Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio -1.4x · EV/EBITDA N/A · ROE N/A. (1996–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $235M | $353M | $306M | $295M | $640M | $781M | $389M | $753M | $794M | $871M | $1.4B |
| Enterprise Value | $3.5B | $3.6B | $3.4B | $3.4B | $3.7B | $3.8B | $3.8B | $5.1B | $5.2B | $5.3B | $6.4B |
| P/E Ratio → | -1.44 | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 2.24 | 4.41 | 7.30 | 42.15 | 4.16 | 4.91 | 1.38 | 2.68 | 4.99 | 2.15 | 4.92 |
| P/B Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | 2.61 | 0.90 | 0.70 | 0.61 | 0.44 |
| P/FCF | — | 9.29 | — | — | — | 1.53 | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | 6.19 | 9.29 | — | — | — | 1.53 | — | — | — | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 45.36 | 81.99 | 478.72 | 23.88 | 24.11 | 13.42 | 18.21 | 32.89 | 13.03 | 22.00 |
| EV / EBITDA | — | 226.80 | — | — | 114.91 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | — | 226.80 | — | — | 114.91 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | 95.50 | — | — | — | 7.52 | — | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 15.0% | 15.0% | -347.6% | -2500.0% | 70.1% | -123.9% | -91.5% | 10.0% | 47.8% | -74.3% | 10.0% |
| Operating Margin | -226.3% | -226.3% | -1050.0% | -6914.3% | -96.1% | -279.9% | -205.0% | -127.0% | -186.2% | -163.2% | -117.3% |
| Net Profit Margin | -221.3% | -221.3% | -1057.1% | -6957.1% | -131.8% | -279.9% | -205.0% | -127.8% | -186.2% | -396.3% | -117.0% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | — | — | — | — | — | — | -117.0% | -36.4% | -23.2% | -68.8% | -9.7% |
| ROA | -8.5% | -8.5% | -18.6% | -16.3% | -5.0% | -8.5% | -8.9% | -4.7% | -3.4% | -15.9% | -2.6% |
| ROIC | -12.9% | -12.9% | -26.8% | -20.3% | -4.5% | -10.6% | -9.9% | -5.0% | -3.9% | -7.1% | -2.6% |
| ROCE | -12.4% | -12.4% | -18.5% | -19.0% | -3.9% | -8.5% | -8.9% | -4.7% | -3.5% | -6.9% | -2.7% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | — | — | — | — | — | — | 23.91 | 5.30 | 4.17 | 3.19 | 1.58 |
| Debt / EBITDA | 209.19 | 209.19 | — | — | 96.97 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | — | — | — | — | — | 22.79 | 5.20 | 3.92 | 3.09 | 1.52 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | 204.75 | 204.75 | — | — | 94.91 | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Debt / FCF | — | 86.21 | — | — | — | 5.98 | — | — | — | — | — |
| Interest Coverage | 0.08 | 0.08 | -1.11 | -1.29 | 0.18 | -1.46 | -1.54 | -0.26 | -0.01 | -1.43 | -0.53 |
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 2.69 | 2.69 | — | 0.94 | 5.82 | 1388.33 | 383.25 | 87.82 | 43.09 | 2.74 | 1.06 |
| Quick Ratio | 2.69 | 2.69 | — | 5.30 | 7.47 | 2057.67 | 383.25 | 128.63 | 60.57 | 29.29 | 11.59 |
| Cash Ratio | 2.43 | 2.43 | — | 3.65 | 5.14 | 897.00 | 225.50 | 55.43 | 29.61 | 18.76 | 7.81 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.05 | 0.03 | 0.05 | 0.04 | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.03 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | 100.0% | — | 7.7% | — | — | 14.1% | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 | FY 2018 | FY 2017 | FY 2016 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | — | 10.8% | — | — | — | 65.3% | — | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 3.0% | 2.0% | 1.3% | 12.9% | 0.5% | 0.1% | 51.5% | 14.1% | 5.5% | 37.9% | 7.6% |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 3.0% | 2.0% | 1.3% | 100.0% | 0.5% | 7.8% | 51.5% | 14.1% | 19.6% | 37.9% | 7.6% |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $49M | $47M | $48M | $50M | $49M | $59M | $81M | $89M | $119M | $133M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 30 years · Updated daily
Live VCP patterns, Cup & Handle overlays, support/resistance, and AI trade plans.
High-probability breakout stocks crossing their pivot across 5 pattern engines.
DCF models, multiple analysis, and analyst estimates.
10-year return with dividends reinvested.
Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying MBI stock.
MBIA Inc.'s current P/E ratio is -1.4x. The historical average is 14.8x.
Based on historical data, MBIA Inc. is trading at a P/E of -1.4x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
MBIA Inc. has 15.0% gross margin and -226.3% operating margin.
MBIA Inc.'s Debt/EBITDA ratio is 209.2x, indicating high leverage. A ratio above 4x may signal elevated financial risk.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
Deepening negative equity deficit
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Book Value Discount Renders P/B Unusable
MBIA trades at roughly 0.36x price-to-sales with a negative price-to-book of -46.18x per the latest reported figures, meaning conventional insurance valuation anchors collapse as the equity base has gone negative; per MBIA's quarterly disclosures, book value per share stood at an implied deficit in every quarter since 2024Q1, worsening to -46.18 by 2026Q2.
