Latest Ratios: P/E Ratio 12.7x · EV/EBITDA 4.2x · ROE 13.2%. (2019–2025 historical series)
Price-based multiples — how expensive the stock is relative to earnings, sales, book value, and cash flow
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Market Cap | $590M | $1.0B | $1.0B | $1.1B | $678M | $1.0B | — | — |
| Enterprise Value | $491M | $930M | $992M | $1.0B | $607M | $890M | — | — |
| P/E Ratio → | 12.66 | 21.17 | 34.10 | — | — | — | — | — |
| P/S Ratio | 0.71 | 1.23 | 1.53 | 1.89 | 1.26 | 2.76 | — | — |
| P/B Ratio | 1.64 | 2.75 | 2.88 | 3.08 | 1.98 | 4.05 | — | — |
| P/FCF | 4.53 | 7.89 | 14.74 | 26.50 | — | — | — | — |
| P/OCF | 4.48 | 7.81 | 14.62 | 15.66 | 27.11 | 144.85 | — | — |
P/E links to full P/E history page with 30-year chart
Enterprise-value multiples — capital-structure-neutral measures of total business value
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| EV / Revenue | — | 1.11 | 1.44 | 1.73 | 1.13 | 2.35 | — | — |
| EV / EBITDA | 4.24 | 8.02 | 17.16 | 20.04 | 33.70 | — | — | — |
| EV / EBIT | 7.06 | 13.36 | 174.03 | 146.23 | — | — | — | — |
| EV / FCF | — | 7.14 | 13.93 | 24.37 | — | — | — | — |
Margins and return-on-capital ratios measuring operating efficiency
Full margin charts and quarterly trend are on the Earnings History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gross Margin | 92.4% | 92.4% | 90.8% | 91.0% | 92.6% | 92.5% | 91.3% | 92.9% |
| Operating Margin | 8.3% | 8.3% | 1.4% | 0.6% | -3.5% | -10.3% | 0.8% | 12.4% |
| Net Profit Margin | 5.8% | 5.8% | 4.4% | -2.0% | -1.9% | -11.2% | 2.2% | 10.6% |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ROE | 13.2% | 13.2% | 8.3% | -3.3% | -3.4% | -25.0% | 11.7% | 302.5% |
| ROA | 10.8% | 10.8% | 7.1% | -2.8% | -2.6% | -13.7% | 2.7% | 16.7% |
| ROIC | 14.0% | 14.0% | 1.9% | 0.7% | -4.5% | -14.6% | 1.5% | 37.1% |
| ROCE | 18.1% | 18.1% | 2.5% | 1.0% | -5.8% | -14.7% | 1.1% | 24.1% |
Solvency and debt-coverage ratios — lower is generally safer
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debt / Equity | — | — | 0.02 | 0.03 | 0.04 | 0.06 | 0.55 | 6.17 |
| Debt / EBITDA | — | — | 0.15 | 0.19 | 0.71 | — | 2.65 | 1.31 |
| Net Debt / Equity | — | -0.26 | -0.16 | -0.25 | -0.21 | -0.59 | -0.46 | -2.27 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA | -0.85 | -0.85 | -0.99 | -1.75 | -3.96 | — | -2.25 | -0.48 |
| Debt / FCF | — | -0.75 | -0.81 | -2.13 | — | — | — | -1.10 |
| Interest Coverage | 116.00 | 116.00 | 8.14 | 8.88 | -7.00 | -28.00 | 1.82 | 26.36 |
Net cash position: cash ($98M) exceeds total debt ($0)
Short-term solvency ratios and asset-utilisation metrics
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Current Ratio | 3.45 | 3.45 | 3.27 | 5.32 | 2.61 | 3.69 | 5.39 | 4.01 |
| Quick Ratio | 3.45 | 3.45 | 3.27 | 5.32 | 2.61 | 3.69 | 5.39 | 4.01 |
| Cash Ratio | 1.39 | 1.39 | 1.10 | 2.69 | 1.16 | 2.55 | 3.48 | 2.51 |
| Asset Turnover | — | 1.81 | 1.57 | 1.43 | 1.27 | 1.04 | 0.96 | 1.58 |
| Inventory Turnover | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Days Sales Outstanding | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
Earnings, FCF, buyback, and dividend yields — total returns to shareholders
Full dividend history and growth charts are on the Dividend History page
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dividend Yield | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Payout Ratio | — | — | — | — | — | — | — | — |
| Metric | TTM | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | FY 2023 | FY 2022 | FY 2021 | FY 2020 | FY 2019 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Earnings Yield | 7.9% | 4.7% | 2.9% | — | — | — | — | — |
| FCF Yield | 22.1% | 12.7% | 6.8% | 3.8% | — | — | — | — |
| Buyback Yield | 11.9% | 6.8% | 7.6% | 1.8% | 0.0% | 1.2% | — | — |
| Total Shareholder Yield | 11.9% | 6.8% | 7.6% | 1.8% | 0.0% | 1.2% | — | — |
| Shares Outstanding | — | $76M | $79M | $77M | $71M | $67M | $66M | $66M |
Includes 30+ ratios · 7 years · Updated daily
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10-year return with dividends reinvested.
Compare growth, multiples, and margins vs sector.
Quick answers to the most common questions about buying NRDS stock.
NerdWallet, Inc.'s current P/E ratio is 12.7x. The historical average is 27.6x.
