the shift in revenue composition. NIM at 1.8% is thin for a lender and offers little cushion if funding costs or yields move. Investors should monitor whether management can bring expenses back in line with a shrinking revenue base.
Equity Cushion Rises Without CET1 Visibility
According to reported figures, equity to assets rose to 0.54 in 2026Q2 from 0.43 in 2024Q1, which supports loss absorption on the surface, but CET1, Tier 1, and total capital ratios are not supplied in the data.
A rising equity-to-assets ratio alongside a shrinking asset base implies capital is being retained rather than deployed, which may strengthen the buffer against further provisions. However, without regulatory capital ratios the true capacity to absorb losses cannot be confirmed against minimums. Investors should monitor disclosed CET1 levels before drawing conclusions about capital return capacity.
Provisions Rising Into Credit Stress
As reported in the financial statements, loan loss provisions climbed to $997.0M in 2026Q2 from $826.8M in 2025Q4, consuming a large share of revenue and suggesting elevated credit stress in the loan book.
Provisions near $1.0B against total revenue of roughly $3.2B represent a very large credit cost load, and the sequential rise points to deteriorating rather than stabilizing asset quality. NPL, charge-off, and coverage data are not supplied, so reserve adequacy cannot be directly tested. This warrants further investigation into whether current reserves are sufficient for the trend in loss provisioning.
P/B Misleads on Shrinking Book Value
The most commonly misapplied metric here is P/B, which appears low at 0.07 but may overstate value if tangible book value is eroding and earnings do not recover to support ROTCE above the cost of equity.
A low P/B for a lender is often read as cheap, yet it obscures whether the book value itself is credible, since rising equity with falling net income may reflect accounting build rather than earnings. The better adjustment is to compare P/TBV against a sustainable ROTCE, which the data does not supply directly. Investors should not treat the sub-0.1 P/B as evidence of mispricing without evaluating credit loss trajectory.