The negative P/B trajectory from -36.80 in 2024Q1 to -46.18 in 2026Q2 implies the market assigns the equity deficit no incremental weight as the share price holds near $4.54; effectively, the equity is not a denominator but a claim deficit that market pricing appears to treat as partly non-recoveryable. A negative P/E of -1.26 says the same thing from the earnings side: losses are large relative to market capitalization, so the multiple inverts. The apparent disconnect — a shrinking deficit that should theoretically narrow the discount to intrinsic value if recoveries land — suggests investors should monitor the actual recovery trajectory on legacy structured finance exposures rather than the multiple itself, which conveys no tradable signal at these levels.
Combined Ratio Figures Contradict Loss Load
MBIA's disclosed combined ratios range from 146.7% in 2025Q3 to 2.6% in 2026Q2, yet the 2.6% reading sits far below that same quarter's 70.4% loss ratio and 188.9% expense ratio, an arithmetic inconsistency that makes the reported metric unusable as an underwriting profitability signal.
A loss ratio of 70.4% plus an expense ratio of 188.9% cannot mathematically produce a 2.6% combined ratio under any standard definition, suggesting the reported metric reflects a net-recovery or non-standard calculation specific to monoline guarantee accounting rather than true underwriting margin. Historical readings of -12.5% and 3.5% loss ratios in 2026Q1 and 2025Q4 reinforce that claims experience is dominated by negative claims, i.e., prior-year reserve releases, not organic loss relief. The most telling cross-check is the income statement pattern: $19 million of claims against $27 million of revenue in 2026Q2 still produced a -$43 million operating loss, implying material costs the combined ratio never captures. Analysts should disregard the headline combined ratio and instead track operating losses relative to revenue as the truer underwriting health metric.
ROA Bleeds Despite Reserve Releases
MBIA's return on assets has been negative in every quarter for the trailing two years, with ROA of -2.3% in 2026Q2 versus -10.7% in 2024Q2, per MBIA's quarterly filings; despite periodic reserve releases, no underwriting profit engine or investment income base exists to generate positive returns on the $2.0 billion asset base.
Because ROE is unreported — and negative equity makes it meaningless anyway — ROA becomes the operative return metric, and its persistent negativity confirms the balance sheet generates no earnings irrespective of how reserves are re-estimated. The near-static $1.0 million investment portfolio means there is no float-generated investment income cushion, the traditional ROE driver for insurers, leaving the entity entirely dependent on guarantee call recoveries and legacy asset monetization for any positive earnings. The narrowing of the ROA deficit from -10.7% to the -2% to -3% range appears to reflect scale effects from asset shrinkage rather than operational improvement, and investors should treat this as trajectory of a wound-down balance sheet rather than a recovery.
Premium-to-Surplus Inapplicable at Deficit Equity
Premium-to-surplus leverage cannot be computed for MBIA given the -$2.3 billion equity deficit as of 2026Q2, per reported balance sheet figures, meaning the conventional rating-agency leverage framework for specialty insurers has no valid denominator and regulatory capital adequacy, not market leverage, governs the credit profile.
With total assets of roughly $2.0 billion against $4.3 billion in liabilities, statutory solvency capacity appears to rest on collateral structures and reinsurance recoverables rather than a shareholders' equity cushion, a materially different capitalization model than investment-grade monoline peers. The deepening deficit each year from -$1.7 billion in 2024Q1 to -$2.3 billion in 2026Q2 suggests leverage to statutory capital is effectively infinite on an equity basis, though precise measurement requires statutory filings not present in this dataset. The absence of disclosed debt-to-equity or interest coverage for most quarters is consistent with a capital structure where debt service is discretionary or immaterial relative to reserve obligations; analysts should weight reserve adequacy disclosures over conventional leverage ratios here.
Peer Multiple Gap Reflects Franchise Erosion
Against Assured Guaranty's 0.60x price-to-book and 6.2% ROE, MBIA's -46.18x P/B and negative profitability represent the weakest position in the monoline peer set, while Ambac's 0.24x P/B and -68% ROE demonstrate that distressed comparables can trade below tangible value when franchise viability is in question.
The peer comparison clarifies that market discounting in this sector is calibrated to franchise durability: AGO's modest 0.60x book multiple reflects stabilized underwriting and positive returns, whereas MBIA's inability to generate a meaningful positive book value removes it from that anchor entirely. Ambac's -68% ROE alongside MBIA's unreported ROE suggests the distressed cohort's return metrics are dominated by episodic charges rather than recurring economics, so relative multiple analysis within the group is limited in explanatory power. The gap between MBIA's ~$4.54 share price and its negative book value implies the market is pricing an option on recovery of legacy exposures rather than the insurance franchise, and any premium to peers' distressed multiples would warrant scrutiny of the recovery assumptions embedded in that price.
Combined Ratio Misleads on Guarantee Carriers
The ratio most commonly misapplied to MBIA is the combined ratio, which for structured-finance guarantee writers swings from 146.7% to 2.6% within four quarters and routinely fails arithmetic coherence with its own loss and expense components, obscuring rather than revealing underwriting economics.
The combined ratio assumes a standardized claims-and-expense framework suited to short-tail property-casualty writers; for a legacy MBS and structured-finance guarantor, negative claims from reserve releases and episodic calls produce readings that cannot be compared to any peer or historical norm. Instead, analysts should anchor on operating loss relative to revenue and quarterly claims cash volatility, which show a near dollar-for-dollar translation from accrual losses to cash drain across the ten-quarter window and expose the structural deficit the headline combined ratio conceals. The residual blind spot is reserve adequacy on legacy exposures: because the $4.3 billion liability base has barely moved despite volatile claims activity, any future adverse development would be the single largest driver of equity deterioration, and no publicly disclosed ratio captures that risk in real time.