NerdWallet, Inc.'s current EV/EBITDA is 4.2x. This enterprise value multiple compares the company's total value (equity + debt - cash) to its EBITDA. The historical average is 19.7x.
NerdWallet, Inc.'s return on equity (ROE) is 13.2%. The historical average is 43.4%.
Based on historical data, NerdWallet, Inc. is trading at a P/E of 12.7x. Compare with industry peers and growth rates for a complete picture.
NerdWallet, Inc. has 92.4% gross margin and 8.3% operating margin.
Key Metrics
Top Statement Risk
EPS miss and investment pivot
Metrics are mathematically derived from official filings.
Market Prices Cyclical Lead-Gen
NRDS trades at 1.99x book and 10.81x forward earnings, a discount to peers like QuinStreet's 4.90x book, reflecting skepticism about growth durability, per current market data.
The forward P/E of 10.81 implies the market expects earnings to recover from the depressed 2026Q2 level, but the P/B of 1.99 is below the 10-quarter average of ~4.8, suggesting a de-rating. This valuation appears to price NRDS as a cyclical lead-generator rather than a high-growth tech platform, consistent with its dependence on partner credit cycles. The PEG of 0.30, if growth sustains, would indicate undervaluation, but the wide EPS miss raises questions about earnings quality.
ROE Volatility Masks Core Economics
ROE swung from 11.2% in 2024Q4 to 1.3% in 2026Q2, with the latest quarter's decline driven by a sharp rise in the efficiency ratio to 89.7%, as reported in financial statements.
The DuPont decomposition shows that with NIM effectively zero and fee income at 99.8% of revenue, profitability hinges entirely on asset utilization and cost control. The efficiency ratio deterioration from 76.9% in 2025Q3 to 89.7% in 2026Q2 indicates that operating expenses are growing faster than revenue, compressing margins. This suggests the investment pivot is intentionally sacrificing near-term profitability for multi-year growth, but investors should monitor whether the efficiency ratio stabilizes above 85%.
Efficiency Ratio Signals Cost Pressure
Net interest margin is negligible at 0.1%, while the efficiency ratio worsened to 89.7% in 2026Q2 from 76.9% a year earlier, indicating rising costs relative to revenue, per reported figures.
With NIM essentially zero, NRDS's profitability is not interest-rate driven but rather dependent on transactional fees. The efficiency ratio trend is concerning: it has deteriorated for three consecutive quarters, reaching 89.7%, which implies that for every dollar of revenue, nearly 90 cents is consumed by operating expenses. This may reflect increased marketing spend to defend organic search traffic against AI-driven changes, but it also highlights the fragility of the business model if revenue growth decelerates.
Equity Cushion Thins as Buybacks Persist
Equity-to-assets ratio slipped to 0.78 in 2026Q2 from 0.82 a year earlier, while share repurchases totaled $88.8M over the last two quarters, according to cash flow data.
Although NRDS is not a regulated bank, the equity-to-assets ratio provides a measure of balance sheet strength. The decline from 0.82 to 0.78, combined with aggressive buybacks ($22.8M in 2026Q2 and $66.0M in 2026Q1), suggests management is prioritizing capital return over retaining a larger cash buffer. This is a deliberate choice, but it reduces financial flexibility at a time when cash balances have fallen from $120.6M to $62.0M, which could constrain future investment if revenue growth stalls.
No Loan Book, But Partner Risk Looms
NRDS holds no loan portfolio, so credit risk is indirect; however, provision expenses of $13-18M quarterly appear to be marketing or partner-related costs, as per financial statements.
The absence of a loan book means traditional asset quality metrics like NPL ratios are not applicable. Instead, the key credit risk is the financial health of partner institutions that pay for leads. If tightening credit standards reduce approval rates, revenue could decline even if traffic remains stable. The provision line item, which is not a true provision, may reflect revenue share adjustments or partner incentives, and its stability suggests no immediate deterioration, but investors should monitor partner concentration.
Valuation Gap vs. Peers Reflects Cyclicality
NRDS's P/B of 1.99 is below QuinStreet's 4.90 but above LendingTree's 1.60, while its forward P/E of 10.81 is lower than peers, indicating the market discounts its growth, per peer data.
Compared to LendingTree, NRDS has a higher P/B but a lower P/E, suggesting the market views NRDS as having better earnings stability but less asset intensity. QuinStreet's high P/B reflects its higher ROE (27.7%) and net margin (0.4%), though its P/E of 254 is distorted by low earnings. NRDS's ROE of 1.3% in 2026Q2 is far below peers, but this is likely cyclical; if the efficiency ratio normalizes, ROE could recover. The gap may be structural if NRDS's organic traffic moat erodes.
P/E Misleads Due to Earnings Volatility
The most misapplied ratio for NRDS is P/E, as earnings are highly volatile due to marketing spend swings and stock-based compensation, obscuring underlying cash generation, per reported data.
P/E is commonly used for banks, but for NRDS, it is misleading because earnings are subject to significant non-cash charges (SBC) and discretionary marketing expenses that can be dialed up or down. The trailing P/E of 15.38 and forward P/E of 10.81 imply a recovery, but the wide EPS miss ($0.07 vs. $0.34) shows how fragile earnings are. Instead, investors should focus on price-to-sales (0.86) or EV/EBITDA, which better capture the underlying cash-generating potential of the platform, and adjust for SBC to assess true earnings power.